

HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH PACIFIC COMBAT COMMAND
APO 75

INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON ENEMY CAMPAIGN
9 Jan 45 - 19 Mar 45

The following notes in regard to intelligence matters as encountered by this Battalion in the Luzon Campaign, are made a matter of record for the information of all concerned.

1. It was found in several instances on forward reconnaissance missions that the enemy will allow small reconnaissance units to penetrate their forward areas, then set an ambush on their return - or allow an impression that the area was clear and ambush the following troops. Another policy which is known and has been used is that of the enemy abandoning - or seemingly so of occupied gun positions - and later using those guns if they were not rendered inoperative by our forces when first encountered.

2. The units of this organization have encountered every type of announced Jap anti-tank, anti-vehicular and anti-personnel mines and have also found several improvisations. However, with the exception of the downtown Manila area, most mines encountered have either been hastily or carelessly exploded and without a definite pattern. One significant fact was that the enemy on two different occasions have worked an area or route over which friendly traffic has moved or cleared. With precautions in areas most suitable for the use of mines, it has been found that practically all can be detected and avoided. During this campaign, it is believed that the enemy has made more use of mines than has been reported previously in the East or West Pacific Area, and it is also believed that more intelligent use of them will be used in future operations.

3. With the exception of the downtown Manila area, there has been little attempt to demilitarize and knock out the armored equipment particular to this type of organization, with demolition or prepared charges. This was tried, unsuccessfully, in downtown Manila. It was also noted in hilly and mountainous areas that the enemy would not open fire with machine guns or small arms against M-10's or against infantry, closely supported by M-10's, unless trapped.

4. The enemy use of artillery and mortars, though directed frequently against this organization has not been effective due to the fact that it has not been marshaled or concentrated, nor in most cases did it seem observed fire. It is believed that if the enemy adopts the technique of concentrated fire of 4 or more guns it will be effective, and this may be expected when larger and better organized units of enemy artillery are encountered.

5. It has been noted that in an armored and/or motorized attack against an enemy position the enemy machine gun and small arms fire has been high. In reported instances, however, the enemy lowered their fire, it would have been quite effective. In one instance, against a tank in reconnaissance units, practically all fire was on a plane about 15 feet above the drivers head - radio antennas have been consistently shot off at that height, but the occupants have not been hit.

6. In action against enemy caves, dugout and pillbox installations, the field of fire of these installations in most cases, were quite limited and not effective to cover all possible angles of approach.

7. This organization, though primarily organized for the operation against and destruction of enemy armored vehicles, engaged only one Jap medium tank (stationary - Zig-zag pass) in the entire campaign. At this date, we have been unable to draw any conclusions on the employment of the Japanese Armored Forces.

8. During reconnaissance missions, this organization has had such contact with both organized guerrilla units and civilians in forward areas. It has been found that reliability and credence of information from these sources was entirely dependent on national feeling, intelligence and locality of the individuals. In several instances, reconnaissance units have been given information which was false. The most consistent false reports from civilians were given in the Compendium - Magaling - Angeles area of central Luzon. The employment of one or two intelligent former Filipino scouts or army men who could question civilians and guerrillas was found to be the most effective means of getting fairly reliable information. It has been noted that the Filipinos generalize and specific information as to time, place and number can not be given much credence unless confirmed by six or more individuals without prior contact with each other.

9. Enemy Intelligence.

The only fact of enemy intelligence which has been noted was that the enemy identified the type of our reconnaissance unit - and this information had been disseminated to the enemy rear areas prior to the approach of our forces. The reconnaissance Company of this Battalion was identified as an "armored reconnaissance force operating several miles in front of the enemy infantry". This identification was taken from a captured enemy document covering the period of our advance from Lingayen to Olongapo.

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