

Ascom Operation

Loyte, P. J.



HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
632nd TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
A.P.O. 72

FOW/cls

6 December 1944

Subject: Report after Action, (Ascom) Leyte, Philippine Island Operation

To : Commanding Officer, 632nd Tank Destroyer Battalion

1. In compliance with V.O.C.O. herewith enclosed is chronological report after action of this organization for period 23 September 1944 to 30 November 1944, (Ascom) Leyte, Philippine Island Operation.

Incl: Report after Action.



FRED C. WELSH,
Captain, F.A.,
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
632nd TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
A.P.O. 72

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6 December 1944

Report After Action: 23 September 1944 to 30 November 1944

1. Name of Operation: (Ascom) Leyte, Philippine Island Operation.
2. Nature of Operation: Support of Ascom Task Force.
3. Mission:

1. Tank Destroyer
2. Supporting Artillery

4. Composition: Headquarters Company 632nd Tank Destroyer Battalion:

C.P. Group

5 Officers
34 Enlisted Men

Roster of C.P. Officers

Captain Theo W. Jordan	01166523
1st Lt. Emil C. Rassman	01823484
1st Lt. Randolph V. Foster	0451595
1st Lt. Donald J. Stickler	0359582
2nd Lt. Michael B. Miner	01824067

Rear Echelon

7 Officers
68 Enlisted Men

Roster of Rear Echelon Officers

Captain Fred C. Welsh	0413757
Captain John M. Thompson	0914067
1st Lt. Robert H. Storts	0373018
1st Lt. Oliver M. Tucker	0359458
2nd Lt. Wendell T. Blevins	01822769
WOJG Joseph J. Krystowiak	W-2107041
WOJG Robert M. Goldenstedt	W-2107089

5. Character of Hostile Operations: Both enemy air and ground opposition. Little ground opposition for this organization.

Fred C. Welsh
FRED C. WELSH,
Captain, F.A.,
Commanding.

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Report after Action, (Ascom) Lcys, Milne Bay Island Operation

- 23 September 1944- This company was located at Aitape, New Guinea in a semi-permanent camp site. Company strength was 3 Officers and 112 Enlisted men with one officer on special duty with Reconnaissance Company and nine enlisted men on furlough. Principal duties of the organization was service company for the Battalion and a light training program was in operation. Enemy air and ground activity was nil. Morale in the company was high. Daily ration strength at end of month was 122 rations.
- 30 September 1944- This period was spent preparing for an operation and sectional work replaced all training. All equipment checked and replaced, crates and lettering accomplished, and all preparations for movement accomplished. Articles of War were read to all Enlisted Men on the 9th of October 1944.
- 1 October 1944 - This period was spent preparing for an operation and sectional work replaced all training. All equipment checked and replaced, crates and lettering accomplished, and all preparations for movement accomplished. Articles of War were read to all Enlisted Men on the 9th of October 1944.
- 9 October 1944 - This period was spent preparing for an operation and sectional work replaced all training. All equipment checked and replaced, crates and lettering accomplished, and all preparations for movement accomplished. Articles of War were read to all Enlisted Men on the 9th of October 1944.
- 10 October 1944- We broke camp at 0930I and moved by vehicle to the docks and commenced loading operations. Company was split up with all Command Post personnel attached to "A" Company and the rear echelon to "C" Company. Strength was 5 Officers and 60 Enlisted Men. Loading of our ship L.S.T. 459, ceased at 2300I, 11 October 1944 due to ramp failure. Company bedded down in native shacks for that night and on 12 October 1944, L.S.T. 459 left for Hollandia, New Guinea for repairs. Ship returned at 2230I and loading was resumed. On 13 October 1944 at 0100I loading was completed and we sailed out of Aitape, New Guinea bound for Hollandia, New Guinea to join the convoy. Under forced draft we arrived at Hollandia at 1130I and joined the convoy. Convoy left Hollandia harbor at 1515I for Ascom Operation.
- 14 October 1944- Company was aboard ship during this period. Orientation lecture and care and cleaning of equipment occupied most of the time. Food was excellent and morale high. Training program was completed on 19 October 1944 and everyone ready for the landing operation.
- 19 October 1944- Company was aboard ship during this period. Orientation lecture and care and cleaning of equipment occupied most of the time. Food was excellent and morale high. Training program was completed on 19 October 1944 and everyone ready for the landing operation.
- 20 October 1944- D-day. We had an air raid at 0645I and all observed the naval action until time to beach. Ship attempted to beach at 1105I but failed due to a sand bar. Enemy fire was falling in the area and we returned to San Pedro Bay for anchorage. There were two air raids at 1700I but no enemy action against our ship and no casualties.
- 21 October 1944- Company unloaded into LCT's from LST 459 at 0930I and we headed for Red Beach with 1st load landing there at 1000I. Battalion organized and moved to an assembly area south of Red Beach. 10-1 rations were utilized and men ate with their sections. A perimeter was organized in the afternoon. Numerous air raids throughout the day, usually early morning and at dusk but no casualties.
- 22 October 1944- Company remained in same area and prepared for operations.
- 23 October 1944- Three air raids at 0605I, 1330I, and 2005I but no casualties. Command Post group moved out on 23 October 1944 and rear echelon assembled in same area. One air raid at 1215I, no casualties.
- 24 October 1944- Fairly heavy air raid at 0615I, five planes observed going down in flames. Small air raids at 1205I and 1815I, no casualties.

Report after Action, (Ascom) Leyte, Philippine Island Operation
Continued.

- 25 October 1944- Rear echelon received its first actual fire when a Jap patrol broke through Artillery perimeter at 0200I. 13 Enemy killed in immediate area. No casualties. Heavy air raids at 0815I, two enemy bombers shot down. Light air raids at 1300I, 1405I, 1600I, 1630I, 1700I, 1800I and 2330I. No casualties. Artillery moved out and rear echelon established a perimeter tying in with other units. Sniper fire only throughout the night with no casualties in the Rear Echelon. Two casualties in C.P. group by sniper fire. Men evacuated to hospitals.
- 26 October 1944- Same location, company operating as Battalion service organization. Seven air raids throughout the day, no casualties in our area.
- 27 October 1944- Rear Echelon moved 1.3 miles to outskirts of Palo and set up perimeter there. Twelve air raids at dawn and dusk, no casualties. Usual company operations during this period.
- 28 October 1944-
- 29 October 1944- Rear Echelon moved 9 miles N.W. to city of Alangalang and established camp near the church utilizing a house to set up Personnel Section and Kitchen. Four air alerts, no bombing observed. Sniper fire nearby throughout the nites but none in our area.
- 30 October 1944-
- 31 October 1944- Usual company functions with one air raid at 0600I. Vehicles strafed by plane but no casualties. Six air alerts between 1800I and 2400I. Month closed with company strength 10 Officers and 109 Enlisted Men. Kitchen served a daily ration of 87 Enlisted Men in rear echelon component.
- 1 November 1944- Usual company duties with all sections operating efficiently.
- 6 November 1944- Numerous air alerts throughout this period but no bombings or casualties. Plane strafed area on 3 November at 0615I, no casualties. An enemy plane shot down by friendly Ack Ack unit near our area on 4 November 1944. On 6 November 1944 company prepared for movement on following day.
- 7 November 1944- Rear Echelon moved to Carigara at 0715I, a distance of 16 miles and established camp in an abandoned church yard.
- 15 November 1944- Supplies were placed in under shelter and Personnel Section set up for operations. Move completed same day at 1400I. Usual company functions. On 10 November 1944, 1 Enlisted Man was missing in action from forward C.P., later found in a hospital as amnesia victim. Numerous air alerts, no enemy action observed during this period.
- 18 November 1944- One air raid at 2000I on 16 November 1944, two bombs dropped and strafing observed. No casualties. Numerous air alerts throughout this period usually early morning and late afternoon, no casualties. Two Enlisted Men L.W.A. on 20 November 1944 at 1500I, not hospitalized. Company strength was 11 Officers and 104 Enlisted Men. Usual function as service company.
- 24 November 1944- Numerous air raids, no bombs dropped and no strafing.
- 26 November 1944-
- 27 November 1944- Two bombing and strafing attacks at 2325I and 2400I. About 14 bombs released in three sectors near our area but no casualties suffered. Usual company functions.
- 28 November 1944-

Report after Action, (Ascom) Leyte, Philippine Island Operation
Continued.

29 November 1944- Usual functions during this period. Air raids both nights
30 November 1944- and bombs dropped in near vicinity with no casualties.
Month closed with a company strength of 10 Officers and
104 Enlisted Men. Company readied to reorganize in a
Battalion Assembly Area. Morale was still high and discipline
good. Plans drawn up for future operation included deficiencies
noted during the previous operation.

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HEADQUARTERS
632d TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
APO 72

27 December 1944

REPORT AFTER ACTION
For Period 23 September to 30 November 1944

MAPS:

- 1. Special Map, Central Philippines, Sheet 3.
- 2. do do Villaba, Sheet F
- 3. do do Ormoc, Sheet E
- 4. do do Capoccan, Sheet A
- 5. do do Lake Danao, Sheet D
- 6. do do Carigara, Sheet 1
- 7. do do Dagami, Sheet 3
- 8. do do Tacloban, Sheet 2
- 9a. do do Tolosa NW, Sheet 4644 - III - NW
- 9b. do do Basey SW, Sheet 4644 - IV - SW
- 9c. do do Dagami NE, Sheet 4544 - II - NE
- 9d. do do Kabalawan SE, Sheet 4544 - I - SE

1. NAME AND NATURE OF OPERATION:

a. Name: ASCOM Task Force.

b. Code names used:

- | | |
|----------------------------|---------|
| (1) GHQ | Jockey |
| (2) Sixth Army | Warfare |
| (3) X Corps | Dover |
| (4) 24th Inf. Div. | Danger |
| (5) 32d Inf. Div. | Ramrod |
| (6) 1st Cavalry Div. | Saber |
| (7) 19th Regt., 24th Div. | Dandy |
| (8) 34th Regt., 24th Div. | Dragon |
| (9) 126th Regt., 32d Div. | Relay |
| (10) 127th Regt., 32d Div. | Record |
| (11) 128th Regt., 32d Div. | Razor |
| (12) 32d Div. Arty. | Relax |
| (13) 632d T.D. Bn. | Rover |

c. Nature of operation:

- (1) Seizure and occupation of Leyte Island, P.I.

2. MISSIONS:

a. This Battalion (less Co. B reinforced with 2d Reconnaissance Platoon attached) was initially assigned the following detailed missions, under 24th Division Landing Team control in Division Reserve:

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- (1) Assist the securing of the initial beach-head by direct fire.
- (2) Defend and protect the initial beach-head from tank or mechanized attack.
- (3) Assist the assault on Hill 522 by direct fire.
- (4) Assist the assault on Palo by direct fire.
- (5) Defend and protect the A-Day Objective from tank or mechanized attack.
- (6) Defend assembly or bivouac areas from day or night attack.
- (7) Assist the defense of the initial beach-head from enemy sea-borne attacks under direction of the Perimeter Defense Commander.

b. Execution of (1), (2), and (3) cited herein above were precluded as the battalion was unable to effect landing on A-Day due to shallow LST beach approaches. Disembarkation was accomplished on A Plus 1. Battalion was prepared to: a. Assist in mopping up rear areas. b. Assist in capture of Hills B and C successively. c. Furnish anti-tank protection to West and South of Palo. While the Battalion was not relieved of the above missions, the battalion less B Co. less 1 Reconnaissance Platoon was subsequently committed to the support of the ASCOM Force by various attachments to units and commands of that force. Due to this attachment of elements of the battalion, the battalion did not function as a complete unit; Battalion Headquarters Command Group functioned as a special staff to the 24th Infantry Division from 21 October to 13 November and with the 32d Infantry Division from 14 November to 30 November 1944, acting in an advisory capacity and as a clearing house for attachments and detachments of its elements to various commands. In addition, the Battalion Headquarters provided for the security of the 32d Infantry Division Command Post with unattached Tank Destroyer elements together with elements of other commands from 19 to 30 November and co-ordinated the supply, maintenance and administrative activities of the battalion. In general this battalion was assigned the following missions in support of the ASCOM Force:

- (1) Support the elements of the ASCOM Force by direct fire.
- (2) Engagement with enemy armor.
- (3) Long range indirect laying missions.
- (4) Provide mechanized security for wire laying crews.
- (5) Provide mechanized Beach Patrols.

c. In general, B Co. was assigned the following missions: On 23 October furnished mounted patrol to Road Junction (1353.3-1362.3) to reconnoiter reported Jeep constructed road to determine length, condition and amount of work necessary to render it passable. During period 24 October to 20 November the company occupied perimeter of 12th Cavalry on Hill 1300 and established listening posts. On 20 November provided a garrison of 1 Officer and 24 Enlisted Men at town of Santa Fe and patrolled vicinity. On 22 November provided a wire patrol from San Miguel to Lukay and were to contact and destroy enemy in the area. On 26 November one platoon reinforced artillery indirect fire mission.

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3. IDENTITY OF FORCE:

- a. The 632d Tank Destroyer Battalion.
- b. The Battalion Strength during the operation was 34 Officers, 2 Warrant Officers, and 604 Enlisted Men.
- c. For Roster of Officers and strength of command by organization, see Supporting Document File.

4. CHARACTER OF HOSTILE OPPOSITION:

- a. The enemy tried to destroy our forces in every way within his power, including local counterattacks. He employed his air force, navy, air borne units and sent in numerous convoys of replacements. The enemy took up a series of defensive positions using the terrain to its best advantage. Each defensive position was defended strongly, using rear guards and delaying actions when he took up his next position. His resistance was stiff and determined throughout the operation. Snipers and infiltration parties operated widely; use was made of artillery to support his forces as well as to harass our troops. His artillery was not massed and single pieces were often located in caves making observation difficult. Our air strips were frequently bombed during dark and counterbattery was fired on our artillery. Little use was made of his armor. No armored attacks in force were made and his tanks were not aggressive. Little use was made of land mines along roads but anti-personnel were used in native houses at various times. No use of gas was made.
- b. This unit was subjected to snipers, infiltration parties, harassing artillery fire and air attacks but did not encounter enemy ground forces in strength.

5. SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED:

- a. Lack of enemy armor and unfavorable terrain conditions has made it impossible to execute our primary mission, i.e.--destruction of enemy armored vehicles.
- b. Direct support missions in general, were not satisfactory from our viewpoint. Again, terrain limitations restricted our movement to roads from which we could not maneuver, thereby decreasing our field of fire and preventing the use of shock action and maximum fire power. It is believed, however, that in some instances, much more effective direct support could have been given had the Infantry Commanders requested recommendations as to employment, and information as to the limitations and capabilities of the M-10s from our platoon and company commanders.
- c. Indirect fire support was requested on only one occasion and was executed by one company to the 19th Infantry. Again, it is believed that more use could have been made of our elements in reinforcing the fires of the Division Artillery. 48

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d. The tendency of Infantry to "bunch" around an M-10 or a tank should be discouraged as it caused many needless casualties.

e. Recommendations for present and future employment:

(1) It is recommended that a Tank Destroyer unit should be in reserve of the Commanding Headquarters in whose zone of action it is to operate, thus preserving the integrity of the unit. This makes available to all elements of the Tank Destroyer unit its trained Maintenance, Supply, Communications and Administrative personnel and facilities in addition to the following tactical advantages:

(a) It more readily permits mass employment on such missions as Tank Destruction, Beach Defense or reinforcing of artillery fires anywhere within the higher headquarters zone of action or boundary.

(b) Direct Support Missions, such as destruction of field fortifications by fire or other direct fire artillery support can then be accomplished by the Tank Destroyers for all elements of the higher command rather than for one subordinate element.

(c) The additional burden of tactical supply and administration is not placed on a subordinate element of the command but becomes the direct responsibility of the Tank Destroyer unit.

(d) This precludes the commitment of a Tank Destroyer force too inadequate or too large to perform the mission required and yet makes the remaining Tank Destroyers available to other elements of the command on call.

(e) When the Tank Destroyer mission has been completed, the Tank Destroyer elements in direct support revert to Tank Destroyer unit control and are then immediately available to some other unit.

(f) The artillery characteristics of a Tank Destroyer unit can be used to better advantage when a larger area is available for firing positions; oftentimes artillery support cannot be given within a battalion or RCT zone of action.

f. Successful direct support of Infantry by Tank Destroyer elements requires complete understanding by Tank Destroyer commanders of the Infantry plan; direct liaison and communications with the supported unit so that location of enemy machinegun or gun positions can be transmitted to the Tank Destroyers thus insuring quick destruction. The open turret of the M-10 renders it very vulnerable to sniper fire and grenades, and close Infantry ground support is required to prevent destruction of the M-10 by mines or grenades.

6. SPECIAL DATA OF VALUE:

a. See Supporting Document File for S-4 report for period.

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7. CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE OF EVENTS:

The 632d Tank Destroyer Battalion departed from Aitape, New Guinea, 10 October 1944, and arrived at ASCOM Force rendezvous, Hollandia, 13 October 1944, proceeding therefrom with the ASCOM Force, and arriving at Leyte Island, P.I., morning of 20 October 1944. Attempts to land were repeatedly made during the day but were unsuccessful, shallow water preventing the LSTs from getting close enough to the beach to permit unloading. One LST nearby was damaged by enemy artillery fire during these attempts. B Co. made the landing on schedule on White Beach, 20 October 1944.

20/21 October: The night of 20 October was spent at anchor aboard LSTs 458 and 459. The debarkation of personnel and equipment commenced at 1200I, 21 October, on Red Beach and was completed by 1800I. O6 and O3 reported to 24th Division CP for duty and received orientation on situation. Disposition of Troops: Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Co.: 59.2 - 52.6. A Co.: 59.2 - 52.6. B Co.: Vicinity of Tacloban with 1st Cavalry Division. C Co.: 59.2 - 52.6. Reconnaissance Co.: 59.2 - 52.6.

21/22 October: O6 received orders from DANGER 3 to be prepared to (1) Assist in mopping up rear area; (2) assist in capture of Hill B by 19th RCT and (3) Furnish anti-tank protection West and South of Palo. The 3d Platoon of Reconnaissance Co., conducted route reconnaissance from assembly area to Palo. O6 received orders from DANGER 3 to support 19th RCT. 1st Platoon of C Co. was ordered to support 19th RCT but was unable to do so because of poor and impassable road conditions. At 1320I the battalion, less one platoon of C Co., moved to new bivouac area. C Co. was assigned to the 3d Battalion, 34th RCT and moved to Palo. Disposition of Troops: Battalion Headquarters: 58.1 - 52.6. Headquarters Co.: 59.2 - 52.6. A Co.: 59.2 - 52.6. B Co.: Vicinity of Tacloban, 1st Cavalry Division. C Co.: Palo. Reconnaissance Co.: 58.1 - 52.6.

22/23 October: A reconnaissance squad from Reconnaissance Co., with radio communication, was sent to Hill 522 to act as Observation Post. At 1500I, 1,000 Japs were reported at Jaro. Co. A attached to 34th RCT with one platoon in direct support South of Pawing. O39 reported to O6 that C Co. knocked out five Jap pillboxes and killed 30 Japs, supporting 19th RCT. From this date on during the operation, company commanders maintained personal liaison with commanding officers of supported units. Disposition of Troops: Battalion Headquarters: 57.5 - 51.9. Headquarters Co.: 59.2 - 52.6. A Co.: Co. Headquarters, 1st and 3d Platoons: 57.5 - 51.9; 2d Platoon under control of 34th RCT, South of Pawing. B Co.: Attached to 1st Cavalry Division, Tacloban. C Co.: Attached to 19th RCT, Palo. Reconnaissance Co.: 57.5 - 51.9.

23/24 October: O6 inspected 2d Platoon of Co. A, forward with the 34th RCT at Pawing. Orders were received from Headquarters X Corps, to post 24-hour Cossack Post along Highway 1. Cossack Post was recalled later this same day because of small arms fire received from friendly troops. Approximately 300 natives were brought into Battalion Perimeter for night, sheltered from enemy fire. Disposition of Troops: No change. 50

24/25 October: Orders were issued by O6 that Battalion will be prepared to operate South of Palo River, with one company in direct support of 19th RCT and one company in support of 34th RCT. Field Order No. 3 received from DANGER. One man from Headquarters Co. was wounded by sniper fire in Palo. Disposition of Troops: No change.

25/26 October: 06 and 03 inspected one platoon of Co. C being held in reserve at Palo. The 2d Platoon of Co. A accomplished mission in support of 34th RCT. The DANGER Command Post is located at 56.4 - 52.2. 039 reported one man wounded in support of 34th RCT. The battalion reconnaissance patrols are working out of Castilla in all directions. One man, from Headquarters Co., was wounded by sniper fire within Command Post perimeter. Disposition of Troops: Battalion Headquarters: 56.5 - 52.1. Headquarters Co.: Palo. A Co.: Company Headquarters, 1st and 3d Platoons: 56.5 - 52.1; 2d Platoon with 34th RCT. B Co.: 1st Cavalry Division, Tacloban. C Co., less one platoon: Castilla, with 19th RCT, one platoon Mobile Reserve, Palo. Reconnaissance Co.: 56.5 - 52.1.

26/27 October: Tacloban airstrip commenced operations today. 02 made reconnaissance of two bridges between Palo and Santa Fe, reporting both bridges serviceable. One man, Co. A, was wounded by sniper fire within perimeter. 03 alerted Battalion for move to Santa Fe. Disposition of Troops: No change.

27/28 October: Company Commanders received instructions that Filipinos would not be permitted to carry firearms without written authority from DANGER. Disposition of Troops: Battalion Headquarters: Vicinity of Alangalang, 39.3 - 55.8. Headquarters Company: Palo. A Co., less one platoon: Vicinity of Alangalang; 2d Platoon, no change. B Co.: No change. C Co.: Vicinity of Alangalang. Reconnaissance Co.: Vicinity of Alangalang.

28/29 October: One platoon of Co. A accompanied Co. C, 603d Tank Co., in support of 3d Battalion, 34th RCT attack on Jaro. 1st Platoon, A Co., assisted in destroying machinegun nest between Galtan and Jaro. Headquarters Co. Rear Echelon moved to Alangalang. Disposition of Troops: Headquarters Company: Alangalang. Remainder of battalion: No change.

29/30 October: Road from Alangalang to Santa Fe to Pastrana was reconnoitered by 3d Platoon of Reconnaissance Co. 06 reported to 34th RCT and ordered A Co. to move to Jaro. At 1120I 06 reported Jap tanks firing on our troops West of Jaro. Later report from 06 that fire received by our troops, West of Jaro, was from 37mm. self-propelled weapons and not tanks. A platoon of Co. C was dispatched to transport Co. D, 185th Chemical Unit, through sniper areas. A Co. reported to 34th RCT and was prepared for one platoon to support the 3d Battalion, with the remainder of the company held in reserve. Disposition of Troops: A Co.: Vicinity of Jaro. Remainder of battalion: No change.

30/31 October: Co. A ordered to continue in direct support of 34th RCT. The battalion moved to a position of readiness, vicinity of Jaro, as Division Reserve. C Co. was prepared to reinforce A Co. and the 19th Infantry as directed. Disposition of Troops: A Co.: with 34th RCT. B Co.: No change. Remainder of Battalion: Vicinity of Jaro.

31 October/1 November: A Co. remained in direct support of 34th RCT. Rest of battalion in Division Reserve. A Co. furnished one platoon to follow assault of 2d Battalion, 34th RCT, with balance of company in Regimental Reserve. Platoon was engaged against enemy machineguns and results were undetermined, but three enemy machineguns were silenced. Disposition of Troops: No change. 51

1/2 November: Received Field Order No. 4, Headquarters DANGER, dated 1 November 1944. A Co. was committed in direct support of DANGER in attack on

Carigara. Battalion (less B and C Companies) moved to vicinity of Tunga. Disposition of Troops: A Co.: Carigara. B Co.: No change. Remainder of Battalion: Vicinity of Tunga.

2/3 November: C Co. reported killing two Japs near their Command Post. A patrol from C Co. was ambushed 1 mile from Tunga. Six Japs were reported killed and one light machinegun captured. The patrol suffered no casualties. C Co. moved to Jaro and fired indirect interdiction fire throughout night on mountain pass West of Jaro. Disposition of Troops: A Co.: Vicinity of Carigara. B Co.: No change. C Co.: Vicinity of Jaro. Remainder of Battalion: 28.1 - 61.2.

3/4 November: C Co. was relieved of fire mission with 19th RCT at Jaro. Disposition of Troops: No change.

4/5 November: Field Order No. 6, DANGER, 4 November 1944, received at Battalion Command Post. A thorough cleaning and inspection of all ammunition was conducted. O6 and O3 reconnoitered area around Carigara River and Pinampoan, for likely positions for coastal defense in the event of a sea-borne attack. Disposition of Troops: No change.

5/6 November: With permission of DANGER 3, the Battalion moved to new area 3 miles West of pontoon bridge West of Carigara. From this newly selected location the Battalion was prepared to occupy previously determined areas for beach defense. C Co. was attached to 21st RCT and moved to vicinity of Pinampoan, keeping one platoon in position of readiness in rear of assault elements. O29 returned from hospital to duty. Three new Officers reported for duty from 5th Replacement Depot and were assigned. Disposition of Troops: Headquarters Co.: Carigara. B Co.: No change. Co. C; Pinampoan. Remainder of Battalion: 17.8 - 67.3.

6/7 November: The Battalion Rear Echelon is located in abandoned church in Carigara. One section Co. C was employed delivering area fire against snipers and automatic weapons not definitely located. Disposition of Troops: C Co.: Pinampoan. Remainder of Battalion: No change.

7/8 November: One section Co. C engaged the enemy South of Pinampoan, and was able to hold the Infantry position, evacuate wounded, while the Infantry regrouped their forces. Disposition of Troops: No change.

8/9 November: Companies spent the day in care and cleaning of equipment and maintenance of vehicles. Disposition of Troops: No change.

9/10 November: DANGER reported that 14 LVTs would be operating in Capocan area during the night. Beach defense elements of Battalion were cautioned not to fire. Disposition of Troops: No change.

10/11 November: The day was allotted to care and maintenance of all wheeled and track vehicles. A report on the activities of Co. C was submitted to DOVER 3. The Carigara bridge was closed to all traffic and roads were reported to be in poor condition due to heavy rains. Disposition of Troops: No change. 52

11/12 November: One platoon of Co. C moved to support the 3d Battalion, 21st RCT, assault. Heavy automatic weapons fire was encountered and many pill-boxes could not be fired upon due to conditions of local terrain. Town of Limon

was now under artillery fire and C Co. was alerted for possible fire mission against Limon. Disposition of Troops: No change.

12/13 November: One platoon of Co. C moved to position 06.6 - 67.3 to give direct fire support to the assault on Limon. Due to the condition of roads the platoon was unable to proceed with the 21st Infantry Regiment. O2 and one platoon of Reconnaissance Co. conducted reconnaissance in the vicinity of Jaro for possible trail leading to Ormoc Valley with negative results. Disposition of Troops: No change.

13/14 November: Companies spent day in care and maintenance of 37mm. and 3" weapons and reviewed indirect fire technique. Disposition of Troops: No change.

14/15 November: Companies conducted indirect fire training during the day. Camouflage of area was improved. Effective at 2000I the Battalion, less A and B Companies, were attached to RAMROD. A Co remained attached to DANGER and B Co. to SABER. B Co. moved from Tacloban to vicinity of Tunga. Disposition of Troops: B Co.: Vicinity of Tunga. Remainder of Battalion: No change.

15/16 November: Field Order No. 9, Headquarters RAMROD, 15 November 1944, and Field Order No. 14, DOVER, 15 November 1944, received by Battalion. C Co. attached to RAZOR. RAMROD in bivouac at Pinampoan. Disposition of Troops: Battalion Headquarters: Attached RAMROD, West of Carigara. Headquarters Co.: Carigara Township. A Co.: Attached to DANGER West of Carigara Township. B Co.: Attached to SABER, East of Tunga. C Co.: Attached to RAZOR. Reconnaissance Co.: Attached RAMROD, West of Carigara.

16/17 November: Filed Order No. 15, DOVER Headquarters, 16 November 1944, relieved Battalion of beach defense responsibility. With the approval of RAMROD 3, the Battalion, less the firing companies, moved to new assembly area in vicinity of Colasian Pt. Upon arrival in new area Battalion was under estimated 77mm. enemy artillery fire with approximately 8 rounds received in vicinity of Command Post. Disposition of Troops: Battalion Headquarters and Reconnaissance Co.: Colasian Pt., 09.8 - 68.8. Remainder of Battalion: No change.

17/18 November: A total of 33 rounds of enemy artillery fire fell in vicinity of Command Post, with most of the rounds falling into the sea approximately 100 yards from our position. O6 left for hospital and O3 then assumed command. At this time Battalion was alerted for move to new assembly area. Seven rounds of enemy artillery fire were received West of new assembly position. Disposition of Troops: Battalion Headquarters and Reconnaissance Co.: Vicinity of Balug, 16.0 - 66.9. Remainder of Battalion: No change.

18/19 November: O3 returned from meeting with RAMROD 3 and alerted Battalion (less Companies A, B, C) to prepare for movement to RAMROD Command Post area. O39 conducted a thorough reconnaissance of the area beyond Pinampoan and reported the restricted conditions of roads precluded employment. Disposition of Troops: No change. 53

19/20 November: Battalion (less Companies A, B, C, less 1 Reconnaissance Platoon) moved to RAMROD Command Post area, occupying position at 14.1 - 66.5 and there relieved Co. I, RELAY, of responsibility for Division Perimeter security. Reconnaissance Co. outposted ridge line generally to South of Division Perimeter.

Where the situation permitted, daily officer orientation meetings were conducted by O3. RAMROD 3 desired elements of Battalion to attempt destruction of enemy road blocks believed to be imposed between Pinampoan and Colasian Pt., and approval was secured to send one section of Co. C M-10s down road toward road block and two Half-Tracks from Battalion Headquarters Command Group to proceed up the road with mission of converging on road block. As it developed, execution of this plan was not possible. The M-10s became stuck in the road. This was a constant problem to all elements of the Command. Due to heavy rainfall roads seldom could support our weight, and maneuvers off roads was generally prohibited by restricted nature of terrain. The two Half-Tracks meanwhile met concentrated automatic weapons fire from the enemy astride the road in the vicinity of Capoccan and O2 died of wounds received. Four enlisted men in the Half-Track with O2 received superficial wounds, and the Half-Tracks returned to Battalion Command Post. The results were reported to RAMROD 3. VOOG DOVER, dated 20 November 1944, relieved Co. A of attachment with DANGER and attached the company to RAMROD. Co. A moved to position in vicinity of RAMROD Command Post. Disposition of Troops: Battalion, less Companies B and C, located at 14.1 - 66.5. Co. C, attached to RAZOR remains in vicinity of Pinampoan. Co. B attached SABER.

20/21 November: Two Co. A Half-Tracks were dispatched by RAMROD 10 with mission of protecting a wire laying party operating in Colasian Pt. area. One section of Co. A M-10s attempted move to Colasian Pt. to support elements of RELAY but were not able to effect this, due to impassable condition of both road and beach. Disposition of Troops: No change.

21/22 November: TMD No. 103, WARFARE Headquarters, received by Battalion but information from DOVER 3 indicated the Battalion would continue present missions until relieved. One section of Co. A M-10s was posted as security for RAMROD QM Emergency Ration Dump, which was located in RAMROD Command Post area. Two ineffective rounds of enemy artillery received in area during day. Following report received: RAMROD 2 Report No. 5 dated 21 November 1944. Disposition of Troops: No change.

22/23 November: Employment of Co. C on direct or indirect fire missions in support of RAZOR was anticipated today, but again condition of roads prevented achievement. Co. A Half-Tracks returned from mission of protecting wire laying personnel with enemy documents and ordnance, and reported killing 16 enemy. Documents, ordnance and report after action were rendered RAMROD 3 by this Headquarters. Disposition of Troops: No change.

23/24 November: Battalion was credited with destroying one enemy airplane, and in assisting in destruction of another. Sporadic and ineffective enemy artillery fire received in vicinity of Command Post during day. Disposition of Troops: No change.

24/25 November: Three Red alerts sounded during day without result. Disposition of Troops: No change.

25/ 26 November: Route reconnaissance was initiated by elements of Co. A between Command Post area and Pinampoan. Roads remain impassable. Three Red alerts sounded during period without result. Disposition of Troops: No change. 54

26/27 November: RAMROD 3 alerted Battalion for preparation against possible enemy air-borne attempts and all echelons of command were instructed to

notify RAMROD if any air-borne signals were observed during night. Reconnaissance Co. outposts were reinforced. Three rounds from enemy artillery were received in vicinity of Command Post, with no damage reported. Col. Fanning (06), absent sick since 18 November was evacuated from island. Capt. Marcelle (03) assumed command of Battalion. Capt. Lang relieved of command of Co. B and was appointed acting Battalion Executive Officer (05) and S-3 (03). Lt. Verlander was appointed Commanding Officer of Co. B (029). Disposition of Troops: No change.

27/28 November: Battalion was notified by WARFARE that it will be relieved of present missions on 30 November at which time Battalion will regroup in vicinity of Pastrana. Route reconnaissance of roads from Command Post area to Pastrana was initiated. With roads impassable, rations and mail are now being supplied Battalion by barge. Four Red alerts sounded during period without incident. Two rounds enemy artillery received in vicinity of Command Post with no damage resulting. Disposition of Troops: No change.

28/29 November: Reconnaissance Co. Pioneer Platoon performed repair and maintenance on Capoocan bridge. Three Red alerts during period were sounded without incident. Received RAMROD 2 report No. 12 dated 28 November 1944. Disposition of Troops: No change.

29/30 November: Four Red alerts sounded during period without incident. RAMROD 3 relieved Battalion of RAMROD Command Post Perimeter Security responsibility. Co. C relieved of attachment with RAZOR and rejoined Battalion. VOGG, WARFARE, dated 30 November 1944, relieved Battalion of attachment of RAMROD, and Battalion moved via Carigara to Jaro for regrouping. Disposition of Troops: Battalion at Jaro.

2400I, 30 November 1944, Journal and Narrative closed.

Malvin P. Wang
MALVIN P. WANG,
Major, F.A.,
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS
632d TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
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OFFICERS ROSTER AS OF 20 NOVEMBER 1944

Bn Staff	- Lt Col	HUGH M. FANNING	0274047
	Capt	DAVID A. MARCELLE	0397220
	Capt	FRANCIS E. LANG	0401073
	Capt	THEO W. JORDAN	01166523
	Capt	HAROLD E. BELL	0372043
	Capt	THOMAS E. MOEHN	0425244
	Capt	ROBERT L. MICHALSKI	0502053
	1st Lt	EMIL C. RASSMANN	01823484
Hq Co	- Capt	FRED C. WELSH	0413757
	Capt	JOHN M. THOMPSON	0914067
	1st Lt	ROBERT H. STORIS	0373018
	1st Lt	DONALD J. STICKLER	0359582
	1st Lt	RANDOLPH V. FOSTER	0451595
	1st Lt	OLIVER M. TUCKER	0359450
	2nd Lt	HUBERT S. ROUSH	01686322
A Co	- 1st Lt	ROBERT H. TIDERMAN	0888198
	1st Lt	HARRY A. BEST JR.	0322074
	1st Lt	JAMES A. MC LELLAND	01168371
	1st Lt	KENNETH L. SAVACOOE	0888309
	1st Lt	MILTON J. BOJDAK	01822348
	2nd Lt	HOWARD S. BERTRAM	01686308
C Co	- Capt	JAMES C. SAWYER	0450113
	1st Lt	DENNIS J. ILLIGE	02034680
	1st Lt	NORBERT F. PETERS	0888199
	1st Lt	WILLIAM R. JOLLY	01824866
	2nd Lt	VIRGIL O. MC ELROY	01824063
	2nd Lt	CEAR B. GEORGE	01824849
Ran Co	- Capt	ELDON A. HAASE	0384205
	1st Lt	WILLIAM R. JUNKMAN	0888272
	1st Lt	PASCAL ADAMO	01822972
	1st Lt	CHARLES E. MYERS	01824901
	2nd Lt	JAMES R. FITZSIMONS	01822690
Med Det	- Capt	JOHN J. O'CONNOR	0419061



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STRENGTH REPORT

AS OF 20 NOVEMBER 1944

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
Headquarters	8	0	0
Headquarters Company	7	2	104
Company A	6	0	120
Company C	6	0	125
Reconnaissance Company	5	0	111
Medical Detachment	1	0	16
Total	<u>33</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>476</u>

