

HEADQUARTERS  
803D TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 230, U. S. Army.

SUBJECT: After Battle Report.

TO : Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (Through Channels)

UNIT REPORT

No. 1

From: 010001  
To : 312400

Unit: 803rd T. D. Bn.  
Date: 1 September, 1944  
Place: Vic. St. Amand, France

1. ENEMY.

a. Units in Contact.

1 to 8 August

- (1) 77th Inf Div.
- (2) 266th Inf Div; 897th, 898th and 899th Regts.
- (3) 343rd Engr Bn (as Infantry).
- (4) 352nd Inf Div; 914th, 915th and 916th Regts.
- (5) 1st Bn 957th Inf Regt, 367th Inf Div (This is a new identification, Div. or other Regts not identified).
- (6) Remnants of Deutschland Regt, 2nd SS Das Reich.
- (7) Remnants 3rd Para Div.
- (8) Following units so badly mauled that they appeared

to be unable to operate. The remnants were absorbed in Krupp or other Divisions: 343rd Inf Div, 5th Para Div, 17th SS, 99th, 77th, 243rd and 9th Inf Divisions.

9 to 18 August -

- (1) 363rd Inf Div.
- (2) 84th Pz Bn of 84th Inf Div.
- (3) Elements of 353rd Inf Div.
- (4) 331st Inf Div.
- (5) 668th heavy AT Bn.

18 to 31 August -

Contact negligible during this period.

b. Reserve situation is problematical. At close of period, it is believed that the 3rd SS, 9th SS and 15th SS were moving up from Italian front. About six (6) Divisions were in Pas de Calais area, but could not well be spared.

c. Enemy continued his practice of fighting a delaying action, using infantry supported with small numbers of tanks or SP's. During latter 15 days of period enemy action more closely resembled a route. His losses were high, in casualties, PW's and equipment. He was bending every effort to salvage as many of his men and material as possible, east of the Seine.

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However, the enemy's situation became more acute and he was unable to stand East of the Seine. At close of period, large numbers of PW's were still being taken, and enemy had not yet given any indication of any action, other than rapid withdrawal.

g. When committed, most enemy units were below T/O and T/E strength. After the mauling of the past 30 days, most units exist in name only, and even regrouping has not brought some units up to strength. PW's indicate that morale is low, even in some SS outfits.

g. Courses open to the enemy are few. It seems probable that he will draw as much of the 7th Army into Germany Proper, as possible. Also troops from other fronts. At best, with resources available, all he can do is fight a stubborn delaying action, prolonging the inevitable for a short time. No prepared lines are known, with the exception of his "West Wall". It is doubtful, that he feels that line will stop our advance, but the only other alternative is guerilla fighting, or surrender.

## 2. OWN SITUATION.

### A. Front Line or most advanced elements:

Enemy withdrawing very fast to North and Northeast, very little contact has been made. Some elements are fighting withdrawal action North of Meru. No organized resistance seems to be in effect.

h. This unit or elements thereof, during period 1 August to 31 August, 1944, was attached to following units: 29th Infantry Division, 28th Infantry Division, 2nd Tank Destroyer Group, "A" company to 630th T. D. Bn., VII Corps and 1st T. D. Group, XIX Corps and 2nd T. D. Group, "B" Company to 113th Cavalry Group. The battalion was used as close support of Infantry, during 1st of period, but during middle and latter part of period, unit as a whole was generally in Corps reserve. Unit was frequently called upon to take up positions, covering possible avenues of counter-attacks, and Reconnaissance company was used as Corps reconnaissance.

g. Combat efficiency is excellent. Casualties negligible.

g. During first part of period, forward movement was slow, but objectives were gained. During latter part of period, enemy was withdrawing rapidly and action consisted largely of trying to move forward fast enough to maintain contact. This unit in its operation, over ran and captured an STU #40 SP gun and one (1) M4 tank. 225 PW's were taken.

## 3. ADMINISTRATIVE.

A. Status of Strength of Command and Replacements Needed: The present effective strength of this unit is above that authorized by T/O 18-25 dated 27 January, 1944. Losses have been replaced by the return of casualties to this unit after their recovery from wounds or sickness.

### b. Casualties:


- (1) Killed - None.
- (2) Sick, gassed & wounded - 15
- (3) Captured - 0
- (4) Missing - 0

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g. Supply during period covered excellent. Status of supplies on hand this date:

- (1) Rations - Two (2) days reserve.
- (2) Ammunition - 3" inch - 2 units of fire.  
37mm - 2 units of fire.
- (3) Gasoline - One (1) days supply at fifty (50) miles per day (Excluding vehicular tanks).
- (4) Diesel Fuel (excluding vehicular tanks) - One-half ( $\frac{1}{2}$ ) days supply at fifty (50) miles per day.

For the Commanding Officer:

  
DONALD J. BROWNE,  
MAJOR, 803rd T. D. Bn.,  
S-3.