

2,632 TD  
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HEADQUARTERS 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Auth: CG 1st Cav Liv  
Init: FK  
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APO 201  
29 November 1944

Annex 1, Intelligence, to FO 14

1. Summary of the situation as of 290600I:

a. Front lines or nearest enemy elements: In the 112th Cav sector only light scattered resistance is being encountered. E of Hwy 2 in the 112th Cav and 126th Inf zone, the 49th Inf Regt and 171st Ind Inf Bn have suffered heavy casualties. They have virtually broken contact and appear to have fallen back toward the Hwy, possibly, however, to prepared defensive positions in the extremely difficult terrain S of Hill 1525.

12th Cav continues to encounter strong resistance on the N peak of what is believed to be MT CATABARAN (1059). Troops in contact indicate that this strongpoint was originally designed to face N and may be the E flank of a prepared line W or WNW to Hwy 2. Evening of 28 Nov, light contact was made between MT CATABARAN and MT CABUNGANGAN (vic 103572) and a possible new Jap position of unknown size was reported near supply line between CATABARAN and (162603).

SW of MT CATABARAN (1059), patrols have been able to penetrate to within 250 yds of the Hwy, but increased enemy outposts E of the Hwy are reported.

On the front of the 5th Cav there has been no formed enemy opposition, except for a small force of platoon or light company strength encountered on Hill 582, 22-23 Nov, and not since located. The 41st Inf Regt and 169th Ind Inf Bn which were to hold the MT PIRA-Hill 582 line apparently were not able to reorganize from their initial defeat between JARO and CARIGARA in time to accomplish their mission before we had seized that ground. Only scattered contacts with individuals and small groups of these units have been made.

b. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention: The KANANGA-LUNOY area continues to be a "hot box" of enemy activity. Enemy forces here include probably most of the 1st Inf Regt, which has been in reserve, and possibly the new 364th Ind Inf Bn which is shown on a captured map to be in that area, but is known to be understrength and deficient in training; also Engr and Arty troops. Captured Intelligence Notes from the 102d Div, dated 22-25 Nov, state that the 1st Inf was to move N to reinforce the 57th Inf. However, movement of an estimated enemy Bn S along the Hwy in the vic of LUNOY (0558) was observed afternoon 28 Nov so that all of the displacement is definitely not to the N. There are known defensive positions in depth along the Hwy between LUNOY and KANANGA. From the standpoint of terrain the defile between (0660) and KANANGA is the logical area for concentration of troops against attack from the N.

The area of HILL (a prox between coordinates 1050 and 1250) has taken new prominence in the past few days. A captured

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b. (continued)

Field Order and Intelligence Notes of the 102d Div, 22-25 Nov, appear to indicate that this Div has an advance command post at RIZAL. Guerrilla reports have indicated that 1500-2500 troops are at RIZAL, that the Japanese were moving supplies to RIZAL, and that a trail leads from RIZAL to the vic of MT PINA. Recent civilian evacuees from RIZAL place enemy strength as high as 5000, which is probably exaggerated. Patrols have not yet been able to locate the trail between MT PINA to RIZAL. However, a patrol of the 302d Rcn Tr 23-24 Nov encountered enemy patrols screening the high ground SE of RIZAL. Some of the forces at RIZAL definitely are remnants of the 41st Inf Regt and 169th Ind Inf Bn, many of which according to natives have no arms or clothing. At the same time captured documents referred to above state that the 10th Co of the 1st Inf Regt and the 364th Ind Inf Bn are to be sent to reinforce the 41st Inf near MT PINA, and the arrival of the 102d Div advance CP at RIZAL suggest the possibility that other elms of the Div have been brought, or may be brought, to this sector.

2. The following are essential elements of information for the Div:
- a. Where is the main strength of the enemy's force E of Hwy 2, from (0662) to LIBUNGAO, including Hwy 2? Are they preparing for offensive or defensive action? What is their strength and direction of movement? What is their identity?
  - b. What is the nature and extent of enemy activity with particular attention to defensive preparations at the following locations:
    - (1) The defile between (0660) and MT AN.
    - (2) Between (1059) and (0660)?
  - c. Is the enemy able to launch an offensive E and NE from vic LOROY or LIBUNGAO? If so, when, by what routes, and with what forces?
  - d. What are the locations and conditions of trails E from Hwy 2 (BORBONG-LIBUNGAO) into the mtns?
  - e. What is the size, location, activity and routes of communication of enemy elements in the areas:
    - (1) E of Hwy 2, between BORBONG and MT CATABLAN to HILL 2048 and CILAYANGAN?
    - (2) From vic HILL to MT PINA-HILL 4013'-HILL 562 meters?
  - f. Where is the enemy's arty located? What calibre? How much?
  - g. Will the enemy infiltrate through our forward elements in small groups either to harass our lines of communication or to assemble at a definite point and launch an attack on our rear? Are there enemy pockets hidden in the mtns between CILAYAN, CATABLAN, PINA, and Hill 283 meters which could assist this course?
  - h. Will the enemy use airborne troops? If so, when, where, and in what strength?

Following specific tasks and observ missions are assigned:

- a. 1st Bn:
  - (1) Continue close-in recon. Mission and to include recon;

c. a. (1) (continued)

maintain continuous observation of KANINGA and LILUNGA/O areas along Hwy 2. Particular attention to movement NE or E from KANINGA.

- (2) Reconnoiter E from MT CATABALAN (1059) to Hwy 2 vic (0600). Special attn to enemy movements NE or SW across this line and possible enemy defensive positions to the W of MT CATABALAN; also to routes of approach to CATABALAN W from Hwy 2 vic (0600).
  - (3) Ascertain strength and disposition of the enemy in the vicinity of KIZAL by conducting at least 1 close-in rcn and establishing forward obsvn. Press vigorous rcn in area MT PINA-Hill 2426-Hill 4047-Hill 582 (meters) to locate any enemy present and ascertain routes of possible hostile infiltration from the SE.
  - (4) Continue counter-rcn screen of high ground Hill 4047-MT MUBAN. Maintain close contact with adjacent elms of 24th Div on MT LARO.
  - (5) Patrol I from vic Hill 2346 and MT CATABALAN to make contact with 112th Cav.
- b. 112th Cav RCT: Patrol vigorously to the S and SW of SINAYANAL to locate any enemy forces between forward elms of 112th Cav and 1st Sq 112th Cav within its zone of action. Particular attn to trails leading E from Hwy 2 into area TONBONCON-MT CATABALAN (1059) within the 112th Cav zone.
- c. Div Arty: Reports as directed in FO #11, Annex 1. Particular attn to be given to determining nature of terrain and enemy activity W of MT CATABALAN to Hwy 2 and between KIZAL and MT PINA.
- d. 302d Rcn Tr (-1 plat atchd to 2d BCT):
- (1) Provide 3, 8-man patrols to make contact between forward elms 112th Cav and 126th Inf, on the NW, and between 112th Cav and 12th Cav on Hill 2346 or MT MUBAN. Operate under direction 112th Cav RCT, until mission complete.
  - (2) Continue local security patrols in assigned zone.
  - (3) Be prepared for special long range rcn missions as directed by CP.
- e. 2d BCT: Continue present patrol plan. Report immediately, followed by detailed report, any indications of enemy reinforcement of BMDR.
- x. All units: Refer FO #11, Annex 1, par 3 x.

Command of Major General MUDGE:

CHARLES A. SEALOCK,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Chief of Staff.


Official:

Warrant,

1 Incl:

Overlay of enemy situation.

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**ENEMY SITUATION**  
 as of 290600I  
 Map: Sheet "A", 1:50,000  
 OAC of S, G 2  
 HQ 1ST CAV DIV  
 Incl 1 to Annex 1  
 FO. 14

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