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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON**

Opn In France - 636th Tank Destroyer Bn



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Oct 44

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS 636th TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
Office of the Battalion Commander

APO 758, U. S. Army
3 November 1944

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Records.

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 758, U. S. Army

1. Pursuant to instructions contained in Letter, Allied Force Headquarters, dated 20 April 1943, file AG 314.7/389 O-M, Subject: Historical Records and Histories of Organizations, transmitted herewith Operations in France, October 1944 of this Battalion.

2. Conclusions:

It is believed that the TD is of little value to the infantry as a close support weapon when the infantry is working in a heavily wooded area. The enemy usually reacts swiftly with artillery and mortar fire when he sees or hears the armor attempt to push forward. Progress is necessarily slow for the bulky TD's, their field of fire negligible, and their open turret makes it possible for mortar fire to land on the inside of the mount. Tree bursts from both mortar and artillery fire are also highly effective against personnel comprising the crew. In a situation such as this it is recommended that the TD's available to that particular portion of the infantry be either assembled on the edge of the woods in a ready position, where they can move forward in bounds, or allowed to take up indirect fire positions where they can support the infantry attack by artillery fire. Experience in combat over a period of time has proven that crew members lose their individual initiative and aggressiveness when they are subjected to heavy fire of any nature for days at a time when they themselves have no opportunity, or are in no position, to fire back. Therefore it is recommended that whenever possible the TD Company Commander or Platoon Commander be consulted as to the selection of positions. Normally he can select positions from which the TD's can give the maximum amount of support.

Based on experience it is believed that in most situations the mission of guarding a flank is a proper mission for an organic TD battalion, or at least a TD battalion less one or possibly two gun companies. The number of gun companies is dependent upon the terrain and distance to be covered, whether the situation is fast moving or stable, and whether or not an armored counterattack is an enemy capability.


The tank destroyer battalion is so organized with its highly mobile

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reconnaissance company and the self-propelled destroyer companies that it is capable of moving to the desired flank with a minimum amount of confusion and loss of time. The three reconnaissance platoons of Reconnaissance Company would be used to maintain patrols (either mounted or foot), establish and man listening posts, OP's, and furnish security for advance TD positions. They also would be used to keep contact with the enemy and maintain liaison with adjoining units. The Pioneer Platoon of Reconnaissance Company is trained and equipped to construct physical road blocks, lay mines and perform other engineer duties. All TD's not used on their primary mission, or held in reserve for primary missions, could take up positions of readiness or indirect fire positions (or both, if possible) where they could provide effective artillery support. One of the principal advantages of using an organic TD battalion for a mission of this type is the efficient communication set up available. There are a sufficient number of radios with trained operators available to set up any size net without any delay whatsoever. This is especially advantageous when an armored counterattack is an enemy capability and time in properly dispersing and coordinating such a flank force is of utmost importance.

It is believed that the school for gunners and drivers conducted by the First Armored Group will be invaluable in training crew members for the TD's. The problem of having skilled personnel on hand to replace casualties has become increasingly difficult - the School should help alleviate that condition. The ideal situation would be for the School to receive replacements from the depot and have them trained prior to the time they are assigned to a unit.



EDWARD PURDY
Lt Colonel, Inf.
Commanding

- 1 Incl:
Narrative of operations for the month
of October 1944, with attached annexes.

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HEADQUARTERS 636th TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
APO 758 U. S. Army

3 November 1944

OPERATIONS IN FRANCE, OCTOBER 1944

The Purdy Blocking Force, formed 30 September 1944, was given the mission of blocking the Vologne River west of Lépanges and keeping pressure on the enemy in that sector. An additional mission was to maintain contact with elements of the 45th Infantry Division on the left flank and the 141st RCT, 36th Division on the right flank. The Blocking Force consisted of Company B, 636th TD Battalion, Company B, 753d Tank Battalion, Company B, 111th Engineers (less one platoon) and the 36th Reconnaissance Troop.

By mid-morning the Battalion Command Group had moved to a previously selected CP site in DOCELLES, V-165500, where close liaison, as well as wire communications, were maintained with the Battalion's forward elements and with the attached units that comprised the Purdy Blocking Force.

The Battalion Commander and Executive Officer reconnoitered and selected positions in the vicinity of LEPANGES that would be suitable installations to enable the Blocking Force to accomplish the mission that had been assigned by the Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division. After making detailed reconnaissance of the LEPANGES sector, the Battalion Commander and Executive Officer returned to the Battalion CP, where the Battalion Commander issued his order to the CO's of the attached units, giving the details concerning the mission, the sector to be defended, organization of the ground, preparations to extend positions and an orientation of enemy troop dispositions.

All elements of the Purdy Blocking Force assembled in DEYCIMONT, V-193528, and at 1200 hours started movement to their positions in the vicinity of LEPANGES. About mid-afternoon it was reported that all of the Blocking Force had been positioned so as to repel any enemy resistance that might occur in the sector. Three strongly defended road blocks were established in the vicinity of the town, Road Block No. 1 being at V-217-542, No. 2 at V-208545 and No. 3 at V-190547. All of these installations were well fortified with armor, its pieces so placed as to protect the flanks and the avenues of approach into the positions. Listening Posts were established to the front of the road blocks where the engineers emplaced a net work of mines and booby traps as an added protection for the posts. Two Company "B" destroyers were in direct fire positions on Road Block No. 1, while four others were in concealed indirect fire positions in the vicinity of DEYCIMONT, vicinity of V-193533. The remainder of the Company was in reserve south of the town.

Wire communications were so set up that the Battalion Commander, from his DOCELLES CP could converse with personnel at the most distant Listening Post. Through this excellent set up the S-3 received hourly reports from the Listening Posts regarding the situation existing in their sectors.

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Patrols were active to the flanks and front, feeling out the enemy and learning the types and conditions of roads, including effects of the inclement weather. One patrol upon reaching FAYS, found the town clear of enemy, so a listening post was established to enable the Battalion Commander to keep abreast with the situation in the vicinity of FAYS.

During the day the Company "C" destroyers supported elements of the 141st RCT in its drive on Hill 609, V-2252. After receiving intense enemy SA, mortar and SP fire, the destroyers and infantry troops were forced to withdraw to PREY, V-2253, at 1900 hours.

The Company "A" destroyers assisted the 142d RCT in clearing the enemy from a road block in the vicinity of V-226454. As this mission was being accomplished, SP fire was received from another road block at V-242445. A number of the Company "A" destroyers were set up in defensive and anti-tank positions along the main highway running southeast through TENDON.

Throughout the night and during the early morning hours of 2 October, no enemy activity was reported in the sector occupied by the Purdy Blocking Force. Moderate enemy artillery shell fire fell in the areas occupied by other elements of the Battalion. Reconnaissance Company in a reserve status in the 143d RCT sector underwent a heavy enemy mortar and artillery barrage in the vicinity of FAUCOMPIERRE shortly after dawn.

A four-man enemy patrol, while reconnoitering in the vicinity of V-215542, was challenged and made prisoners by the occupants of Road Block No. 2.

During the morning an inspection was made of all road blocks by the Battalion Commander and Commanding Officer, 36th Reconnaissance Troop. They reported that all installations were well established, concealed and ready to intercept any hostile force that might appear.

Through the Battalion's liaison officer with the 141st RCT, and the liaison radio vehicle with the elements of the 179th Infantry, 45th Division, the Battalion Commander was kept well informed of the situation in the neighboring sectors. With this information and through detailed study of available maps and photographs, the Battalion Commander was able to make plans that would accomplish the reconnaissance missions assigned to the Blocking Force.

The tanks and tank destroyers in DEYCEMONT were registered in for indirect fire missions during the morning and through wire communications with Division Artillery, the destroyers were available to that Headquarters as well as the Blocking Force for missions. A forward observer from Division Artillery was assigned to the Force so as to adjust heavy caliber artillery shell fire if it were needed.

Reports were received giving the location of enemy troop dispositions and an OP. The Company "B" indirect pieces placed several effective concentrations on the areas. In addition to the latter, several harassing fire missions were fired for Division Artillery.

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Shortly after sunset harassing enemy artillery shell fire fell in the Purdy Road Block Sector, while enemy artillery shell fire of increasing intensity fell on PREY, V-220517.

At 2316 hours the Division G-3 called the CP and informed the Executive Officer, Major Richard A. Danzi, O-1822375, that he was to command a Task Force which would be attached to the 141st RCT. He was instructed to report to the CO, 141st RCT, for further instructions regarding the Force. The Battalion Commander and Executive Officer immediately left the CP to contact the CO, 141st RCT.

At 030020A October the Battalion Commander and Executive Officer returned to the CP. The Executive Officer stated that his Task Force was to be comprised of Company A, 753d Tank Battalion (less one section), Company C, 636th TD Battalion (less one platoon), Reconnaissance Company, 636th TD Battalion, AT Company, 141st RCT, Company F and one platoon Company G, 141st RCT. Elements of the Force were to assemble in PREY with the infantry arriving about 0600 hours. The Force was to launch its attack at 0700 hours, seizing the objectives within its zone of action. Additional missions were to secure the Division's left flank, block all road nets to the north and northeast, and be prepared to assist in the capturing of HERPLEMONT.

Shortly after dawn, 3 October, an increase in enemy shellfire was reported by all installations of the Purdy Blocking Force in both the LEPANGES and DEYCIMONT areas.

The Danzi Task Force started movement from PREY towards HERPLEMONT, forcing the enemy to exhibit a stronger defensive attitude with SP, heavy artillery, machine gun and mortar shell fire of unabated intensity. During this action the Battalion Executive Officer, Major Richard A. Danzi, O-1822375, was injured by fragments from an enemy artillery shell while leading the infantry elements of the Task Force forward.

Through the Battalion's forward observers that were at the Purdy Blocking Force's forward listening post, counter-battery fires were placed on the enemy artillery pieces that were laying the heavy concentrations on PREY.

At 1321 hours it was learned that Task Force Danzi had penetrated enemy positions east of PREY and had reached V-235535, southwest of FIMENIL. One platoon of Reconnaissance Company had been sent forward to observe the enemy's strength in FIMENIL while another platoon established a road block at V-220538.

The Battalion Commander returned to the CP at 1502 hours and reported that he had conferred with the Division Commander at 1430 hours. The Division Commander had stated that he desired vehicular reconnaissance be made of the sector between the Division's left flank and the southernmost elements of the 45th Division. The purpose of the mission was to ascertain whether or not enemy occupied the area and if possible, its strength.

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Upon receiving those instructions, the Battalion Commander contacted the CO 36th Reconnaissance Troop and directed that reconnaissance be made, either by foot or vehicle, from FAYS to LA VOID DE LA BORDE, and then to VIMENIL, where the patrol should contact elements of the 179th Infantry. The Reconnaissance Platoon that was securing Road Block No. 1 would be used for the mission, with a platoon of Engineers relieving them.

The CO 36th Reconnaissance Troop called the CP at 1932 hours and informed the S-3 that the patrol which went forward to contact the 179th had reached the heavily wooded area north of FAYS at 1211566, but had withdrawn to the vicinity of Road Block No. 2 at darkness and the poor condition of the roads prevented their movement forward.

During the evening the Division Commander called the CP and informed the Battalion Commander that in addition to commanding the Purdy Blocking Force he would assume command of the Danzi Task Force.

The Battalion Commander left the CP and visited the CO 141st RCT with whom he discussed the employment of the Task Force. Upon returning to the CP the Battalion Commander called the company commander of Company "C" and made arrangements for a conference at Company "C's" PREY CP at 040630A October 1944. At that time he, with the infantry commanders, tank officers, CO Reconnaissance Company and CO Company "C" would plan and put into operation the results of a plan of attack on the morning of 4 October. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop continued on its mission of contacting elements of the 179th Infantry and accomplished its mission at 1010 hours.

Reconnaissance Company sent out foot patrols from PREY to contact and feel out the enemy's disposition. One platoon was forced to withdraw after encountering heavy enemy SA fire. Shortly after noon another Reconnaissance Company patrol went forward and returned to PREY at darkness after being pinned down by enemy machine gun fire all afternoon.

The Company "B" destroyers that were in indirect fire positions in the vicinity of DEYCIMONT expended 537 rounds of HE and 26 rounds of smoke on various known dispositions. The Company "C" destroyers, in the vicinity of PREY, expended 55 rounds of HE on enemy personnel in its sector.

During the afternoon the Battalion Command Group moved to LEPANGES so as to better the communication system of the Purdy Blocking and Task Force, as well as enable the Battalion Commander to maintain closer control and coordination of the forces under his command.

At 1632 hours the S-3, 141st RCT called the CP and informed the Battalion Commander that the Division Commander and CO 141st RCT had directed that the Battalion Commander attack and get his armor through to VIMENIL if at all possible. The Battalion Commander contacted the CO Company "C" and gave him orders to send the armor to VIMENIL.

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The CO 141st RCT called the CP at 1751 hours, at which time the Battalion Commander oriented him on the situation existing along the Purdy front. After learning the situation the CO 141st RCT directed that the armored group that had been sent out to take FIMENIL be halted as enemy troops occupied strong installations between our lines and the town. He further directed that two destroyers and tanks be sent to V-250514 to comprise a road block for protecting the flank of the 141st RCT to the east and south. The CO, 1st Battalion, 141 RCT, was to be contacted upon the completion of establishing the road block. The Battalion Commander called the CO Company "C" and instructed him to contact the armored group and have them maintain positions for the night which would enable them to place shell fire north of BEAUMENIL and protection to the RCT's left flank. Company "B" was given the mission of sending two destroyers and two tanks on the road to HOUX, establishing a road block at V-250514, contacting the 1st Battalion 141st RCT, learning its situation and giving them the disposition of the road block.

Throughout this period enemy artillery shell fire of both light and heavy caliber subjected the LEPANGES and PREY areas to intense barrages.

During the night Company "A" fired several harassing missions for Division Artillery. Just before dawn of 5 October 44, OP #1 reported that enemy vehicular traffic could be heard in the vicinity of LAVAL.

Reconnaissance Company and Company "C" set up an observation post so as to direct shell fire on reported enemy positions and engage any effort put forth by the enemy in repulsing our Force's movement forward.

About mid-morning the Division Commander visited the CP and conferred with the Battalion Commander. He stated that he desired that reconnaissance be made to the front and that contact be made with the forward elements of the 179th Infantry on our left flank. The Reconnaissance Troop sent out a foot patrol which later in the day contacted forward elements of the 179th Infantry, 45th Division at V-226592. Before making contact with this friendly force the patrol had to clear enemy road blocks comprised of felled trees at V-209572, V-212576 and V-213580.

As the morning passed, numerous reports were received from the Force's Listening Post and OP's giving the locations of enemy artillery pieces, troop concentrations and installations. Company "B" and Division Artillery placed shell fire on the targets, silencing the artillery pieces and dispersing the troop concentrations. Enemy mortar positions in the vicinity of BLANC CHAMP were silenced after two Company "B" destroyers placed effective direct fire on its position.

At 1615 hours the Purdy Blocking Force and Task Force reverted to the command of the CO 753d Tank Battalion, Lt Colonel Felber. The communication system, plus the Purdy Force Headquarters in LEPANGES, was turned over to the Felber Force. The Battalion's Command Group, which had made up the Purdy

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Force Headquarters, moved to its former CP site in DOCELLES, closing into that area at 1840 hours.

On the sixth of October a memorandum, issued by the Headquarters, 36th Division Artillery, was received at the Battalion CP. The memorandum attached the destroyer companies to designated artillery battalions within the Division Artillery for the purpose of supplementing the fires of the Division Artillery in interdiction and harassing missions. It stated further that when the destroyers were not engaged with the RCT's to whom they were presently attached, the artillery battalions would assume control of them only insofar as advising them in the selection of firing positions and giving them fire missions.

During the morning the S-3's of Division Artillery Battalions visited the CP and conferred with the Battalion Commander on using the destroyers for supplementing their Battalion's artillery fire.

The Company "B" destroyers which were in indirect fire positions in the vicinity of DEYCI MONT, expended 121 rounds of HE between 1300 and 1700 hours on missions assigned by Division Artillery. This fire was observed as it fell on enemy installations, in a wooded area in the vicinity of Hill 512, and the FO reported that its effect was excellent. The same destroyers were assigned harassing missions of firing 540 rounds of HE on plotted targets during the night of 6 October.

At 062200A October the G-3, 36th Division, called the CP and informed the Battalion Commander that the Battalion, less Company "C" and one platoon of Reconnaissance Company, was attached to the 45th Infantry Division for operations. Company "C" and the one Reconnaissance Platoon of Reconnaissance Company would remain with the Felber Task Force.

All elements of this Battalion that were effected by this attachment were notified and directed to start movement to an assembly area in DESTORD as soon as possible. Arrangements were made through Division Artillery for Company "B" to fire its harassing fires of 540 rounds of HE before departing from its DEYCI MONT positions.

Clearance for the movement was obtained from the 36th Division Traffic Control Officer, and shortly thereafter the Battalion less Company "C" and one platoon of Reconnaissance Company started its movement to the 45th Division sector.

The Battalion Command Group closed into its CP site at ST HELENE, V-200663, at 070345A October. Company "A" completed relief of Company "A", 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion, at 0530 hours and occupied positions in the vicinity of RAMBERVILLERS in conjunction with the 157th Infantry. Company "B" relieved Company "C", 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion, at 0530 hours. The 1st platoon was situated at V-225688, while five destroyers were in indirect fire positions at V-173715, and two in firing positions at V-215665. Reconnaissance Company (less one platoon) was relieved by elements of the 111th Engineer Battalion in the 36th Division sector at 0706 hours. Upon arrival in the 45th Division sector the Company relieved elements of the Reconnaissance Company, 645th TD Battalion. One CP was

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established at V-191709, one at V-199739, V-222654 and one at V-217665.

Throughout this period the enemy forces were apparently concentrating on the consolidation of their positions as only scattered SA fire occurred in parts of the front line sector. The enemy situated in the BRU-JEANMONTIL area continued to exhibit great sensitivity, placing mortar and artillery fire on any observed movements.

During the evening of 9 October one platoon of the Company "C" destroyers was relieved of its road block mission with the Felber Force and moved into indirect fire positions at V-183525, to fire harassing missions assigned by the 36th Division Artillery.

On the morning of 10 October a four-man patrol went forward on a patrol with elements of the 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry and established a listening post in the wooded area at V-2368, northwest of AUTREY.

During the period 10-18 October 44, "A", "B" and Reconnaissance Companies remained in the positions they had occupied upon moving into the 45th Division sector. Company "A" continued supporting the 157th Infantry from positions west, northeast and east of Rambervillers. These platoons were so positioned to cover terrain passable for enemy tanks. At all times they were held in readiness, prepared for rapid movement to any area threatened by Hostile armor and counter its movement against friendly dispositions. Two platoons were dug in and camouflaged so as to give direct fire support to the assaulting infantry troops upon request. The company commander of Company "A", while reconnoitering for prospective destroyer positions, in ROVILLE and DONLIERES, contacted the forward elements of the French II Army. He also selected prospective positions on the RAMBERVILLERS-AUTREY road.

As an anti-tank warning service is always essential, one was perfected through the Reconnaissance Company's OP's, liaison with higher headquarters and other ground and air agencies.

The Company "B" destroyers continued to maintain positions in the vicinity of AUTREY. Much time was devoted to the preparation and improvement of its positions and routes of access. Six destroyers in indirect fire positions supplemented the fires of the 158th Artillery Battalion in interdiction and harassing missions, expending 1356 rounds of 3" HE and 56 rounds of 3" Smoke on various enemy targets during the period. From a Company "B" OP in AUTREY frequent reports were received on the enemy's night and day movements between WUILLAUME-FONTAINE, V-239662, and HOUSSEFAS, V-243684. On 151715A October 44 one section of the 3d Platoon moved from its indirect firing positions at V-173715 to V-228647, where they relieved elements of Company "C", 191st Tank Battalion.

Reconnaissance Company continued to man its OP's in the vicinity of RAMBERVILLERS and AUTREY. All locations of observed enemy artillery installations, troop concentrations, etc., were called to the Battalion CP, whereupon arrangements were made to have friendly artillery placed on the dispositions. The enemy continued to strengthen his position, improving his entrenchments and reallocating his troops to more advantageous locations.

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Sharp and close combat was reported all along the front line sector, particularly in the vicinity of FRAMFONTAINE. The OP's on the outskirts of RAMBERVILLERS submitted numerous reports of enemy activity around BRU and JEANMENIL. The majority of hostile movement during 17-18 October was unobserved by the Reconnaissance Company installations as heavy mist and rains curtailed observation of the terrain east of the line BRU-JEANMENIL-WILLAUME-FONTAINE.

At this time enemy artillery shell fire showed a decided increase in activity. The Battalion's elements in the vicinity of RAMBERVILLERS and AUTREY underwent frequent shellings. The Battalion CP in ST HELENE was harassed twice by enemy artillery shell fire.

On October 14 Company "C" was relieved of its attachment to the Felber Force. The 1st Platoon moved into an assembly area at V-213506, prepared to support the 143d RCT upon call. The two remaining destroyer platoons were attached to the 442d RCT and moved into an assembly area in the vicinity of DEYCIMONT. The 2d and 3d Platoons supported the 100th Battalion and the 2d Battalion 442d RCT when they started their attack towards the objective -- BRUYERES, jumping off at 150800A October. The destroyers moved forward through dense wooded areas and over rain-softened terrain, supporting the assaulting troops with direct fire. Often the advance was held up by the enemy's strongly consolidated positions, and local counterattacks, preceded by heavy concentrations of enemy mortar and artillery shell fire.

The enemy resistance grew more severe during the evening of 18 October when the troops were held up at V-235580 by shell fire from the slopes of a hill at V-240582. At 181000A October an attack was launched against fierce enemy opposition and after sharp clashes our infantry occupied and secured Hill 578 and Chateau Hill. Throughout the period 15-19 October 1944 the 1st Platoon, Company "C", supported elements of the 143d RCT in assaults on and the capturing of LAVAL, CHAMP LE DUC and BRUYERES. During its supporting maneuvers the destroyers were contested by extremely heavy SP, mortar and AA fire. During this action Company "C" destroyed an enemy AT gun.

At 191900A October 44 the 2d and 3d Platoons of Company "C" were attached to the Felber Force. The Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division gave the Force the mission of attacking from a designated line of departure, capturing the town of BELMONT, reconnoitering the valley to the north, including the towns of VERVEQUELLE and DOMFAING, blocking to the north and northwest, protecting the northern flank of the Division and maintaining contact with the 442d RCT on the right and the 45th Division on the left. The 1st Platoon of Reconnaissance Company established an OP in the vicinity of BEAUMENIL at V-255535. This CP was used exclusively by the 36th Division Staff, affording them observation of the enemy activity in the Vologne River Valley.

The six indirect fire destroyers of Company "B" continued supplementing the fires of the 158th FA Battalion during the period 10-24 October. Most of the harassing missions were directed on known enemy dispositions in the vicinity of BRU and JEANMENIL.

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The Felber Force's attempts at capturing the town of BELMONT was met with heavy enemy opposition and mined roads. On the 21st October two platoons of Company "C" attached to the Felber Force, plus a force of tanks, succeeded in attacking and liberating the village. At 221400A October the two platoons of Company "C" were relieved of their supporting role with the force and moved into a BRUYERES assembly area as Division reserve.

The 1st Platoon supported the Stack Task Force in its mission of preventing the advance of the enemy, protecting the right flank of the Division and maintaining contact with elements of the French II Corps in the vicinity of JULIENRUPT. The 1st Platoon of Reconnaissance Company, also attached to the force, was employed as a holding force under the control of the 142d RCT. The platoon, plus the I and R Platoon 142d RCT and the 2d Platoon AT Company, 142d RCT, relieved Company "B", 111th Engineers in the vicinity of V-247450.

At first light of 25 October the 1st Platoon of Company "B" supported the 1st Battalion, 157th RCT on its attack to the east from AUTREY, covering the infantry troops advance from previously selected direct fire positions. The 3d Platoon supported the 3d Battalion, 157th when it assaulted the strongly fortified town of HOUSSEFAS, four kilometers northeast of ST HELENE. As all roads were heavily sown with mines, the destroyers supported the infantry's spearheaded attack on the enemy's fiercely defended installations, from direct fire positions on Hill 355. Throughout the attacks the Company "B" indirect pieces fired 438 rounds of HE on various observed targets. During the evening the destroyers of the 1st Platoon moved into HOUSSEFAS, and set up road blocks and defensive positions at V-238686 and V-243686 to counter any enemy opposition that might present itself.

The 3d Platoon of Company "C" went into indirect firing positions on the 26th, and during the night fired harassing missions for the 133d EA Battalion. Upon receiving orders from the Division Commander, the platoon at 271200A October moved to BELMONT and occupied positions from which it might displace forward on call to support the 442d RCT. The 1st Platoon still maintained its support of the 143d RCT with one section in BRUYERES and another in the vicinity of BIFFONTAINE, V-305577. The 2d Platoon assaulted enemy positions with the 100th Battalion in the vicinity of V-331581. While advancing with the infantry through thickly wooded areas, the destroyers underwent heavy enemy mortar barrages. Shell fragments from mortar tree bursts destroyed a radio and other equipment within one destroyer, disabling it to the extent that it had to be withdrawn for repairs.

Two Company "A" destroyers moved out before daylight on the 27th to support elements of the 36th Engineers on its attack towards the town of MENIL. The platoon occupied previously selected positions northeast of RAMBERVILLERS which would enable them to place shellfire forward of the Engineers and curtail any enemy opposition that the friendly forces encountered.

Shortly after noon the Battalion Commander received a call from the

G-3, 45th Infantry Division, directing that he report to the Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division. Upon conferring with the Commanding General the Battalion Commander called the Battalion CP in ST HELENE and informed the S-3 that orders had been received from the Commanding General, VI Corps, attaching the Battalion (less Companies "B" and "C" and the 1st Platoon of Reconnaissance Company) to the 36th Infantry Division. The Company Commanders concerned were contacted and oriented on the move. The Battalion Commander selected assembly areas in the Division sector that would accommodate the elements of the Battalion that had been effected by the Corps order.

Reconnaissance Company (less one platoon) moved to its assembly area in the vicinity of FAUCOMPIERRE. The Company "A" destroyers moved from their battle positions in the vicinity of RAMBERVILLERS to an assembly area near FAYS to await orders of employment from the Division Commander. So as to be on the Division's Axis of Advance, the Battalion Commander moved the Command Group to BRUYERES, V-247573. A liaison officer established himself at the Division CP. Wire and radio communications were quickly set up with the forward elements as well as with the Division CP in LEPANGES.

On 28 October the destroyers of Company "A" moved to indirect fire positions west of FEMINEL, where two six gun batteries were positioned so as to supplement the fires of the 131st FA Battalion. During the period 28-31 October the company expended 2319 rounds of 3" HE on various harassing and interdicting fire missions. Each day the guns were re-registered through direct communication with the Division Artillery Air Observation Plane.

During the same period Company "B" was attached to the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron for supporting its troops on various assigned missions. On 30th October the 1st Platoon supported "A" and "B" Troops in their attack toward the town of MENIL, V-227774. During this action one enemy machine gun nest was silenced by the destroyers supporting fire. The 2d Platoon moved from its indirect positions to a reserve area in the vicinity of RAMBERVILLERS. The 3d Platoon moved into direct fire positions at V-228713, east of JEANMENIL.

During the 31 October the 1st Platoon of Reconnaissance Company was relieved as the holding force at V-249449 and V-249451. After dusk the remaining elements of Reconnaissance Company, two Reconnaissance Platoons and the Pioneer Platoon, relieved Company "K", 142d RCT of its front line positions in the vicinity of V-240470, southwest of REHAUPAL.

Map Reference: France, 1:50,000.

Attached Annexes:

1. Casualty Report
2. Awards and Decorations Report
3. Officers Roster
4. Journal, with supporting Annexes.
5. Overlays.

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