

HEADQUARTERS
814th Tank Destroyer Battalion

4 November 1944

SUBJECT: After Action Report for October 1944.

TO : Commanding General
7th Armored Division



1. On 1 Oct 1944 the 814 TD Bn., attached to the 7th Armored Division, was sub-attached as follows: Company "A" to CCA, Company B to CCB, while Hq and Hq Co, Rcn Co, and "C" Company with D Co (-1 platoon) 17th Tank Battalion, "C" Co 33rd Engineers together with 165 Belgium volunteers attached, formed TF JONES.
2. TF JONES had the mission of maintaining road blocks at Duerne (#1), Liesel (#2), and Weert (#3), Holland. On October 1, 1944, the road block at Duerne was given the mission of patrolling NE from Wasberg, effecting crossing of canal and establishing bridgehead, using all attached Belgians as foot troops. The Belgians refused to attack and mission was discarded. On October 2, 1944, Belgians were returned to their homes and normal patrols continued.
3. The road block at Weert, relieved by British and their force, closed in assembly position 1/2 mile North of Ommel at 1800 hours, 2 Oct 1944.
4. Road blocks at Duerne and Liesel continued, with only small enemy patrols encountered and several prisoners taken, until relieved by CCB at 0900, 9 Oct 1944, at which time Reconnaissance and "C" Companies assembled in bivouac area with Hq and Hq Co. at Sommeran and attached units were relieved of attachment. 814th (-A and B Co's) reverted to CCR control as Division Reserve.
5. 814th (-A and B Co's) went into training period which lasted until 25 Oct 1944. "B" Company joined the Bn on 21 Oct 1944. During this period Rcn Co did Area and Route Reconnaissance for CCR.
6. On 25 Oct 1944, Rcn Co attached to CCA and 814 (-A and Rcn) moved to billets in Asten and continued training. On 27 Oct 1944 battalion made plans to defend against enemy armor attack North from Meijel and "C" Co was attached to CCB while B Company was attached to CCR.
7. 814th (-A, B, C & Rcn) moved to Sommeran 29 Oct 1944, at 1915 hours, and finally arrived in bivouac 3 miles South of Maarheeze at 1015 hours on 30 Oct 1944. "B" Company reverted to Bn control at 1600 hours.

RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY

1. Rcn Co remained under battalion control until 25 Oct 1944 when it was attached to CCA to relieve "D" Company, 87th Rcn, and patrol mission in vicinity of Weert. Normal patrol activity was carried on with little enemy action encountered.



(After Action Report, 814th TD Bn, month of Oct '44, cont'd)

"A" COMPANY

1. On 1 Oct 1944, Company "A" with 1 platoon attached to 40th Tk Bn and A Company (-) attached to 48th Inf, was in assembly position in vicinity of Oploo, Holland. On 3 Oct 1944 first platoon was used as flank guard for 40th Tk Bn in attack on Overloon. The second and third platoons were used as flank guards for 48th Inf in reserve.

2. Upon the relief of Division by British, Company "A" moved with CCA to assembly area in vicinity of Maarheeze on 7 Oct 1944. On 8 Oct 1944 moved to assembly area 1/4 mile SW of Altweert using two platoons with 48th Inf employed as road blocks. On 13 Oct 1944 platoons returned to Company control and company moved to indirect fire positions one mile E of Weert. They remained in indirect fire position firing with air observation on selected targets until 27 Oct 1944 when one platoon was attached to 40th Tk Bn and moved to position 3 miles North of Nederweert. Balance of Company remained in old position with no mission.

"B" COMPANY

1. On 1 Oct 1944, Company "B" was attached to CCB with two platoons employed as reserve and one platoon employed with 23rd Inf. Upon relief of CCB by CCR the company moved to assembly area NW of St. Anthonis with CCB as reserve. On 5 Oct 1944 they moved 2 1/2 miles SE of St. Anthonis, Company Commander given task force consisting of "B" Company, 814th, Company "D", 31st Tk Bn, and 1 platoon of Engineers. The next day first platoon, Company "B", relieved first platoon, Company "A", and the task force was dissolved.

2. Upon relief by British of CCB, company moved to assembly position near Ommel on 9 Oct 1944 where it remained until 12 Oct 1944 at which time it moved into indirect fire positions SW of Duerne. Numerous concentrations were fired under control of 434th FA Bn in support of attack by CCB on canal. Remained in this position until 21 Oct 1944 when company reverted to Battalion control and closed in bivouac South of Sommeran. On 25 Oct 1944 company moved, under Battalion control, to billets in Asten. At 0800, 27 Oct 1944, company was alerted for move and company commander with platoon leaders went on reconnaissance to select positions to repel counter attack by enemy armor NW from Meijel. First platoon moved out at 1430, attached to CCR. Second and third platoons attached at 0100 and 1300 hours respectively on 28 Oct 1944.

CCA 7AD ("A" Co., 814 TD Bn.)

- 22-23 Oct - Remained in Indirect Fire positions. No missions.
- 24-26 Oct - No change except on 24 Oct Mortar Crew fired 20 rounds of HE in conjunction with Tp D, 87th Rcn. One MG and 2 Pill Boxes were hit.
- 27-28 Oct - Second platoon attached to 40th Tk Bn on 27 Oct and moved to position 3 miles North of Nederweert. No missions for balance of Co.
- 29-31 Oct - *

* Reports not available.

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Div Tps. 7AD (814 TD Bn minus A Co.)

- 22-24 Oct - 814 TD remained in bivouac, vicinity Zommeren. No missions. Cont'd training.
- 25- Oct - Rcn Co attached to CCA and rel'd. D Tp 87 Rcn vicinity Weert (608950) at 0830. Balance 814 TD (-) moved to billets in Asten.
- 26- Oct - No missions.
- 27- Oct - Asten shelled 0700 hours. B and C companies alerted 0800 hours. Plans and reconnaissance made to defend against armor counterattacks North from Meijel. C company attached to TF WEMPLE, CCR, at 1200 hours and moved to positions vicinity Liesel-Heittrak. First Platoon, B Co., attached to TF CHAPPUIS, CCR, 1430 hours.
- 28- Oct - Second platoon B Co. attached to TF CHAPPUIS, CCR, 0100 hours. Third platoon B Co. attached to TF CHAPPUIS, CCR, 1300 hours. Enemy planes dropped anti-personnel bombs 400 yards West of 814 CP about 1930 hours. Injured 6 men off 440th FA airstrip.
- 29- Oct - 814 TD (-) moved to Zommeren (588115) at 1915 hours.
- 30- Oct - 814 TD (-) moved 3 miles South of Maarheeze (545015) at 1015 hours. B company returned to Bn control at 1610 hours.
- 31- Oct - No missions.



CCA 7AD (Rcn Co., 814 TD)

- 25- Oct - Rcn Co rel'd Tp D, 87 Rcn at 0830, vicinity Weert (608950) and began patrolling missions.
 - 1st Plat: From bivouac area S to Nearitter; return via Zwartbroek, Hunsel, Ittervoort.
 - 2nd Plat: From bivouac area S along MSR to Stamproij and return.
 - 3rd Plat: From bivouac area to Weert and Nederweert and return.
 - Pion Plat: In reserve.
- 26-27 Oct - No change.
- 28- Oct - First and third platoons exchanged missions. Entire first platoon remained at Road Block in Nederweert (618009) because of enemy threat. Pioneer platoon laid Booby traps in this vicinity. First platoon killed 4 Germans with MG and 37 fire vicinity of road block. Second platoon given additional mission of supporting first platoon in Nederweert.
- 29-31 Oct - *
 - * Reports not available.

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TF CHAPPUIS, CCR, 7AD (Co. "B", 814 TD Bn)

27-31 Oct - At 1425 Hours first platoon, B Co., moved to previously selected position and was attached to TF CHAPPUIS, CCR. Lt Col Chappuis ordered first platoon to move about 1 mile south on Asten-Meijel road to establish a road block. Platoon leader was ordered to reconnoiter for TD positions further south and reported after a dismounted reconnaissance that the ground would not hold M-10's and that there were no suitable positions. At 0100 hours the second platoon of B company was attached to TF CHAPPUIS, CCR, and went into road block position. Lt Col Chappuis ordered that first platoon leader move one M-10 about 1500 yards further south down the road into a position occupied by a 57 AT gun. About 0330 second platoon leader accompanied Lt Tavlinisky in a 1/4 ton, stopping at first platoon position and alerting #1 gun to move south slowly and meet them when they returned from reconnaissance. On arriving at the proposed position they moved the 57mm AT gun already occupying the position. While doing this the officers received SA fire and mortar fire from the East where German Infantry were moving up. A and B companies of the 48th AIB were also receiving direct fire from enemy tanks to their south.

The officers returned to meet the destroyer. First platoon leader took a position on the outside of the destroyer so as to guide it in the dark. Second platoon leader backed his 1/4 ton behind the destroyer and followed it as it moved. Upon arriving near the intended position at 0400, first platoon leader saw small arms and machine gun fire about 200 yards ahead and halted his M-10. An Infantry soldier ran up and reported that this fire was coming from a German tank on the road. First platoon leader gave the order to fire. The gunner attempted to fire 5 times (3 times with the solenoid and twice with the manual bar) but the gun failed to fire. It was then attempted to back the M-10 up without being detected. The gun commander moved to the rear deck to guide the driver back. The Germans then opened fire hitting the M-10 in the turret and the M-10 slipped off into the ditch on the east side of the road. The gunner was seriously wounded and the loader was slightly wounded. The Germans were now firing with mortars, machine guns, and small arms. The second platoon leader and his driver had taken cover in the ditch but the driver was killed. First platoon leader called second platoon leader to bring up the 1/4 ton to evacuate the gunner. The enemy continued intense fire but the M-10 crew and 2 officers succeeded in removing the gunner. The Platoon Leaders then returned to their platoons. Tiger tanks were reported moving N from about where #1 destroyer, first platoon, had been abandoned and Lt Col Chappuis ordered an M-10 forward to duel with them.

Second platoon leader told him that this employment put the M-10 at great disadvantage and that he would obey the order under protest. He then went forward to the first platoon position and relayed the order. First platoon leader said that before he would order his M-10 forward he wanted to talk to Lt Col Chappuis himself.



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Second platoon leader undertook to knock down the church steeple in Neerkant. This was accomplished with about 30 hits, around 0900 hours. #4 gun, first platoon opened fire at a Tiger tank at about 1600 yards range. Fire opened at 0800 and continued until 0930. Second platoon leader, anticipating a tank attack down the road, placed his destroyers in positions to allow short fields of fire from the flanks. The flat terrain off the road was soft and #3 gun, second platoon, obtained some cover by backing off the secondary road and bellying his tank down the field.

Number four gun, third platoon, attached to first platoon, spotted an enemy tank and fired until he set it on fire. Number four gun, first platoon, knocked out an unidentified vehicle (presumably a tank, according to Infantry reports) in about the same vicinity as the one with which he was dueling. Enemy fire at first platoon's position was heavy enough to cause supporting tank crews to abandon their vehicles. At least 4 medium tanks of the 17th Tk Bn and 5 half-tracks of 48th AIB were destroyed in vicinity of first platoon position during this fire fight. Around 0930 #4 gun, first platoon, received a direct hit with white phosphorous setting it on fire, killing loader, seriously wounding gunner, and wounding ass't driver in face, head, and right arm. First platoon leader then ordered the Security Section and the balance of his knocked out TD crews to the rear. The 1 1/2 ton security truck moved cross-country W of the road but was stuck about 1,000 yards N of first platoon's position. The crew moved back on foot to company "B", 814 TD Bn CP, which had been established at 48th AIB CP at about 1000 hours. Later in the day artillery fire damaged the 1 1/2 ton truck.

The first platoon leader received a report about 1100 hours that his #1 M-10 had been evacuated by the Germans in spite of American Artillery fire in that area. Between 1200 and 1230 hours three heavy artillery concentrations were delivered by the enemy in the area occupied by company "B" CP. During the third concentration Company Commander was seriously wounded and his M-20 crew were slightly wounded. All four were evacuated immediately.

At 1300 hours the third platoon was attached to CCR and third platoon leader was given command of the company. Platoon occupied reserve positions. Around 1400 hours four or five German tanks supporting a deployed Infantry attack moved North on the Asten-Meijel road and the tanks fired on #4 gun, third platoon destroyer damaging the building behind which the destroyer had taken cover. When German artillery was also directed at this position Lt Tavlinsky went back on foot to the advanced 48th AIB CP to see if they would allow him to move the lone destroyer back to a better position. He was referred to Lt Col Chappuis' CP and then learned by radio that #4 gun, third platoon, had attempted to move back cross-country without orders and was now moved near the 1 1/2 ton security truck. Lt Col Chappuis ordered another destroyer immediately to the position originally held by #4 gun, third platoon. Second platoon leader ordered #4 gun, second platoon, back down the road to stay there until he personally ordered them out. In spite of German direct fire on the road all day, #4 gun, second platoon, arrived at the advanced position about 1615.

During the day small arms fire from the E of second platoon's position had been heavy and continued during the night. Around midnight Bn Maintenance accomplished the evacuation of #4 gun, third platoon, and the 1 1/2 ton security truck. Small arms and mortar fire was heavy. By 0500 hours "C" Co, 48th AIB dug in East of second platoon's position.



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During the night 5 light tanks of the 87th protected his East flank, withdrawing behind him during the night and by daylight there were practically no supporting troops near #4 gun, second platoon's position.

Around 0700 approximately 30 enemy Infantry moved to within 400 yards of East flank but the light tanks drove them off. About 0730 5 medium tanks from CCB attempting to establish Liaison with CCR arrived near second platoon leaders position and he used them to strengthen his west flank. At approximately the same time 3 Mk VI tanks with Infantry were reported by 48th AIB, to be moving in on second platoon's east flank. The tanks over ran C Co, 48th AIB position and one continued west across the road and out across country until it became mired. One of CCB's medium tanks had moved forward and the second platoon observed 5 hits from its 76mm bounce off. #3 gun, second platoon fired 3 rounds in the turret and the Tiger began to smoke. Its crew escaped. The other 2 Mk VI's took cover behind buildings to the front of the second platoon's position and subsequently withdrew under the smoke and confusion. The 48th AIB moved its forward CP back near the second platoon's position and reorganized the remnants of "C" Company. The tanks from CCA were ordered back to their zone and later 4 medium tanks from Co. C, 17 Tk Bn moved up behind the TDs. In the meantime #4 gun, second platoon, radioed that he could see enemy Infantry in a position to outflank him to the East and 4 Mk VI's south on the road from his position. He stated that the supporting Infantry had withdrawn and asked for permission to come back. The second platoon leader told him to try it down the road as the destroyer would get stuck going cross-country on either side of the road.

While Lt Rose was listening on the radio he could hear the .50 cal. firing. With the gun in the rear position the driver swung the M-10 out on the road. At high speed and with the crew firing the three inch gun, .50 cal., and throwing hand grenades, the driver bore down on the German Infantry, crushing several under his tracks. When about 500 yards from the second platoon position, the M-10 took a direct 88 hit in the armor plate around the gun tube splitting the armor and wounding all five of the crew. The gunner had planned to fire a round of smoke and had it loaded when the M-10 was hit. The driver, although wounded in the side, started up again and drove another 1000 yards to the third platoon's position where he was forced to stop because the tank was burning. Before additional help could reach him, he climbed in the turret and beating the fire with his hands, attempted to lift out the gunner. Men from the third platoon reached the tank by this time and completed the evacuation.

Shortly after this had happened 4 Mk VI tanks at 50 yard interval moved in column up the road toward second platoon position. When the leading tank was about 400 yards away it attempted to move off the road to the west and slipped into the ditch. #1 gun, second platoon, opened fire but was knocked out immediately by one of the Mk VI's. The assistant driver was instantly killed and the loader wounded. The M-10 burned. #2 gun, second platoon, put two rounds in the side of the Tiger in the ditch, the Tiger did not burn but was definitely knocked out. The second ~~platoon~~ Tiger came up abreast of the first and one crew member dismounted. #3 gun, second platoon's destroyer hit the Tiger 4 times in the side. The Tiger's crew climbed out and were killed by the Infantry. The Tiger blew up. The third Mk VI moved west off the road and attempted to take cover behind a farm building. #3 gun, second platoon, threw ten rounds at it and the Tiger blew up. The fourth Mk VI by this time had withdrawn in the smoke and confusion. Later in the morning Tigers succeeded in knocking out a medium tank (75mm) near second platoon's position. Friendly artillery was



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called for in view of the enemy's repeated attempts to force the crossroad.

In the early afternoon 2 more Tiger tanks attempted to come up the same road. Second platoon leader had moved a tank with a 76mm gun from Co. C, 17 Tk Bn, up to replace his burned out destroyer. #2 and #3 guns both directed fire at one of the Tiger's sides when the Tiger attempted to turn. It was hit 3 times and blew up, the crew failed to escape. The Tiger behind turned back. There were now 3 Mk VI's knocked out within 10 yards of each other on the road which formed an effective road block covered by fire from second platoon's guns. Ammunition was low so first platoon leader made a quick trip back to Asten and brought back 30 rounds in 1/4 tons. This ammunition was loaded in the destroyers during the fighting which occurred later.

About 1600, 6 enemy tanks (Tigers or Panthers) were observed moving NW on the East side of the road. Their apparent plan was to attempt an end run with the two leading tanks while the 4 behind provided over-watching fire. The last two had fairly good cover. #2 gun turned around so that he could shoot East from behind the building he was using for cover and the gunner opened fire. In 4 or 5 rounds he blew up the leading tank. After he had put 1 round in the second tank, the over-watching tanks knocked brick and rubble from the wall of the building into the open-turreted M-10 injuring the loader and causing all but Funk, the gunner, to dismount. The gunner loaded 1 more round himself, hit the tank again, causing it to blow up, slipped down into the drivers seat and backed the M-10 to a cover position on the other side of the building. While #2 M-10 was engaging the two leading tanks, #3 destroyer got two hits on the turret of the nearest over-watching tank. Friendly artillery was also landing in the area and the turret was hit again. The German crew escaped. The other 3 overwatching tanks fired on Sgt Ferrosso's #3 gun in its exposed position wounding the loader and causing the destroyer to burn. The over-watching tanks withdrew.

Lts Lazaros, Tavlinsky, and Rose, next observed 3 German AT guns being dug into position in the open about 1200 yards southeast of their position. Artillery fire was called for again and two of the guns were destroyed; the Germans removed the third one. The first and second platoon leaders next put out 4 smoke pots to screen while #2 tank was backed out of the way and #1 destroyer, third platoon, was brought up. Just as it was dusk a German tank was heard moving on the road towards the 3 knocked out Tigers that formed the road block. Artillery fire was called for and the tank withdrew. Company Commander was informed early in the evening that CCR was being relieved by elements of the 15th Scotch Division. He ordered second platoon leader back to the rear and at 0130 the relief was effected and the five remaining TD's moved back to Zommeren.

On 30 Oct 1944 "B" Co. moved to bivouac area 3 miles South of Maarheeze for re-organization and maintenance. No change on 31 October. Four M-10's had been totally destroyed (3 burned; 1 captured); one M-10 evacuated to Ordnance; one was in Bn Shop; 6 available for action.



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TF WEMPLE, GCB, 7AD (Co. C, 814 TD Bn.)

27-31 Oct - Reconnaissance of positions in Liesel-Heitrak area was completed by Company Commander and Platoon Leaders by noon, 27 Oct 1944. "C" Company was attached to TF WEMPLE at 1200 hours and platoons moved from Asten toward their positions. Company Commander remained at Heitrak which the enemy was shelling and was told by 87 Rcn that 3 Mk VI tanks were moving West from vicinity of Helenaveen. Company Commander returned to Liesel and his vehicle was hit by direct 88 fire (no casualties). Second platoon was warned about the 3 Tiger tanks and ordered into position. First and third platoons moved to Heitrak and Liesel as planned although Col Wemple at first ordered both units to Heitrak. (Company Commander urged him to protect Liesel as it was a key point in the road net and defense system).

About 1330 87 Rcn reported that a Mk VI had been disabled by one of their M-8's about 1200 yards from second platoon position and that the M-8 had withdrawn because a second Tiger had come up behind the first. #1 Destroyer moved forward about 200 yards and set the Tiger on fire with hits in the right side, turret and track. The German crew had left the tank when first hit in the rear by the M-8. #1 destroyer fired about 25 rounds APC at the first Tiger, and then raked the road with HE and APC in an attempt to hit the second Tiger which had withdrawn or enemy Infantry that might be with the tanks. Effects of this fire could not be determined. #1 gun then resumed its original position. 87 Rcn reported two Tigers moving South about 1400. Second platoon established their security and the balance of the day was without action except for artillery fire.

In Liesel, third platoon occupied position in the southern part of town displacing to the center of town around 1630. Liesel was shelled regularly during the afternoon and most of the buildings were damaged, however, no casualties occurred. Without notifying the Co. Cmdr. the third platoon was ordered to Heitrak by TF WEMPLE arriving there about 1730.

In vicinity of Heitrak, first platoon had gone into position to protect TF WEMPLE's left flank. About 1500 #2 destroyer received small arms fire from the East. A high muzzle velocity gun fired in the platoon position at the same time and was silenced by 4 rounds APC, 10 rounds HE from #4 gun. The platoon fired HE at houses, haystacks, etc across the road during most of the afternoon.

At dusk dispositions in all platoons were changed enough to confuse the enemy and to obtain better protection from artillery and small arms fire which had been constant during the day. About 2000 a German approached Heitrak from the South and called "Surrender my company". Fire was held to prevent disclosure of positions, and the German disappeared. During the night artillery shells hit two houses near the TD's and the resultant fires necessitated change of position.



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At the second platoon position local security was reinforced by security section from the third platoon about 1700 hours, it not being considered wise to take the unarmored vehicles into Heittrak because of artillery fire. An assault gun platoon had arrived during the afternoon and was also used to further protect the road junction.

About 0400 hours a German patrol of about 8 men approached the second platoons security from the East. Two of them were wounded by security section machine gun fire and later captured. Around 0530 a German half track (personnel carrier) was identified moving on the road from the East. The nearest assault gun was told by telephone to fire but failed to do so. Machine gun fire from the security section wounded some of the Germans as they were heard to scream. The half track paused a moment at the road junction then turned North and moved at high speed towards Liesel. About 45 minutes later it returned on the same road and the second platoon security hit it in the rear with a bazooka and machine gun fire. The half track, however, continued to move and disappeared down the road towards Hoogbrug.

Shortly after daylight, 28 Oct, 40 to 50 Germans carrying mortars and machine guns were observed moving up the same road towards the second platoon. #1 and #2 destroyers and an assault gun moved forward a few hundred yards and fired HE at 800 yards. The enemy Infantry dispersed.

At 0800 CCB planned to attack East astride the road to Hoogbrug with 2 Co's of Infantry supported by tanks. Second platoon was to protect their left flank, advancing behind their tanks. Just as the Infantry companies moved East from the second platoon's position a terrific mortar barrage was laid by the Germans on the road junction. The fire was concentrated on a small area and was so intense that the road junction was completely obscured to the Company Commander 50 yards away. A 1/4 ton and a 1 1/2 ton truck of C Company were badly damaged. One of the third platoons machine guns received a direct hit and a 23rd Infantry half-track was destroyed.

CCB's attack pushed on and the second platoon deployed and followed. 10 of 12 enemy Infantry moving southeast were killed or wounded by time fire from the TD's at 2100 yards with the fuze cut to 2.5 seconds. A machine gun delivered heavy fire on a medium tank ahead of #3 destroyer. #1 spotted a German getting in a foxhole, he fired HE, and in a few minutes the machine gun fire ceased. Prisoners began straggling in and went to the rear without guards. The TD's fired on a house that looked like a fortification. More prisoners came in - about 100 by around 1045 hours.

However, the medium tanks on the right flank had been taking heavy losses and the attack bogged down. The second platoon moved back to its original positions. During the period of this attack, the first and third platoons at Heittrak had been firing HE and MG at visible Infantry in the same area as the previous day. The second section of the third platoon also fired 25 rounds at the same church steeple in Neerkant that second platoon of B Company was firing on. After the steeple fell, about 1030, the third platoon guns were told to fire one round every 5 minutes for 50 minutes to keep the Germans off the base of the steeple that remained. The Germans continued to shell Heittrak and around 1400 #2 gun was hit in the breech block and evacuated after dark.



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The medium tanks near Heittrak were being hit by high muzzle velocity projectiles and a foot reconnaissance to the East disclosed 3 Tigers bunched together about 1100 yards away. Detailed plans for bringing the destroyers into position were made and by 1700 #'s 1, 3, and 4 destroyers with a medium tank (76mm gun) moved forward by concealed routes. The Co. Cmdr. crawled through the woods to where he could observe. On arriving in position all guns opened fire simultaneously. Two Tigers were seen to be definitely knocked out but did not burn. The third was hit but it could not be confirmed as knocked out. #4 fired 10 rounds; #1, 17 rounds; #3, 5 rounds, and the medium tank, 4 rounds - all APC.

However, it soon became apparent that the 3 Tigers were not the only 88's in the vicinity. Tracer from farther North could be seen coming in, and before this new threat could be located the medium tank was set on fire (2 men wounded); #4 destroyer was hit in the right drive sprocket and the crew bailed out, #3 was hit, knocking out its left center bogie wheels but was still able to escape; and #1 backed off when 5 rounds of APC whittled over making it apparent that the enemy had him spotted.

After dark #1 destroyer moved to the second platoon position and #3 was evacuated to Asten. The enemy had continued to fire on #4 until it went up in flames.

The third platoon was now given a road block mission and moved into position by dark. The mission was to block two secondary roads against attack from the East. #1 destroyer, third platoon had gone to Asten with motor trouble. Outposts were established and security dug in.

Both the second and third platoons received artillery fire during the night, one shell half burying some men in their foxholes at the second platoon position. A full scale barrage came down about 0530.

Around 0700 a German patrol approached the third platoon position from the South. The third platoon leader and driver of #2 destroyer advanced toward them on foot in an effort to make them surrender and were wounded.

The platoon leader called to his #2 gun to open fire and it moved up and fired HE into the bushes where the Germans were hiding. Arms and legs flew up. A German bazooka man fired at #2 gun from back of a house and #3 gun swung around and gave him 1 round of HE. The crew of #2 gun moved far enough forward so that the gun commander could lift the wounded driver on the rear deck. The platoon leader lying on his back was too seriously wounded to be handled that way and he ordered the gun to keep firing and to send the Medics for the wounded man. #2 gun attempted to back up, hit a tree with the tube and the gun swung around, knocking the driver and the loader who was holding him off the rear deck. The Gun Commander loaded them up again and took them to the Medics. The platoon leader was evacuated by Co C aid men under heavy small arms fire.

The Co. Cmdr. was told to hold his positions at all costs and that the 23 Inf would attack on the 29th of Oct. At the same time he was instructed to locate routes by which the destroyers could withdraw if GCB had to give up Liesel.



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About 1000 the Germans attacked Liesel in force and the second platoon was ordered to move immediately to the West of the town to prevent their armor from breaking through towards Asten. A previously reconnoitered route was followed; the platoon split at Leensel with #1 and #2 guns going with the platoon leader into woods to the North and #4 destroyer and #1 of third platoon going East towards Liesel under the Company Executive Officer.

The second platoon leader went on dismounted reconnaissance and spotted a Mk VI and enemy Infantry within 900 yards of his destroyers. He moved his section to firing position and #2 pulled up from cover, fired, knocking the Tiger out and withdrew to cover.

Now a small tank (possibly Mk IV) and a half-track personnel carrier appeared 200 yards south of the Mk VI. #2 gun pulled up again and knocked out both. First, the tank with 5 rounds causing it to blow up; second, the half-track with 3 rounds causing it to burn.

The platoon leader again went forward on dismounted reconnaissance. He saw a Mk VI near his last target with two Germans standing in front of it. #2 destroyer fired one round of HE at the Germans suspecting they were officers or tank commanders; immediately raised the range 100 yards and knocked out the tank with 1 round. 4 more rounds were put in the Tiger but it did not burn. Range to all targets was between 800-900 yards. About 1200 hours 15-20 Germans were observed going into a house 100 yards East of the K.O.'d Mk IV. #2 destroyer blew out the walls of the house with 10 rounds HE and then put 1 round HE in the previously knocked out Tiger causing it to burn. #2 again withdrew to cover.

At about 1300 the platoon leader moved #1 and #2 to an alternate position because of direct fire from a tank (type unknown) 1000 yards to the North.

During this period the other section under the company executive officer was covering the main road from Liesel to Asten. On dismounted reconnaissance around 1200 hours the officer saw a Mk IV burning South of Liesel (K.O.'d by medium tanks) and about 50 dismounted Germans coming South out of the town. Observing that they went into buildings he returned to the gun positions and took the buildings under fire with #1 gun, third platoon. 4 rounds of mortar fire landed near #1 gun; #1 knocked the mortar out. Each time that 2 or 3 Germans got together 1 round of HE was dropped in on them.

CCB prepared to attack Liesel with dismounted Engineers and Tanks and about 1330 hours TD's were ordered to support the attack. Positions to accomplish this were in the open and the platoon leader reported that there was still a tank firing from the North that should be knocked out first. The destroyers were ordered to move to positions to support the attack and shortly after arriving there at 1400 hours #2 destroyer was hit and burned. The driver was killed and the other crew members and 1 security man wounded. #1 destroyer moved up to shield them from small arms fire and picked up the four men most seriously hurt. #4 evacuated the other man. No aid men were available so the platoon leader evacuated the 4 wounded to the aid station in #1 destroyer. When he returned he found #1 destroyer, third platoon back from Asten where it had gone for repairs, and put it in position. He learned that #1 destroyer, first platoon had been knocked out by 5 rounds of 88 AP from the East about 1530 hours. The dismounted crew had been fired on by 88 HE but had no casualties.



(After Action Report, 814th TD Bn., Month of Oct '44, cont'd)

About 1600 a Tiger was spotted 1300 yards to the East. It was probably the gun that knocked out #1, first platoon. #1, second platoon and #1, third platoon, hit it with 5 rounds each and destroyed it. #4, second platoon, moved near the remaining two TD's at 1615 and about 1700 the three destroyers were ordered to an assembly area East of Asten and remained there until CCB was relieved.

At the third platoon position, the road block mission continued during the morning. About noon a Tiger tank was reported to have moved out of Liesel and to be on the road about 700 yards South. #3 and #4 guns under the platoon Sgt moved North to block this or other vehicles with 6 medium tanks. Platoon Leader, first platoon, remained with security to maintain outposts at previous nights position. Because the Germans continued to shell the area and there were a good many Infantry wounded and 4 PW's for which no evacuation facilities were available, he sent in the 2 1/2 ton trucks with orders not to return. When the position was relieved at about 1900 his dismounted men went cross country until out of small arms range and rode to the assembly area on tanks.

#'s 3 & 4 destroyers did not pick up the Tiger tank reported at noon and remained at their new position until relieved. At about 1900 they moved on route previously reconnoitered to assembly area.

About 2100 Co. C moved with CCB to assembly position North of Weert. On 30 Oct the company was given road block missions South of Weert. No enemy contact was reported on this mission which continued through 1 November 1944.

Three (3) M-10's were totally destroyed (burned); 3 in Bn Shop; 6 available for action during 27-29 Oct.