The Employment of the Tank Destroyor Battalion with the

Infantry Division

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(This discussion on Tank Destroyer employment is submitted by an officer with four year's experience on this subject. Lessons learned are from personal observation and actual combat experiences in /frica, Sicily, Normindy, France and Germany)

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The role of the Tank Destroyer Battalion in direct support of the infantry has taken on many new aspects in the present campaign in France and in Germany. A gun and weapon, originally designed and coferred to as "tank killers," now finds many new and varied missions to perform daily. The perticle deals only with the successes, mistakes and lessons learned to the tar at the .D. M-10 is concorned, although cimilar lessons have undoubtedly been as attined in actual combat experiences by M-18 and M-36 units also.

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The primary duty of the T.D. Bn with any division is the destruction and annihilation of the enemy's armor. The elimination of enemy tanks from any given sector of the combat zone will usually pave the way for a successful infantry attack and advance. The secondary role of the tank destroyers in combat is well-known, for artillery support (harassing; interdiction, counterbattery, etc.). A third role, but not third in importance or priority, the employment of the T.D.s to neutralize enemy O.P.s, church steeples, pill boxes, machine gun nests, enemy occupied houses, anti tank weapons, suspected enemy strong points, employment of the naval star shell to illuminate any given point of enemy held ground at night, racing motors to frighten and harass enemy nerves; these are the varied uses that the T.D. has been put to in the present campaign.

The purpose of this paper, then, is to discuss the problems of the T.D.s in combat, their support of the infantry division, their role on the offense, the defense, and a general summary of general lessons learned.

TANK DESTROYERS ON THE LINE WITH THE INFANTRY DIVISION: - Initially, the T.D.s should have been made an organic and integral part of each inf. division! This union should have taken place before the units came overseas, even at the time of activation. (This statement also applies to our tanks.) And what is the reason for this statement? It's this. Any units, working together, training together, manouvering together, yos, even relaxing together on off hours - will know and understand each other's problems better! Tactics and techniques can be worked out and the "bugs" discovered. Officers and enlisted men will gain a working knowledge of each other's worpons, fire powers, abilities and limitations. In other words, a sotup such as this would have relieved many T.D. Bas from their "orphan rele" prior to combat or prior to being assigned to a division. Far too many T.D.s have been placed with a division a few days before combat, or even actually during combat, and lives are lost while lessons are learned! Too many T.D. Bns have trained alone (and done a good job of it toe), but they have been compelled to work out their own problems, their own tactics and techniques, only to be assigned at the last minute to a division which may have different ideas as to their correct useage. Some divisions, for example, placed the T.D.s completely under the control of the artillery section; others under the infantry rule, others half way between! Coordination, cooperation, close limison, and a thorough understanding of T.D.s and the infantry are obtained ONLY by long months of training together - or long weeks of actual combat. During these weeks of battlefield conditions, (when initially the T.D.s are "strangers" to their new parent unit), many lessons will be learned the hard way11

One learns to understand and respect the abilities of others only through combat experiences! An officer will learn the traits and habits of the infantry battalion C.O. - generally speaking - under combat conditions. It is quite a problem for a new T.D. Battalion to join a new division - both then go into battle - and expect all to operate smoothly right eway. It won't work!! You must learn your lessons quickly, work out problems of tactics and handling immediately, or men and material will be lest!

Of course, it is quickly admitted and acknowledged that the war against the Germans is well along, and probably most divisions have their normal T.D. support now and have a good working knowledge of each other's abilities. Some divisions did enter combat with a well trained T.D. Bn (one which had been with them for some time) - and better results must have been obtained initially! But others met their new division commander, staff and infantry regiments while action was going on, hurried introductions took place, and off to combat!! This problem of course is new "water over the dam." And very possibly the War Department had definite reasons for keeping many Tank Destroyer Battalions separate. But there were many headaches, "bugs," misunderstandings in France - because of this condition.

TANK DESTROYERS ON THE LINE WITH THE INFANTRY AND THEIR ASSOCIATIONS:-The following is not offered as the approved or school solution, but it is the method which the 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion was employed with the 79th Inf. Division. The closest possible lipison, network of communication and control, is required and most necessary for good to anyork: The T.D.s must keep abreast continually of all infantry fins, movements, etc., and conversely must tell all their plans. Both infantry and T.D.s must know at all times the other's dispositions, houndaries, schemes of battle, (whether on the offense or defense). Each infantry regiment had one T.D. Company in support (not attached). The distinction between "support" and "attached" is finely divided, but an E.T.O. order several months age called for "support only" from the T.D.S. Each regt., then, had 12 T.D.S in support, and usually alletted a plateon of four guns to each battalien of infantry. Thus, under normal conditions and with the T.D. Plateons up to strength, one officer and four M-DE were interveven into the plans and maneuvers of each of the nine Inf. Battaliens. The permitted, and the situation was such that wire could be laid, each T.D. The destine permitted, and the wire into the nearest Inf. company command post, which in temp gave it communications with the battalien, regt., and the remainder of the division signal network. Each plateon, in order to keep well up on any given situation, would place one enlisted man (preferably an NCO - there never were enough officers!) at the Inf. Bn C.P.

In the next higher echelon of command, the T.D. Company placed its command post in the same town or nearby the regt'l C.P., and always laid in by wire. The T.D. Bn command center, by division order, always set up in the same place as did the division and, in addition, a liaison officer remained at this C.P. at all times. Company officers checked in from time to time with their respective higher headquarters, and the T.D. staff (C.O., exce off. S-2, S-3, and the other Liaison officer), made continual "rounds" of the gun positions and the infantry command posts.

What all this represents is this:- the closest and keenest liaison and contact between infantry and tank destroyers (and it's up to the "junior" unit to maintain this offort), is none too good, and must always be improved! A lack of proper liaison and cooperation is nothing short of criminal!

TANK DESTROYERS ON THE OFFENSE: - T.D.s on the attack with the infantry bn, can prove helpful and offective in many ways. Of course the initial role is to get the enemy tanks! All suspected enemy tank positions, routes of approach and retreat, suspected and known hideouts, must be constantly watched. On the attack, the T.D.s must NEVER operate as one gun!! They must work in pairs or mere! Time and time again this fact was driven home to us in France - one T.D. or one tank - on a strenuous attack - will eventually fall prey to a German anti tank gunner, bazoeka or Jerry tank. (A marked increase in the useage of the enemy of bazoekas and anti tank weapons showed his hand in an effort to stop our armor!) In our operations, one T.D. (or tank), must always cover and protect an adjoining T.D., both work tegether, move alternately and keep in mind that two ean live a lot longer than ONE under battlefield conditions. This theory of supporting each other is well known and Very Old - but American gunners on tanks and T.D.s still, with a lapse of memory - will be sucked in by ONE GERMAN TANK only to find another hidden away to cut them down! Never underestimate your enemy - and never assume he will operate one tank only - he knows better!

No platoon should ever be split up by the parent unit (the inf), so that it cannot operate in "twos" or "fours." Three porhaps working together is all right, but never ONE ALONE!

Another vital point which will prolong the life of the T.D.s (and its general support to the infantry) - close in inf support! It is most important that a plateon of infantry be assigned to the T.D.s, work together, sleep together, fight together - and both will live a let longer. If the infantry commander cannot attach any infantry directly to the T.D.s, then make sure that close liaison is maintained, that the inf and T.D.s will move in any direction TOGETHER, and not leave one or the other "stranded."

On the attack, the T.D.s will do well to romain back a bit, and yot close enough to be a good supporting weapon. 500 to 800 yeards behind an attack, and rolling along with it - will find the T.D.s performing offectively - and yet not running the chance of meeting an enony A-T gun, bazoeks or mines. The infantry must encounter these obstacles FIRST - let the T.D.s know where they are, and aid them in the neutralization process! Infantry protecting the T.D.s as they move forward, and the doughboys out in front (looking for the German defenses against our armor), and you should have a satisfactory working arrangement. The tank destroyer gunner can lend a let of morale support to our doughboys by firing at ANTHING which may resemble the enemy! Throwing a three inch shell at suspected enemy hideouts, strong points, occupied homes and so on will aid greatly in getting the attack underway, frightening the enemy, and belstering our own men. Time and time again it was proven in combat, the sound of a racing motor, the wild and promiseuous shooting of all the armor's firppower had a dovastating effect on the enemy, no matter which and suppower at this method of attack! It's hard on the nerves, there's no two ways about it, and the doughboys up front know this all too well!

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Prior to any attack, another S.O.P. was a careful study of the ground and terrain over which we planned to pass. An understanding of the terrain, its possibilities and limitations, can either make it a storn barrier (or a successful stopping stone) to the infantry commander along with his T.D. plateon leader! In this regard, for quite committee in France, with swellen rivers, swemps, muddy ground and all - both our armor and the energy's could operate (MLY on the reads, (which were many tinds hone too read anyway.) Therefore either side (on the defense) could set up read blocks, mines, barriers and so on and know the other must come through that sector and be slowed down.

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The few times that the ground did freeze over during the winter, found American and German tanks exploiting to the fullest, the wide open terrain. And conversely defensive plans were much more difficult for both sides. Even with the ground frezen, it was necessary to double check to be certain there were no bogs or sunken areas which would trap the attacking T.D.s.

With any American attack successfully completed, it immediately became necessary to CONSOLIDATE. The Gorman likes to countorattack when you have reached your objective! He will take advantage of the normal confusion any attack carries, the possibility that communications are upset, that you are relaxed, or even hunting for souvenirs (still a popular Yank pastime!) There is no time to relax and let down! Foxholes must be quickly dug, new cover positions found, boundaries between companies, bus and regts doublechecked and lined in, avenues of approcaching enemy tanks guarded, - in general - there's "no sleep for the weary." It's strictly a 24 hour job until relieved. The enemy will ALWAYS get his artillery and mortar fire lined up just about the time you reach your objective - so a word to the wise is sufficient!

The problem of tying in flanks (for infuntry and T.D.s) is extremely important. There can be no guessing that "another company" is holding a cortain piece of ground, a road net, a corner of a village - you must check it and find out. The Germans are pastmasters at the art of infiltration - and by their excellent patrolling and local "fifth column" or friendly civilian reports, will quickly know what ground you hold - or if you have left any loopholes! The Boche have a habit of attacking on boundary lines, or against new green troops at a point where they know it will cause confusion and perhaps load to the most success.

Hunting for souvenirs, relaxing after the attack, failure to get "lined in," hoping the enemy is "whipped" - has in many cases cost American lives and equipment. The price of carelessness and neglect in time of war is very dear, in human lives! Battlewise units on the line today know and respect the German abilities - and act accordingly - whereas inexperienced troops usually must learn the hard way!

TANK DESTROYERS ON THE DEFENSE: - T.D.s, on the defense, need not be right up on the front lines, literally among the foxholes of the infantry, to be effective. A covering position, back from the lines a bit at some strategic spot, is far more satisfactory. T.D.s, too far forward, risk the chance of being overrun by enery infantry on a strong German attack. They'll either be overrun, or be forced to pull back. Once or twice, during this operation of "pulling back," or a strategic withdrawal, it was learned that the T.D. (or tank) cannot maneuver quite as simply as the individual doughboy. It takes time to "get off" the front lines - and the lumbering T.D. doesn't always come back as quickly as expected. Our armor has been picked off by the enemy, physically overrun by Jorry infantry, knocked out by German tanks - more than enough trying to stay too far forward on the defense - and then getting back "in a hurry." It can't be done every time, so the solution scems to be a covering position, behind the inf lines, in close support. The best spot for this "happy nodium" behind the lines - and yot not too far back, must come from careful advanced planning and a study of the terrain.

The problems on the defensive are great. Depending upon the situation, of course - cover, concentment, protection, hull down positions, the correct spot all had to be weighed carefully.

In open country, it was extremely difficult to find good cover positions close enough to the infantry to be of vilue - and yet remain concealed. The obvious answer is a hull-down position, concealment behind some barn, house, (etc.), and camouflage. Sometimes the T.D. stood out on the scenery like a "sore thumb" for want of a better position. It was felt for a while by the infantry - that the T.D. weapon - being large, sturdy and armored, could stand out in open terrain and "take it." It was quickly lograted that stordy artillery and mortar fire from the enemy soon were down the nerves of the gun crows, the same way bettle fatigue occurred among frontline infantry. Although the crows naturally enough had good protection - and a good sense of security - they still are only human, can stand se much - and had to be relieved. This is all in line with the following thought - if the T.D.s are kept back a bit, (but still in a position to aid the infantry) - the crews and vehicles will last a lot longer. The danger of arty shells and fragments injuring the vehicles will be lessened. The crew will be able to operate longer - and be of more value to the doughboys ahead. (Our battalion had two cases where direct hits were scored by long range enemy arty-on the front of the T.D.s - in each case none were injured and only a shaking up was the result - to the nerves of the crews. M-los were not damaged to the extent that they could not be back on the line in a few hours.)

It should be S.O.P. for the T.D.s to be dug in (if time permits) in a stable defensive position. Engineer bulldozers can be of great assistance in this respect. (Even with dug in positions, it is still possible for an accurate German tank gunner to pick a T.D. off). Our battalion had two M-lOs knocked out while defending positions in the Maginot Line (Seventh Army Sector north of Haganeu). All defensive positions, it should go without saying, must have mutual and supporting fire from another T.D., tank, or a nearby anti tank gun.

Two types of defensive setups (there are many more) proved to be the most boneficial. When defending a town, village or city - and the action if rather stabilized - wo adopted the following policy: - Each T.D. was placed in position behind the front lines AND behind a house, thick wall, or some type of good protoctive cover. The crew then more or less took up residence in the house, rested, slept fairly well, stayed out of the inclement weather. One man from the crew (or an E.M. from the Battalion's Resonn Company) established a "seeing eye" 0.P. nearby - and watched the enemy territory. From this 0.P. any enemy tank movements could be spotted and quickly called (phoned) to the waiting gun crows. The observer could then - on the appearance of enemy armor - lead the T.D. (over proviously reconnoitered roads) to a firing point and engage the tank. As a result of this simple method, all strain of combat exhaustion, battle fatigue and their like were reduced to nearly zerol For the first time in any defensive setup it gave the crow a break - a chance to get out of the vehicle, relax, out and sleep well - and still be readily available for any German thrust! Under this plan, all T.D.s word wired into their O.P.s, as well as to the infantry. So a well developed tank warning system was developed. No T.D.s were lost to the enemy while resting in this setup - and yet were always prepared for an attack by the Hun.

The other type of a defensive setup, in more or less open country and away from any villages - is the standard S.O.P. arrangement. Hull down positions, good camouflage, concealment behind woods, brush and so on - were effected. One distinct advantage here was the ability of the T.D. gunner to watch the terrain and be ready to fire at the enemy armor without moving his weapon. However, the crows were compelled to can, sleep, live and fight inside the cold bodies of the armored vehicles. Physical ailments, colds, constipation and other troubles did show up under this type of "forced living" conditions. One gunner fired on a German tank at less than two hundred yards range - for the simple reason that the eamouflage was so therough and complete - the Jerry tank never knew where the shot came from. The T.D. was literally "buried" in a mass of wreekage, rubble and shrubbery (only the tube and sight could be noticed by the casual observer). The Jerry tank didn't even see this much of the deception II

T.D.s, like any one clse on the front line, must know a good "escape route" in addition to all the other plans, schemes and so on which are worked out. A great deal of planning goes into any defensive setup - it's a 24 hour job and no sleep for the weary if the job is to be done successfully.

It's wise and a time henored idea anyway, on the defensive - to keep a section or plateen back in reserve, an "ace in the hele." No matter how critical the situation may be at the front, a few extra T.D.s on hand will usually prove a godsend when a serious attack is thrown by the Jerries.

TANK DESTROYER REACTIONS IN GENERAL TO THE FIGHTING IN FRANCE: - All loarn quickly that FEAR is a normal and natural instinct - and nothing to be ashamed of. In fact, four, coupled with extra care and courage, makes for a botter fighting man. The crack of German artillery shells, their mortar barrages, the clatter of the machine pistels and "burp" guns - all will work on the soldier's nerves and get him tense and strained. Now men going into combat for the first time should be lectured on this subject - and know it's no disgrace to be afraid the best of them are (experienced veteran doughboys).

Confusion in combat, the apparent SNAFU of things, changes of orders, counter orders, and so on all must be recognized as S.O.P. in battle. There is always a certain amount of confusion in an attack by either side - all should recognize this and learn to keep a coel head, when it appears that the whole situation is "bawled up." Rumors and false reports in combat have a deadly affect on morale and plans!! They must be checked, doublechecked and weighed carefully before going to higher headquarters. Now units in combat soum to report too quickly (and without careful investigation), "enemy tanks are overrunning us," "the town is clear," "we're surrounded by Jerries," "we are falling back," and hundreds of others. In many cases one or two individuals get rumors and incorrect reports started - they'll run through a command like wildfire!! One case is hereby given to qualify this point further.

A new regiment was on the line with our depictor, and in the heat of a strong Gorman attack (designed to grive the marie an Soverth army out of Haganeu) the S-3 phoned our command post about 0300 hours. "Your T.D. crows have abandoned their guns and are running away!!," he stated. The duty officer at the T.D. C.P. asked for further information on the subject - and promised to check up on it from his and the. It finally came out that the T.D. crows had become engaged in a fire fight with the enemy, both T.D.s were knocked out, so the report went - and their crows forced to leave the guns under pressure of enemy infantry surrounding them. The S-3 called up later and apologized for the incorrect report all was forgiven. One erroneous report like this had tied up the telephone wires for over an hour (during an attack) trying to prove or disprove it!! Further proof that the mind will become confused in battle:- the T.D. crows suffered casualties, believed their guns were burning up and get out. Inspection a day or two later, when the attack had died down, showed that NEITHER of the T.D.s had been knocked out - but that enemy flare nearby led the crew to believe they thomselves word aflamoili - and a mortar fragmont had wounded a crew member so the rost figured they had been hit and got out! In other words, both the crow and this particular S-3 had reported facts erroneously - and tied up a lot of personnel and TIME trying to "untio" the moss! Don't make reports, ospecially in the heat of battle - unless you are very cortain of the source and the corructness of thoma:

There is a good bit of "buck passing" in combat in an effort to "tag" someone for mistakes. Watch out for it - admit your errors rather than waste time trying to get out of them!

A fattlistic attitude as regards gotting injured or killed in combat is soon developed. "A miss is as good as a mile" attitude goes a long way toward keeping one's mental balance! American soldiers are remarkable anyway - they always like to figure, it will be the one next to them who will "got it," not themselves!!! It's a good attitude to have, about the only one to keep a man going over a period of menths. There is a good bit of feeling that one's "luck will run out" - and after quite a while in combat the average enlisted man and officer wonders when his will. A rest, if pessible or a change of jeb will sometimes cure this "mental quirk."

ENEMY TANKS ARE GOOD! Nover underestimate your enemy, and nover underrate his armor! The German tankers are well trained, know all the tricks, have been in the war a long time! The Mark 5 (Panther) and Mark 6s (Tiger and King Tiger - or Royal Tiger) are excellent weapens. The latter tank is a bit slow and lumbering, but has tremendous long range fire power and the improved sight. Many a shell has bounced off a German tank much to the consternation and disgust of the American gunners! The German tanks can get in that first shot at a greater range than we can!! Our gunners must usually hold their fire until the energy tank gets in closer (for an offective "KILL"). The Mark 5 rates on top of all tanks, American and German - for heavy armor, excellent fire power, maneuverability, speed and se on. It's good, in fact very good - se den't underrate them for one moment!

German tanks on an attack will fire wildly at times with all their weapons, race their meters, and so on - anything to distract the nerves of the American doughboy in front of them.

When a German tank is knocked out - it must be S.O.P. to keep shooting until it BURNS UP. Too many Jerry tanks have been immobilized ONLY by our fire power - and are retrieved that night by the German tankers. Any German tank, once hit - must be burned up - or it may well reappoar the next week or so in another fight!!

The Germans may be running short of tanks - but in their present attitude - on the defensive - they can meet our tanks with plenty of A-T guns and bazookas. Our infantry must spot these and bitter kneck them out - or get help - to preserve our own armore strength

CONCLUSIONS: -

1. The T.D. has proved a very effective weapon in the campaign against the Germans. Its original designation, as a tank destroying weapon, has been fully exploited and expanded far beyond one time pre-war days! T.D.s are called upon to do almost every job there is against the enemy. When no Jerry tanks are around, almost always the infantry colonels will find another job for them, another mission - to make use of their tremendous fire power and range.

Many times the T.D.s find themselves in an ironical spot too. On the line, the driver must turn over his noter every so eften to keep the battery charged up. This noise of the motor will usually bring down enemy mortar and arty fire. So the doughboys "curse" the T.D.s. But if the T.D. leaves the line for almost any reason - maintenance, more fuel, more ammunition, relief and so on - the doughboys will cast a leary eye towards them and wonder "WHY ARE THEY LEAVING US ALONE!" They'll almost think something is wrong and maybe they better get out too! The T.D. has an extremely good boosting affect on the minds and morale of the infantry. They like to see them up there with them, makes them feel a lot better when the going's tough.

And it works both ways too. Gun crews like to know the infantry are nearby and "with thom." If the infantry are forced to pull back, the T.D.s usually come out with thom - and vice versa.

From a gun designed and referred to as TANK DESTROYER, it has become a three inch sniper, a powerful threat to the enemy, and the strong right arm to the infantry!

Tank Destroyers, properly employed and with plenty of advanced planning and reconnaissance, have proved invaluable. No division which has had a battalion for even a month or two wants to give it up for any other unit.

They learn to "do or die" togethor

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