

HEADQUARTERS 636th TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
Office of the Battalion Commander

APO 464, U.S. Army
5 January 1944

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Records

TO : Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, APO 36, U.S. Army.

1. Pursuant to instructions contained in Letter, Allied Force Headquarters, dated 20 April 1943, file AG 314.7/389 C-M, Subject: Historical Records and Histories of Organizations, transmitted herewith Operations in Italy, December 1943 of this Battalion.

2. Conclusions:

a. The action just completed by this organization demonstrates without a doubt the value of the Tank Destroyer as a direct fire Infantry support weapon in the neutralization of pillboxes, machine gun nests and other emplacements. Firing against personnel in houses with delayed fuze high explosive ammunition secures bursts within the buildings and is especially effective. It is also extremely effective against dugouts and caves in the sides of hills. Massed guns in indirect positions can be used with closed sheefs using forward observer methods to traverse and search an area immediately in front of our attacking Infantry. In the action just completed these tactics were employed repeatedly and also proved valuable in breaking up an enemy counter-attack.

Van W. Pyland
VAN W. PYLAND
Lt Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

1 Incl:

Narrative of Operations for the month
of December, with attached annexes

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**HEADQUARTERS 636th TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
APO 464, U. S. Army**

5 January 1944

OPERATIONS IN ITALY, DECEMBER 1943

On the morning of December 1st, the three destroyer companies were in indirect fire positions well forward in the 36th Infantry Division sector. The Division was, at that time, preparing plans for the capture of the Maggiore Hill Mass, the attack to be coordinated with the British 10th Corps, which was planning the capture of Mount Camine and other adjoining terrain features.

The Battalion Commander held a conference with the staff to prepare notes regarding the attack and later in the morning all Company Commanders attended a conference at which our part in the coming operation was explained. Each Company Commander was given a 1:25,000 map of the Mount Camine, Mount Maggiore area and a specially prepared air photograph with enemy installations marked on it together with phase lines of the planned operation. Final instructions were given for the movement of A, B, and C Companies into direct fire positions as shown on the attached over-layer to support the attack of the 142nd Infantry with direct fire. Liaison Officers who were to accompany each Battalion of the 142nd Infantry were given their final instructions at this conference. These officers were to carry radios with the 142nd Infantry Battalions as they made the attack and be prepared to direct fire on any enemy installations that threatened the advance of the Infantry.

During the early hours of the night, Companies A and B moved into the direct fire positions which had been selected, and 1,000 rounds of extra ammunition were delivered to the new positions. Three days extra K rations were also issued, since supply in these forward areas would be difficult. During December 2nd, a new OP was established and the S-2 spent most of the day observing the area over which the attack was to be launched and making notes of points which would be helpful in supporting the Infantry with direct fire. The liaison officers joined the Battalions they were to move forward with, and certain changes were made in the phase lines which our destroyers were to use in shifting their fire. Company C moved to its new direct fire position as shown on the overlay attached and three days extra rations

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and extra ammunition were issued during the night. At 2300 hours, Company B reported the capture of one German prisoner. The prisoner was transferred to the Division prisoner of war inclosure. During the early morning hours of December 3rd, very heavy preparation fires fell on the enemy positions and the attack was launched as scheduled. The planned fires were placed on Mount Maggiore and Mount Lunge, both with three inch guns and .50 cal. machine guns. A considerable amount of counter-battery fire fell on our positions and we requested the Division Artillery to place some concentrations on S. Pietro. At 0900 hours, heavy concentration fell on our Company A position, killing one man and wounding three. One half-track was destroyed, one quarter-ton truck was destroyed and one damaged.

Our Liaison Officers with the 142nd Infantry reported in several times during the day, requesting fires on various houses and terrain objects which were giving the Infantry trouble. Fires were immediately placed on these points. Throughout the day, fires were placed on Mount Lunge and other targets, located by our Battalion OP, when special missions were not being fired in response to requests by the 142nd Infantry. At 2000 hours, Company A reported three of their men wounded and also one of their medical aid men wounded. All of our positions received counter-battery fire during the day and it was especially heavy in the Company A area. Our ammunition expenditure in support of this attack for the twenty-four hour period was as follows:

1. Company "A"	1,100 rounds H.E.	
2. Company "B"	970 rounds H.E.	744 rounds AP
3. Company "C"	1,345 rounds H.E.	

On December 4th, the 142nd Infantry continued clearing the Mount Maggiore Hill Mass which was taken on the previous day and no fire missions were requested during the morning. One of our Liaison Officers returned, but two remained throughout the day. Visibility was very poor and consequently no missions could be fired in the valley opposite Mount Maggiore. Later in the day, the 142nd Infantry requested fire at one point where enemy mortars were suspected. Company "B" placed a concentration at that point. Another of our Liaison Officers reported in from the 142nd Infantry that night, leaving one Liaison Officer still on duty with the 1st Battalion, 142nd Infantry.

With the completion of the operation on Mount Maggiore, on 5 Dec 1943, indirect fire positions were selected near the direct fire positions in the various company areas and companies were registered on base points so that suitable targets could be engaged in the valley and on the Mount Samucre Hill Mass. Enemy activity was noted along the railroad

track at the foot of Mount Lungo and a considerable amount of fire was placed in the draw along this railroad. The three destroyer companies were strafed by enemy planes about noon and our .50 cal. AA guns returned the fire. Company C reported that their AA Sections made hits on at least two of the planes. They began smoking and apparently fell over the hill beyond Mount Rotundo. Our Reconnaissance Company continued to maintain contact with the British. All of our positions were still under considerable shell fire throughout the day. Our Battalion OP reported that several fires were started in the valley between Mount Lungo and Mount Camino, as a result of our fires, but it was impossible to determine the exact result which we obtained. Company "B" fired 357 rounds of 3 inch H.E. and 300 rounds of .50 cal ammunition. Company "C" fired 1,370 rounds of H.E. and 500 rounds of .50 cal. ammunition.

The situation throughout 6 Dec 1943 was comparatively quiet. A number of indirect missions were fired by our forward observers, but no definite results could be noted except that on one mission, fired by Company "B", three enemy vehicles were set on fire. During the day, our ammunition expenditure was as follows:

- | | |
|----------------|-----------------|
| 1. Company "A" | 92 rounds H.E. |
| 2. Company "B" | 338 rounds H.E. |
| 3. Company "C" | 47 rounds H.E. |

About 2000 hours, our Liaison Officer at 36th Division Headquarters brought a tentative field order, giving information about a proposed operation by the 143rd Infantry, which we were to support.

On the morning of 7 December 1943, plans were completed for supporting the 143rd Infantry, in their attack on S. Pietro and Mount Sammuero and the attack of the First Italian Motorized Brigade on Mount Lungo. (See Field Order attached). The destroyer companies were given points to register on in support of this operation and registration on these points was completed during the day. A conference was held at 1830 hours with the staff and Company Commanders to familiarize them with the coming operation. A Liaison Officer was sent to the 143rd Infantry CP to direct the fire of this Battalion on any targets of opportunity which might appear as the Infantry advanced on its objective.

The morning of 8 Dec 1943, Company "A" moved its 3rd Platoon to the position selected for it, as shown in the field order attached. The scheduled fires in support of the operation were reported completed at 0620 hours. The attack of the Italian Motorized Brigade on Mount Lungo was not successful and at 0858, Division called and informed us to be prepared to meet a counter-attack down the railroad at the foot of Mount Lungo. Heavy shell fire fell in our Company "C" area during the morning.

We placed several concentrations on targets on Mount Lungo and in the afternoon fired missions which were requested by the 143rd Infantry on S. Pietro. Later in the afternoon, several concentrations were placed in the vicinity of S. Vittore and also along the railroad at the foot of Mount Lungo. Our ammunition expenditure during the day in support of the operation was as follows:

1. Company "A" 402 rounds H.E.
2. Company "B" 800 rounds H.E. 56 rounds AP
3. Company "C" 741 rounds H.E.

On 9 Dec 43, the Battalion continued firing on targets which appeared in the valley between Mount Maggiore and Mount Lungo, on Mount Lungo itself and in the S. Pietro area. The attack by the 143rd Infantry on S. Pietro had not been successful and all of Sammucro had not been captured. The Italian attack on Mount Lungo had been completely repulsed by the enemy, and the 36th Division began preparing plans for another assault on these positions. A mission was given to our Battalion and the Battalion Commander was requested to make a reconnaissance and then prepare recommendations for the consideration of the Division Commander.

The S-3 and a party from Reconnaissance Company made a reconnaissance of the S. Pietro-Venafro road to check the road conditions and to determine the possibility of operating tanks and TD's in that area. The Battalion Commander visited the Commander of the 143rd Infantry to get complete information about conditions in the 143rd Infantry sector. The S-1 and the Company Commander of Company "A" made a reconnaissance of the pass between Mount Rotunda and Montecello.

On the morning of 10 Dec 1943, the Battalion Commander called his staff, the Company Commander of Company "A", and the Company Commander of Reconnaissance Company together to discuss the results of the various reconnaissances. It was the general concensus of opinion that any operation down the S. Pietro-Venafro Road would not be practicable as neither tanks nor TD's could move to the side of the road successfully due to the nature of the terrain and the deep mud which was the result of much heavy rain-fall. The pass between Rotunda and Montecello had been found to be impracticable in its present condition but it was thought that with sufficient engineering work it could be made passable and that the most practical support to the new operation could be given by repairing this pass and placing destroyers in direct position on the forward slopes of Mount Rotunda and Mount Montecello. From such positions, fire could be placed all along the slopes of Sammucro, in the valley between Sammucro and Montecello, in and around S. Pietro, and out into the valley to the West.

At the conclusion of the conference, the Battalion Commander, the S-1, and the S-3 visited Division Headquarters and the Battalion Commander made these recommendations to the Division Commander.

During the day, Company "B" fired on some targets which were located by our forward OP, and at 1430 hours, all Company Commanders reported to the Battalion CP for a conference regarding the coming operation. The mission and the plans were discussed by the Battalion Commander who then decided that two platoons of Company "A" and one platoon of Company "C" were to take positions beyond the pass between Mount Rotundo and Mount Montecello. He also decided that a number of .30 and .50 cal. machine guns would be placed beyond the destroyers to support the 143rd and the 141st Infantry regiments in making the assault on S. Pietra. The remainder of the Battalion was to support the operation with indirect fire, searching the area in front of the Infantry advance and firing on any suitable targets which might appear.

On 11 Dec 1943, the Battalion Commander took the Company Commanders forward into the area in front of the Mount Rotundo Pass to select positions for their destroyers and machine guns, in accordance with the plan which had been made the previous day. The S-2 went to Division Headquarters to secure large scale photographs of the area to assist in selecting targets and in placing the weapons in position. As the operation was to be coordinated with the 753rd Tank Battalion, contact was also made with that unit. At 1440 hours, orders were received to place 12 destroyers in position beyond the pass during the night and that there was to be no firing from these positions until directed to do so by the Division Commander. In addition to the 12 destroyers, 24 .50 cal. machine guns were also put into position on Montecello to assist in forming a base of fire. Indirect fire missions were fired during the day by Companies "A", and "B". Three enemy vehicles were hit but the extent of damage could not be determined.

During the early morning hours of 12 Dec 1943, the 12 destroyers were placed in position in accordance with the Division Commander's order. The two platoons of Company "A" were first in position and were being lead into the area by the Company Commander, Captain Alec P. Pearson, and as the first destroyer left the road, it hit a mine which exploded and wounded Captain Pearson and Sergeant Broussard. The Sergeant was evacuated promptly but, in spite of his painful wound, Captain Pearson remained on duty throughout the night, directing the movement of his unit and was still on duty early the next morning when the Battalion Commander arrived to check the area. The Battalion Commander ordered Captain Pearson to report to the aid station for treatment and told the Division Commander of Captain Pearson's gallant action.

For this conspicuous service beyond the call of duty, General Walker awarded Captain Pearson the Silver Star.

The Division Commander held a conference at 1220 hours, with all the unit commanders who were to participate in the attack to make final plans for the operation and to coordinate the movement of the various units. It was decided that additional time was needed to get all units in position as the 142nd Infantry was to attack Mount Lunge from the flank the night following the assault on S. Pietro and Sammucre. Because of this, it was necessary for those destroyers in direct fire position on the nose of Mount Montecelle to remain concealed throughout that day and the following day. Considerable activity was noted in the valley West of S. Vittore and North of Mount Maggiore throughout the day, so those destroyers that were in indirect fire position fired several indirect missions. Our forward positions were under considerable shell fire throughout this period.

During 13 Dec 1943, our destroyers which were in indirect fire positions completed registration on points that could be used to assist the Infantry in its attack on S. Pietro and Sammucre. Our positions were again under intermittent shell fire. Our OP located an enemy gun position which could not be fired on by our flat trajectory weapons so we called the Division artillery, reported the target, and our OP adjusted the fire of the artillery on the gun position.

The Battalion Commander held a conference with the staff and the Company Commanders during the afternoon and gave the final instructions for our support of the 141st and 143rd Infantry in the attack on S. Pietro. He also stated that the 753rd Tank Battalion was to send one Company of tanks down the S. Pietro-Venafro Road and that our gunners should be alert to lift their fire when the tanks appeared.

During the night our listening posts reported that motors could be heard on the highway in the vicinity of S. Pietro and S. Vittore and also reported that some lights had been observed in these areas. This information was passed on to the Division. An over-lay showing our disposition in support of the operation is attached.

On 14 Dec 1943, it was learned that the attack which had been planned would not take place until the following day, as all troops could not be in position before that time. During the early morning hours, shelling was intermittent throughout the area and the Battalion Commander spent most of the day at the OP checking the area in front of our positions and making final plans for supporting the attack on the position with fire. Our forward areas were dive-bombed twice during the morning and a bomb fragment damaged one of our quarter-ton vehicles.

During the afternoon a heavy artillery concentration fell on one of the platoon positions in front of Mount Montecelle. One shell hit the extra ammunition which was stacked behind one of the destroyers, setting it on fire. The platoon commander with other members of the platoon got out of their vehicles with fire extinguishers to extinguish the flames and prevent them from spreading. In spite of the fact that the ammunition was exploding they continued to fight the fire using fire extinguishers and water and shoveling dirt onto the flames until they were extinguished. Lieutenant Boyea and three enlisted men were wounded while putting out the fire. This officer and all the enlisted men who participated in this action have been recommended to be awarded the Silver Star.

Some indirect fire missions were fired during the day by the platoons that had remained in indirect fire positions.

On the morning of 15 Dec 1943, the Battalion Commander called the Commanding Officer of the 141st Infantry to coordinate operations with him. He also checked with Division Headquarters and 143rd Infantry to ascertain if all were ready for the attack that day. The operation was to begin at 1200 hours and we had Liaison Officers with both organizations. At 0900 hours, 15 enemy planes bombed and strafed the valley in which we were operating and four planes were destroyed by the AA Artillery. No firing was done by our Battalion until the attack started at 1200 hours and then the scheduled fires were laid down. The Tank Company which was to move into S. Pietro on the S. Pietro-Venafro Road, made the assault, but was unsuccessful. Some of the tanks almost reached the town and found that the road had been blocked with vehicles and debris, several had hit mines before reaching the Town and it was decided later in the day to withdraw the remainder of the tanks, since the Infantry had not been successful in moving along with them. Some members of the 141st Infantry had succeeded in reaching the village, but were apparently cut off. No communication was ever established with them. During the early part of the night, the 142nd Infantry moved into position near Mount Lungo and during the night assaulted the Mountain.

The Battalion Commander spent 16 Dec 1943 in the forward area at the Battalion OP. The Commanding Officer 141st Infantry reported that his attack against S. Pietro had not been successful and that most of the Battalion making the assault were casualties. The 143rd had not advanced as far as planned so our destroyers that were in indirect fire positions fired most of the day in the area around S. Pietro, selecting targets which were suspected to contain enemy machine guns and mortars; A fire was started by one concentration and it appeared to be either a fuel or an ammunition dump. The assault by the 142nd on Mount Lungo had been successful and enemy on that mountain were mopped up during the day.

After dark our listening posts reported heavy shell fire northeast of S. Pietro in the 143rd Infantry Sector and shortly thereafter, the 143rd Infantry reported a counter-attack in that area and requested supporting fire. Two concentrations were placed in the area as requested and later information was received that the counter-attack had been broken up and that no further firing was necessary. About 2300 hours, the Division Commander called and reported that it was suspected that the enemy was withdrawing from the S. Pietro area and asked us to have our observers alert.

Most of 17 Dec 1943 was spent in reconnaissance as the enemy withdrew from the S. Pietro-Sammucro area during the early morning hours. Very little enemy shelling occurred during the day and patrols were pushed forward aggressively. It was found that a considerable amount of equipment had been abandoned when the enemy withdrew and that the area had been heavily mined. A few mortars and machine guns had been left to cover the withdrawal but they were mopped up by the Infantry. The early morning of 18 Dec 1943 was quiet and the Battalion Commander went forward to reconnoiter positions for a possible forward displacement of the Battalion. While on this reconnaissance, a German soldier surrendered to the Battalion Commander. He brought the prisoner to the rear and upon questioning him, it was found that he had worked in a Battalion Headquarters and stated that his unit had orders to hold until 17 Dec 1943, and then withdraw to another line. He stated that the enemy had fallen back to S. Vittore area where positions had been prepared. After questioning, the prisoner was sent to the PW enclosure. During the day our M-10's which had been in position in front of Mount Montecello were moved back into indirect fire positions since they could make no further advance in that direction, and were not in suitable positions for indirect fire from that point. Some shell fire fell on our positions during the day, but it wasn't heavy.

19 December 1943 was spent in making reconnaissance of the forward area and preparing plans for displacing forward to give closer support to the Division. In moving one of the Company "A" destroyers, a track was blown off by a mine and one of the mechanics working on the destroyer was injured.

Preparations were made to move the service trains further forward and the Reconnaissance Company was moved to an area which was at the foot of Mount Rotundo. Enemy artillery fire was more active throughout the day.

On 20 Dec 1943, the Battalion Commander left for a reconnaissance just at daylight, to select direct fire positions West of S. Pietro to support Infantry attacking C. Morello. Contact was made with 3rd Battalion, 141st Infantry, outposting the line. Just after noon, instructions were received to place a platoon of destroyers Northwest of S. Pietro

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prior to dark. One Platoon of Company "B" was given this mission and a platoon of Reconnaissance Company was also ordered to screen the Company "B" platoon. The other two platoons of Company "B" were ordered to take positions astride Highway #6 North of Mount Lunge near Road Junction #69 and one platoon of Company "C" was placed along the western slopes of Mount Rotunda. Company "A" and two platoons of Company "C" were held in indirect fire positions. It was found that the Company "C" position had been heavily mined so it was necessary for the Pioneer Platoon to carefully sweep the area before the Company "C" destroyers could take up their positions.

On 21 Dec 1943, visibility was very poor and it was impossible to observe fire, so no missions were fired during the day. Patrols were sent out from Company "B" and Reconnaissance Company with orders to move forward as far as road junction 69 and report back each hour. Enemy shelling was fairly heavy throughout the day.

During the early morning hours of 22 Dec 1943, there was intermittent enemy shelling of our positions and enemy patrol activity was heavy. One man was wounded and one quarter-ton was damaged by a shell at about 0500 hours in the Reconnaissance Company area. Patrols were sent out again on the night of 22 Dec 1943 to the vicinity of the road junction 69.

During the early morning hours of 23 Dec 1943, a shell hit near a patrol which had been sent out by Reconnaissance Company and one man was killed and another wounded. An enemy patrol attempted to infiltrate through our positions West of Mount Lunge but was driven off. At about 1300 hours, a shell hit in Company "B" area and killed one man and wounded two others. A conference of Company Commanders was called and the Battalion Commander instructed them to redouble their vigilance and see that the men remained dispersed and under cover.

Enemy patrol activity had been so vigorous that on the morning of 24 Dec 1943, the Battalion Commander decided it would be well to place a strong point in the vicinity of road junction 69 to prevent infiltration by enemy patrols into our area. Plans were made to do this but, since the 15th Infantry was in that sector, it was necessary to coordinate with them before placing a strong point in that road junction.

The 15th Infantry had planned considerable patrol activity for the night, so the Commander of that regiment stated that he would establish a strong point there as the two units operating in the same area would cause confusion. Our Battalion Commander agreed to this and instructed Company "B" and the Reconnaissance Company to continue our usual patrol activity, but to discontinue plans for the establishment of a strong point. Visibility continued to be poor and since the ammunition expenditure had been sharply curtailed, no firing was done.

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There was practically no activity on our sector during the 25th of December 1943, patrols were maintained during hours of darkness and a conference of Company Commanders and Company Executive Officers was held during the afternoon. There was little shell fire in any of the areas.

On 26 Dec 1943, visibility was good and the Battalion Commander went to the OP to carry out fire missions. Permission was obtained from G-3 to fire in an area South of the North edge of S. Vittore and West of C. Merallo. The Battalion had 20 destroyers registered on S. Vittore and more than 1000 rounds were fired on appropriate targets. A reconnaissance of the area East of S. Pietre was made by the Reconnaissance Company. Considerable firing was done in the vicinity of S. Vittore and in the area North and West of the Town. At 1830 hours, we received orders from Division Headquarters to be prepared to move in the vicinity of Alife by noon 27 Dec 1943 and to have a quartering party report to G-1, 36th Division at 1800 hours 27 Dec 1943. This information was given to all Company Commanders immediately and the quartering parties were formed.

On the 27th of December, the quartering parties left as planned and the Battalion started the movement at 1200 hours. The Battalion closed in its new area at 1635 hours and at 1830, the Battalion Commander held a conference with the staff to make plans for reorganizing the Battalion, and for servicing of all types of equipment. The period 28 Dec 1943 to 31 Dec 1943 was utilized for maintenance work on all types of equipment and a complete ordnance inspection.

Map Reference: Italy 1:50,000.


Attached Annexes:

1. Copy of Unit Journal
2. Overlays of Positions
3. Personnel Casualties during period
4. Vehicular Casualties during period
5. Enemy Casualties caused by 636th TD Bn during period

For the Battalion Commander:

REAGAN L. DUBOSE
Captain, Infantry
Unit Historian

OFFICIAL:


REAGAN L. DUBOSE
Captain, Infantry
Adjutant

1 December 43

ANNEX #1.

TO : Operations covering #13.

THATCHER HILLTOP FIRE PLAN

1. Following completion of present operation the following indirect fire plan will go into effect upon order of Lt.
2. Lt Base Point as shown: All platoons to register.
3. If base point cannot be fired on due to minimum elevation. Then register company on a check point, beginning on check point No. 1. If that one cannot be fired on, then check point No. 2
4. Check points as shown will be adjusted on by one platoon per Co. Check points to be adjusted on when targets of opportunity are not available.
5. Adjusted data on base point for all platoons and data for one platoon on check points to be reported to Lt as soon as possible.
6. All firings on points, that can be identified on a map, such as cross roads, towns, distinctive terrain features, large buildings, railroads will be reported to Lt. giving adjusted base deflection and range, and coordinates of that point. Firings on points that can not be definitely identified on the map will not be reported.
7. When this plan goes into effect company "A" and "B" will establish an OP on Mt LINDS if that mountain is in our possession. If it is not OP's will be established on Mt HAZARD.
8. Company "C" will establish an OP on Mt HAZARD as soon as possible.

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ANNEX
8 - 3

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OPERATION OVERLAY: #25

HQ 636 T.D. Bn. APO #36

1600 10 DEC 43


MAP: ITALY 1:50,000

ORDERS:

1. 2ND PLATOON OF "A" AND 1ST PLATOON "C" WILL MOVE FROM PRESENT AREA TO POSITIONS AS SHOWN TO SUPPORT 143 INF AND 141 ST INF IN THE LUNGO + PIETRO AREA
2. MOVE FROM PRESENT AREA DURING NIGHT OF 11-12 DEC 43
3. OTHER CO'S NO CHANGE.

OFFICIAL:
AUSTIN
5-3

PYLAND
C.O.



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ANNEX NO. 3

BATTLE CASUALTY REPORT

	GRADE	ASN	DATE OF CASUALTY	TYPE OF CASUALTY	PLACE OF RESIDENCE
<u>HEADQUARTERS</u>					
PYLAND, VAN W.	Lt Col	0-236089	17 Dec 43	LWA	2104 Trice Ave Waco, Texas
<u>HEADQUARTERS COMPANY</u>					
WALTER, WILLIAM F.	2nd Lt	0-1824256	17 Dec 43	LWA	2609 Hackney St Pittsburgh, Penn
HASTEN, LEO L.	Techn 4th	36024854	19 Dec 43	LWA	Webster, Ill.
HOFFPAUIR, ALBERT N.	Pvt	38173404	4 Dec 43	LWA	R #1 Box 27 Crowley, La
<u>MEDICAL DETACHMENT</u>					
MILLER, WILLIAM F.	Pvt	37147168	3 Dec 43	LWA	Gen Del Wheatland, Wyo.
<u>RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY</u>					
CARLE, ROBERT L.	Pvt	20815861	7 Dec 43	LWA	2205 Clower St San Antonio, Texas
WILSON, CHARLES D.	Stf Sgt	20815901	22 Dec 43	LWA	1026 W. Craig St San Antonio, Texas
NIXON, STANLEY T.	Pvt 1 cl	37147147	23 Dec 43	KIA	RFD #2 Colome, S. Dak
SALRIN, JOHN E., JR.	Pvt	36554188	23 Dec 43	LWA	4803 14 th St Detroit, Mich
<u>COMPANY "A"</u>					
PEARSON, ALEC P.	Capt	0-394225	12 Dec 43	LWA	Route 5 Waco, Texas
LANDERS, PAUL P.	Cpl	38038566	3 Dec 43	LWA	Box 53 Newsome, Texas
PHILLIPS, WILLIAM H.	Cpl	13087124	3 Dec 43	LWA	133 Wellington Ave Washington, Penn
PARKER, JUDGE O.	Techn 5th	38026133	3 Dec 43	SWA	1928 Ave L Huntsville, Texas
YURKEVICZ, ROMAN (NMN)	Techn 5th	31125952	3 Dec 43	SWA	Garage Road Sunderland, Mass
SWETT, GILBERT L.	Pvt 1 cl	37146913	3 Dec 43	KIA	Endicott, Nebr
BROUSSARD, ERNIE T.	Sgt	20816997	12 Dec 43	LWA	1402 Park Ave Curville, Texas
<u>COMPANY "B"</u>					
SHELTON, GRADY E.	Sgt	20813190	15 Dec 43	LWA	Winters, Texas
DICKEY, H.O. (I.O.)	Cpl	38036608	15 Dec 43	LWA	RFD #1 Kosse, Texas
BAILEY, ELISHA E.	Pvt	37146001	15 Dec 43	LIA	RFD #1 Schuyler, Nebr
HEININGER, JOSEPH E.	Pvt	33142484	23 Dec 43	LWA	2305 Clearfield St Philadelphia, Penn

	GRADE	ASN	DATE OF CASUALTY	TYPE OF CASUALTY	PLACE OF RESIDENCE
<u>COMPANY "B" (Cont'd)</u>					
SILKOWITZ, MORTON (NMN)	Techn 5th	32394805	23 Dec 43	SWA	1878 58th St. Brooklyn, N.Y.
THROCKMORTON, WILSON E.	Techn 5th	37147161	23 Dec 43	KIA	Wheatland, Wyo.
<u>COMPANY "C"</u>					
TULLOS, JOHN G.	Pvt 1 cl	20813730	3 Dec 43	SWA	Gen Del Decatur, Texas
MOBILIO, RALPH J.	Pvt	36422865	3 Dec 43	SWA	322 E. Stuart Ave Flint, Mich.
CORDISCO, NICHOLAS (NMN)	Pvt	33320521	3 Dec 43	LWA	1021 Chestnut St Bristol, Penn.
BOYSA, ALPHONSE J.	2nd Lt	0-1301601	14 Dec 43	SWA	465 Georgia Ave Brooklyn, N.Y.
JORDAN, JOSEPH H.	Cpl	37163668	14 Dec 43	SWA	Route #2 Wayzata, Minn.
WELLBORN, JACK T.	Cpl	38035985	14 Dec 43	SWA	RFD #4, Box 325 Fort Worth, Texas
KING, ERNEST F.	Techn 5th	33348697	14 Dec 43	LWA	Center St Shavertown, Penn.
SEWELL, JAMES E.	Techn 5th	20802556	15 Dec 43	LIA	Route #1 Dale, Texas
RAMEY, ROB R.	Sgt	38039654	17 Dec 43	LWA	Taft, Texas
ANTOLIK, EMIL J.	Pvt	33348166	21 Dec 43	LWA	435 Wilbur St Scranton, Penn.

ANNEX NO. 3.

PERSONNEL BATTLE CASUALTY REPORT

	<u>OFFICERS</u>				<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>			
	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>Captured</u>
Dec 3	0	0	0	0	1	8	0	0
Dec 4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Dec 7	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Dec 12	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
Dec 14	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0
Dec 15	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
Dec 17	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0
Dec 19	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Dec 21	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Dec 22	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Dec 23	0	0	0	0	2	3	0	0
TOTAL	0	4	0	0	3	25	0	0

ANNEX NO. 3

ANNEX NO. 4

VEHICLE CASUALTY REPORT

- 1 - Halftrack destroyed 2 Dec 1943 by enemy artillery fire
- 1 - One quarter ton destroyed 2 Dec 1943 by enemy artillery fire
- 1 - One quarter ton damaged 2 Dec 1943 by enemy artillery fire
- 1 - M-10 damaged 12 Dec 1943 by enemy mine
- 1 - One quarter ton damaged 14 Dec 1943 by bomb fragments
- 1 - M-10 damaged 19 Dec 1943 by mine
- 1 - One quarter ton damaged 22 Dec 1943 by enemy artillery fire

All the above destroyed vehicles have been replaced by ordnance and those damaged have been repaired by our Battalion Motor Shop and are back in service.

ANNEX NO. 4

ANNEX NO. 5

ENEMY CASUALTY REPORT

- Par. 1. Total expenditure of 3" ammunition during period was 15,374 rounds H.E. and 800 rounds AP. Total expenditure of .50 cal. ammunition during period was 1400 rounds.
- Par. 2. Estimated enemy personnel killed: Due to the nature of operation of this unit during this period no accurate account of enemy killed can be accounted for.
- Par. 3. Damage to enemy material: Due to the nature of operation of this unit during this period no accurate account of enemy material damaged or destroyed can be accounted for.

ANNEX NO. 5