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HEADQUARTERS 1ST TANK DESTROYER BRIGADE
Office of the Brigade Commander

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TANK DESTROYER INFORMATION)

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SECTION I

CUMULATIVE REPORT OF TANK DESTROYER UNITS TO 25 DECEMBER

BATTALION	TOTAL TANKS DESTROYED	TOTAL SP GUNS DESTROYED	TOTAL ARTY & AT GUNS DESTROYED	TOTAL ROUNDS FIRED	ROUNDS FIRED DIRECT	ROUNDS FIRED INDIRECT
602 (1)	29	2	39	6411	2962	3449
603	30	10	22	11515	5331	6184
607	51	25	29	33876	9471	24405
609 (2)	19	3	9			
610	66		24	6717	3517	3200
631 (3)						
654	36	7	30	9814	4350	5464
691 (4)	1		1	7713	1381	6332
704 (5)	44	3	4	1380	736	644
773	88	19	26	9510	6726	2784
774	5	4	5	27647	7305	30542
807			19	35500	13218	22282
808			4	18347	1708	16639
818	26	2	12	19625	2657	16968

In addition to the tanks and self-propelled guns destroyed as shown above, these U. S. Tank Destroyers have also destroyed 300 machine guns, 437 pillboxes, and 766 other targets, including artillery prime movers, GP vehicles, OPs, AAA guns, troop trains, ammunition dumps, airplanes, etc.

- (1) 602 - No report for week 16 December - 25 December
- (2) 609 - No report for weeks 27 November - 3 December; 10 December - 17 December
- (3) 631 - Not yet in action
- (4) 691 - No report for week 18 - 25 December
- (5) 704 - No report for week 18 - 25 December

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SECTION II

TANK DESTROYERS IN COMBAT

1. 602ND TANK DESTROYER BATTALION:

The 3d Platoon of "C" Company, Lieutenant Gay Hutchison, Platoon Leader, gave the infantry a welcome lift November 20 in the vicinity of town. The infantry mission was to take the town. Two routes of approach somewhat separated from each other were available to the assault companies. The infantry was concentrated at one approach route and the tank destroyers were left in a position of readiness close to the other. Our artillery laid a twenty-minute concentration on the town and the enemy anticipated immediate attack. The tank destroyers moved to full defilade positions along the near approach route and threw direct fire into the town. All enemy weapons were turned on the tank destroyers and their assumed line of advance. In the meanwhile the infantry slipped round the other route and were within the town before they received a single round of enemy fire. There were no casualties among the tank destroyers. (S-2, 602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion).

2. 607TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION:

... 2nd Platoon - no change in location. A tank holding up the infantry in the town of ST BARBARE (8223) was finally destroyed by the 2nd platoon. This tank was so situated in the town that direct fire could not be brought upon it without undue exposure to its fire. A bazooka team, headed by Sergeant Holcomb was sent out to try and destroy the tank. This team hit the tank with a round of bazooka, but failed to disable it. The tank withdrew, but later returned to its former position. Further attempts to get to the tank with the bazooka failed. Lieutenant Knapp then fired several rounds of 80mm through the buildings in the direction of the tank, plunging a hole through several buildings causing a dust and smoke screen in the vicinity of the tank. Under the protection of this smoke and dust screen Lieutenant Knapp placed his destroyer in a position and fired through the smoke and dust screen at the location of the tank. Later reports from the Infantry and a tank officer confirmed the destruction of the enemy tank. (Commanding Officer, 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

3. 609TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION:

a. On 28 December Company "C" was contacted for the first time since their departure to the BASTOGNE pocket on 18 December. Fifteen enemy Mark Vs and one Mark VI as well as three anti-tank self-propelled guns were known to have been destroyed. Fourteen of these tanks were destroyed during the period 20th - 21st December by the 3rd Platoon under command of 1st Lieutenant David K. Hagons in the vicinity of NOVILLE (P588646) Belgium. The attacking enemy tanks were engaged as they emerged from the heavy fog at ranges of 200 - 300 yards. One destroyer knocked out five Mark Vs with six rounds.

Lieutenant Hagons employed two destroyers in static positions with excellent fields of fire and took advantage of buildings in NOVILLE for cover. The other two destroyers of his platoon roved about the village and were prepared to move into numerous positions upon call from either Lieutenant Hagons or Platoon Sergeant Hays.

b. The 2d Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Edward Gladden was successfully employed in direct fire at enemy infantry to repel counterattacks. It was while breaking up one of the enemy's persistent counterattacks, that Gladden's platoon destroyed a Mark V tank with an M-10 destroyer which was manned by a makeshift crew composed of personnel from Company Headquarters. The M-10 had been recovered under fire, manned and employed successfully.

c. The Reconnaissance Platoon, commanded by 1st Lieutenant M. K. Grant operated directly with elements of the 101st Airborne Division and was outposting the BASTOGNE-ARLON Highway. (Commanding Officer, 609th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

4. 610TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION:

a. On December 4th, the 1st Platoon, Company "C", commanded by Lieutenant Robert Hearn, was taken under fire by three anti-tank guns located in woods, 1000 meters East of THEEDINGEN. One tank destroyer was damaged by the first shot.

4. 610TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION (Cont'd)

but due to the alertness and quick firing of its crew and that of an overwatching tank destroyer, two enemy towed anti-tank guns and one assault gun were destroyed.

b. On 23rd December 1944, 2nd Platoon, Company "A", commanded by Lieutenant Michael Enich, supported infantry attack North from HEIDERSCHIED, by destroying 7 enemy tanks (2 Mark VIs), 3 halftracks, 1 anti-tank gun, 1 machine gun nest, and one ammunition dump.

c. On 25th December 1944, 3rd Platoon, Company "B", commanded by Lieutenant Marshall Legino, supported infantry attack on KEEMEN, by destroying one tank, two anti tank guns, and at least a platoon of infantry. This platoon was very instrumental in repelling an enemy counterattack in this same vicinity by firing against enemy infantry with all weapons, ranging from the 90mm gun to the effective use of hand grenades and individual small arms. (Commanding Officer 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

d. "On the morning 10 December 1944, about 1000 hours, I received word that two enemy tanks were spotted about 100 yards West of BRANDELFINGERHOFF FAR M which was about 1200 yards to the front. I went forward with Sergeant Faulkner, a platoon leader of Company "B", 602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion, and we tried to spot the tanks. I happened to pick up a gun barrel protruding from a barn on the BELLE-VUE FARM (North of BRANDELFINGERHOFF FARM). I moved the M-36 destroyer, commanded by Sergeant Travis, into position. The gunner, Corporal Jones, fired two rounds of APC into the barn. We then tried HE - 6 rounds of it and tore down the barn until we could see the tank. Corporal Jones then fired three more rounds of APC to finish it off. I then spotted another tank, a Mark V which moved up the trail toward BRANDELFINGERHOFF FARM then moved back down the trail to the west. I also spotted another tank about 1000 yards east of the first one. I again maneuvered the M-36 into position to fire on these tanks. Sergeant Faulkner moved an M-18 to fire on the nearer one. We were ready to shoot at the tanks when Lieutenant Marshall, leader of the first platoon, Company "A", 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion, opened fire from a position farther south, knocking out the first tank. The M-36 with us then opened fire on the other two tanks and knocked them both out. An enemy tank that I had not seen on the edge of the woods to the north (vicinity 611548) fired on the M-18 of the 602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion, destroying it.

"I want to advise about two things which may be of use to other Tank Destroyer people. The first thing - stay out of woods and if you have to go into them - go in backwards so that you can come out in high. The second thing - use plenty of reconnaissance to spot tanks, leaving the destroyers back until the tanks are found. The use of forward tank - spotting OPs - using the best glasses or instruments you can get is essential. Find the tank first and don't go poking destroyers over the hill. I do not recommend firing at long ranges, but we can destroy tanks at long ranges to protect the infantry when necessary." (Commanding Officer, Company "A", 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

e. Lieutenant Marshall, 1st Platoon Leader, Company "A", 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion, then described the action which destroyed the Mark V tank.

"I spotted the tank at a range of 4200 yards and moved the destroyer commanded by Sergeant Ring up to fire on it. He fired eleven rounds. The first three rounds were HE (so I could tell where we were hitting) and the other eight were APC. I didn't think the tracer would list at 4200 yards - but found that it did. We obtained four hits and the tank burned immediately. The crew of the destroyer (M-36) was Sergeant Ring, Corporal Pinto (gunner), Technician Grade 4 Satriolo, Private, first class DeCost and Private Slovak.

"Corporal Pinto (Sergeant Ring's gunner) told how on 11 December 44 he had had a fire fight at a range of 4000 yards - driving the tanks off, but not destroying them. He stated -

"I fired 5 rounds at the first one before he backed out and shifted to the left - and hit another one on the first round. He backed out and got away. I always try to locate the tank before we pull the destroyer up to shoot. If I can, I like to go up and look through the twenty power glass in the OP. What we need is bigger and better glasses."

5. 691ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION (Towed):

a. "The 1st Platoon of 'A' Company, 691st Tank Destroyer Battalion, was closely following the infantry's advance in the vicinity of GUEBLING. While moving into the southern part of town the Platoon Leader, Lieutenant Carnine, was contacted for support by the commanding officer of a company of infantry which was pinned down by machine gun fire and direct fire from an anti-tank gun. Lieutenant Carnine volunteered the support of his platoon and under machine gun fire moved his platoon into a farmyard from where he was able to deliver direct fire on the small woods from which the enemy fire was coming. The results of his fire on the suspected locations of the enemy guns resulted in the verified destruction of 3 machine guns, 1 anti-tank gun and 1 OP. The enemy retreated from the area and the infantry continued their attack and took their objective without further loss.

"The platoon's heavy occupation of the farmyard put to rout the crew of a Pak-40 anti-tank gun which was in a camouflaged position on the opposite side of the farmhouse. The crew deserted the gun with a round in the chamber and the piece in perfect condition. They also left a light machine gun behind, which was in position for flank protection."

b. "... 2nd Platoon, 'B' Company, credited themselves with one Mark V tank. The tank was one of the leading an enemy counterattack on Hill 265. The tanks were followed by approximately one company of infantry. The first tank was allowed to advance to a range of 500 yards before the first round was fired. The first round glanced off the glacis plate of the Tiger but it succeeded in jamming the elevating mechanism and forced the crew to start abandoning the tank. The 2nd round was an HE which took care of the personnel. Eight more rounds of APC completely disabled the tank and set it on fire. The second tank turned around after the first was stopped and started to retreat. This allowed the infantry to fire a rifle grenade into the rear of the tank; this stopped the tank and a bazooka round set it on fire. The enemy infantry decided they had had enough and did not bother to follow up the attack." (Commanding Officer, 691st Tank Destroyer Battalion).

6. 773RD TANK DESTROYER BATTALION:

Difficult river crossings continue to be a specialty with this battalion. Following up the crossing of the flooded MUSSELN RIVER, the battalion supported its division in the crossing of the SAAR RIVER, without a bridge. All M-10s and other combat vehicles were crossed over the SAAR during "flood stage" on ponton ferries without loss. Notwithstanding the intense enemy resistance encountered in the bridgehead. Later it was necessary to withdraw the battalion via the same route. The system developed here should solve to some extent the problem of getting tank destroyer weapons into bridgeheads without loss of time. (G-3, 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade).

7. 776TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

a. On the morning of 24 December 1944 the enemy launched a local attack. "A" Company's general position was northeast of SCHNIGG with all tank approaches covered. One gun knocked out a Panther at 200 yards with one round of 90mm AP. The hit was made on the side and corner of the tank right above the driver. The AP blew a hole about two feet in diameter and stopped the tank cold. One crew member survived and jumped on the back deck for a bazooka. He was quickly liquidated with a round of HE. The tank burned. One round each of AP and HE was expended.

From the same position another 40mm gun got a Panther at about 1500 yards. Two hits were scored on this tank. One in the track by AP, which blew the track off, and the other round of 45 in the turret, which blew a hole about six inches in diameter and made large cracks in the entire side of the turret, blew the breech block off, then blew off about half of the turret top. This turret hit was about a 5-degree hit from the perpendicular. The turret burned, but not the entire tank.

b. Company "A" was in direct support of 71st Infantry Regiment in the attack on MACHILLER. The 2nd Platoon, in position on the dominating ground west of BERG, supported the 3rd Battalion. The infantry moved along against light resistance until it came to the railroad track, where it was pinned down by small arms fire from armored vehicles. Because our infantry was so close to

7. 776TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION: (Cont'd)

the enemy our friendly artillery could not be used. The tank destroyer platoon leader, who was at the Infantry Battalion observation post with a battery pack, called his guns and identified the target. Three rounds of HE were fired at 4200 yards and the third round dropped right in the enemy armored halftrack causing it to burn. The crew was killed. The vehicle was dug-in, reinforced by railroad ties, and well camouflaged. A total of eight rounds were fired destroying all enemy resistance and although our infantry was almost in the enemy lines, no rounds fell on our infantry.

The infantry then advanced into the town, and the tank destroyers destroyed the upstairs of buildings, which were enemy strongpoints, while our infantry occupied the lower floors. This close support was possible because the platoon leader was able to communicate with his platoon and immediately take under fire any enemy targets designated by the infantry in addition to those he picked up himself. The platoon leader was able to keep informed of our front lines and prevented rounds falling short on friendly infantry. (S-3, 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

8. 807TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION (Towed):

"... A sergeant from Company "A" of the 807th spoke German fluently and had a great booming voice, both of which were used to excellent advantage against the enemy. Usually after several rounds from three-inch guns had been fired at strongpoints, their fire would be silenced and the sergeant would shout orders to the Germans for their surrender. The fire of the three-inch guns combined with the lusty voice of the sergeant was directly responsible for the surrender of one hundred and sixty German prisoners." (Report of Action, 807th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

9. 814TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION:

"... Good concealed positions on the flanks of tank approaches enabled my platoon to knock out eight Panther tanks in a recent action astride the MEIJEL-AUSTEN Road. All of my guns were knocked out but I was able to evacuate one of the destroyers. My last two remaining M-10s were engaging two attacking Panthers which were supported by four overwatching Panthers. The first Panther had been hit when an overwatching tank scored a hit on the turret of one of the M-10s, wounding the loader and assistant driver. The crew, except the gunner, evacuated the vehicle and removed the two wounded. The gunner continued firing and knocked out the leading Panther. The gunner then dropped down into the driver's seat and drove away under the cover of four smoke pots placed by other members of the platoon." (Platoon Leader, 814th Tank Destroyer Battalion: From Battle Experiences No. 9, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, dated 11 December 1944).

SECTION IIITANK DESTROYER TACTICS1. ANOTHER MISSION FOR THE TANK DESTROYER:

774th Tank Destroyer Battalion reported novel employment of 3" tank destroyer guns. Due to the shortage of 155 ammunition, a 3" tank destroyer gun was placed in position beside a 155mm self-propelled gun. The tank destroyer registered on a pillbox until scoring a direct hit. Data was given to 155mm crew and adjusted. The 155mm gun scored a direct hit with the first round fired. (Commanding Officer, 774th Tank Destroyer Battalion). EDITOR'S NOTE: Not a guaranteed procedure.

2. SUPPORT Vs ATTACHMENT:

From experience it is our conclusion that the tank destroyer companies are best employed in a supporting rather than an attached role. With this method in effect, the company commanders and platoon leaders have an opportunity to use their initiative and knowledge of tank destroyer tactics. It is our belief that the resulting coordination leads to a more satisfactory employment. (Commanding Officer, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

3. OPERATIONS AT NIGHT AND OPERATIONS IN WOODS:

a. It has been the experience of this battalion, that tank destroyers should be held to minimum use in any night operations. Even if the target may be illuminated by flares, the tank destroyer gunner is actually only able to fire one shot, because of the blinding effect caused by the terrific flash. By the time the gunner's eye sight is again readjusted, his position has become very vulnerable to enemy anti-tank fire. (Commanding Officer, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

b. In night attacks with tanks, the Jerry tank commander always leads his tank in the dark to its final position. The commander will invariably shout loudly his commands to the driver (who is not 'buttoned up') and this situation makes an excellent target even in the dark. Infantry and tank destroyers will do well to fire at the SOUND of the commander's voice, also at the tank itself to kill the driver. (813th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

c. The wooded and mountainous terrain presented problems that heretofore had not been encountered in FRANCE. The movement of the tank destroyers required extensive foot reconnaissance on the part of the Platoon Commanders and Chiefs of Section in order to find favorable trails by which the destroyers could keep up with the Infantry and give it the necessary supporting fires. However, this movement of the tank destroyers over seemingly impossible routes, through woods and over hill masses, paid big dividends in that it allowed the destroyers to surprise the enemy with devastating flank fire.

The .30 caliber machine gun mounted on the front of the turret proved of great value against enemy infantry, especially in wooded terrain. This gun also acts as an excellent security weapon for the tank destroyers while in night firing positions. Often times the enemy has attempted to infiltrate through our front lines with the object of attacking friendly armor placed immediately behind the lines.

d. While operating in the VOSGES MOUNTAINS and in the FOREST of RAMBERVILLERS, it was often found that proper foot reconnaissance over mountainous and wooded trails would reveal an untold wealth of trails by which tank destroyers could be brought up into position and surprise the enemy with fire on rear and flanks. (601st Tank Destroyer Battalion).

4. CUB PLANES OBSERVE FOR TANK DESTROYERS:

a. The 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion has assigned one of its Reconnaissance Company officers the full time duty as Air Observer. This officer is stationed at the Division Air Strip throughout the daylight hours. Since Reconnaissance Company has been authorized an additional officer, this has not in any way impaired the officer strength of the Company. Although this officer does, on occasion, act as an Artillery Observer, his primary mission is that of an Observer for this battalion. In addition to constantly observing for action of enemy armored elements, this observer is available to check any area on request. The communication procedure has been made an Annex to the 35th Division Anti-Mechanized S.O.P. and is as follows:

When an enemy armored force is reported, the Tank Destroyer Observer or an Artillery Air Observer will be assigned to locate the reported enemy and the Tank Destroyer Battalion Commander will be notified by the fastest possible means. The Tank Destroyer Battalion Commander will determine which Tank Destroyer Company is to engage the enemy force and will notify the Company Commander by radio on the 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion channel. The Company Commander will then contact the Artillery Observer on the Air-Ground net and inform him that he is ready to proceed with the mission.

The Company Commander will call the platoon leader or platoon leaders on the Company channel and assign their missions, whereupon, the assigned leader or leaders will switch their radios to the Air-Ground net and the designated destroyers will switch to the Air-Ground net, at the same time reversing their vehicle identification panels. When the panels are reversed, putting the white side up, it will indicate that they can hear the transmission and identify themselves and their positions to the Air Observer.

When Tank Destroyer Companies are assigned to the direct support of a Combat Team and the initial report of enemy armored activity originates

4. CUB PLANES OBSERVE FOR TANK DESTROYERS (Cont'd)

within the Combat Team area, the assigned Tank Destroyer Company Commander will immediately initiate action in conjunction with the assigned observer and will notify the Battalion Commander at the earliest possible opportunity. Upon the completion of the mission, all radios in Tank Destroyers and Tank Destroyer vehicles will be switched back to their normal channels.

To facilitate the above and to identify the Tank Destroyers, the call letters have been printed in black on the white side of their panels. The panels are left with their white side down until they are actually working with the Air Observer.

By rigging an SCR 608 with a four wire cable approximately 150 feet in length, we are able to keep a loud speaker and a microphone T17 in the command post. This SCR 608 is linked in the Air Channel and thus we have communication with the Air Observer. By monitoring the transmissions over this net we pick up much valuable information. (Commanding Officer, 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

b. Each of our tank destroyer platoons is tuned in on the observation plane channel at all times during daylight hours. We have had considerable success with air ground coordination and cooperation in this theatre. In one case, a cub plane spotted German tanks in front of one of our tank destroyer positions. Unable to reach the particular platoon by radio the pilot dropped a note on the movement of the enemy tanks and successfully warned the tank destroyers of the presence of tanks. Our command post also monitors all cub transmissions as a double check on possible tank and armor movements. (Commanding Officer, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion).

5. TANK DESTROYER SUPPORT OF RIVER CROSSING

Although it was impossible for the Destroyers to cross the SAAR RIVER until a bridge had been constructed, the gun companies of this battalion supported the Combat Teams by firing from positions on the friendly (West) side of the river while one platoon maneuvered to the south and crossed the river in the sector of the division on our right. Two enemy tanks were destroyed by firing across the river. (Commanding Officer, 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

6. COVERING TOWNS FROM OUTSIDE

One platoon leader was swayed from his better judgment by the insistence of the Infantry Battalion Commander whose battalion he was supporting and moved his platoon from a position on the outside of a town to a position within the town where he could not as adequately afford anti-tank protection. The change was made at night and resulted in the platoon's moving back to its original position the following morning. (Commanding Officer, 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

7. COVERING NOISE OF TANK DESTROYER MOVEMENT BY ARTILLERY FIRE

In a recent tank engagement with our Tank Destroyers, a platoon lieutenant found it necessary to move his guns forward to engage the enemy. He called for an artillery barrage on the enemy tanks. This served two purposes: (1) it caused the tanks to "back up"; and (2) mainly, the exploding shells completely masked the sound of the M-10 motors turning over and moving up to firing positions. In covering the sound of the tank destroyers moving up, he was able to engage the enemy tanks (Mark IVs and Mark Vs) and knock out three without loss to himself. This method of calling for artillery and even a mortar barrage is quite satisfactory in covering the sound of moving tank destroyers. (Commanding Officer, 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

8. CUTTING DOWN TREES WITH APC

When the Infantry Battalion his platoon was supporting was held up by enemy small arms fire coming from houses, Lieutenant McNaught, Platoon Leader, First Platoon, Company "B", delivered to fire on the houses with HE but could not obtain a hit due to trees in front of the houses. The trees were "cut down" with APC and then HE was fired on the houses. As a result of this effective fire, twenty (20) enemy soldiers were killed and fifty-four (54) surrendered. (Commanding Officer, 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

9. ANOTHER BATTALION USES POINT SYSTEM ON MAPS:

This battalion uses a numerical point system for making road map references. Each prominent terrain feature on the map is given a number. An overlay is prepared and distributed to all staff sections and companies. Not only does this facilitate more rapid reference but is an aid to security. (Commanding Officer, 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

10. SITUATION REPORTS:

This battalion has used very successfully, a code method in getting the situation report from the companies. A five paragraph report is requested daily, and at any other time deemed necessary, consisting of:

1. Location (including Company CP's and platoons)
2. Personnel casualties and P's captured.
3. Enemy equipment destroyed and own equipment damaged or lost.
4. Ammunition expended.
5. Gasoline needed.

In making these reports only the number of the paragraph is referred to. (Commanding Officer, 640th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

11. WE STILL MAKE MISTAKES:

On the morning of the 28th of November 1944 the 3rd Platoon, Company "C", . . . Tank Destroyer Battalion was asked to support the attack on the town of . . . Franco, by reducing by direct fire certain strong points expected in the town and thereafter to secure the town from counterattack. The 3rd Battalion, . . . Infantry was to attack from . . . and secure both flanks of the axis of advance by moving one company to the right or south of the road and one company to the left or north of the road.

Elements of the battalion were reported to have reached the edge of the town on the west and the tank destroyer platoon was to advance at 0930 and meet an infantry officer at the road block at the west edge of the town from which place he would point out the targets the tank destroyers were to reduce.

The platoon advanced as scheduled with three guns moving forward along the road and one acting as overwatch. Half-way between the overwatching destroyer and the roadblock the 2nd tank destroyer was taken under fire by an anti-tank gun and a track knocked off. Subsequently a second shot from the same gun set the tank destroyer on fire. The other two guns proceeded to the road block where they found enemy infantry in considerable force and none of our infantry. The platoon leader's destroyer was hit by a Panzerfaust (German Bazooka) on the final drive housing which penetrated the housing from the front but did not immobilize the vehicle and, after firing HE and .50 caliber machine guns at the infantry in the town, guns #1 and #3 were forced to move away from the buildings.

In backing and turning around the platoon leader's tank destroyer became stuck in the mud and was hit by three rounds from another anti-tank gun. The gunner was killed and the platoon leader wounded. These shots rendered the gun inoperative. Two other members of the crew were killed by small arms and mortar fire as they abandoned the tank destroyer. Tank Destroyer #3 returned unharmed to starting position.

During the entire action the overwatching tank destroyer had observed the flash of the anti-tank guns and attempted to fire but the firing mechanism failed to function. This was later found to be due to a weak firing pin spring.

The infantry who were to advance along the flanks had met greater resistance than anticipated and did not clear the anti-tank gun positions or reach the road block until after the foregoing action had taken place.

No prior reconnaissance of route was made due to small arms fire and no reconnaissance was made along the route followed or to be followed by the infantry, to determine what the intermediate position at the road block was secure before the tank destroyer platoon started for that point.

11. WE STILL MAKE MISTAKES: (Cont'd)

The loss of the two guns is attributed to: (1) poor coordination with the infantry; (2) the mechanical failure of the firing mechanism of the overwatching tank destroyers; and (3) lack of reconnaissance to determine the security of the intermediate position at the road block. (From report of investigation by . . . Tank Destroyer Battalion).

12. FIRING AT LONG RANGES:

Recently there have been numerous instances of tank destroyers firing at tanks from long ranges (3500 to 4200 yards). In some cases the tanks have been destroyed, more often the tanks got away. Our present tank destroyer guns are admittedly capable of knocking out tanks at 4000 yards but at this range odds are against us. Here are some reasons why:

a. At 1500 yards range estimation is accurate and with a maximum ordinate of 14 feet (3" gun) a hit on the first round is assured. At 4000 yards, however, range estimation is difficult and with a maximum ordinate of 137 feet several ranging shots will be necessary.

b. At 1500 yards the 3" projectile releases some 70,000,000 foot-pounds of energy on striking. At 4000 yards the projectile has lost more than half its energy, releasing only 30,000,000 foot-pounds -- a much softer punch.

c. Long range firing discloses our positions prematurely.

A company commander of the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion who has destroyed tanks at 4000 yards has made an excellent comment on the subject, saying: "I do not recommend firing at long ranges, but we can destroy tanks at long ranges when necessary to protect the infantry".

SECTION IVINTELLIGENCE NOTES1. EQUIPMENT

a. NOTES ON PZ KFW TIGER, MODEL B (EXTRACTED FROM WAR OFFICE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 148, 18 OCTOBER 1944)

(1) Weight, in action 66 tons 18 cwt.

(2) Crew 5 (Commander, gunner, loader, W/T operator, driver).

(3) Armor: Rolled plate of homogeneous machineable quality, except for gun mantlet, cupola, and exhaust brackets, which are castings. Thin apron plates, probably of mild steel, extended from the bottom of the superstructure sides to the top of the track and are spaced 2 ft. 11 in. from the hull sides.

(4) Armament

(a) Turret: One 8.8 cm KwK43 and coaxial 7.92mm MG 34. Cupola has fittings for 12 MG mounting (Fliegerbeschussgerät).

(b) Hull: 7.92 mm MG 34 ball mounted on offside of glacis plate.

(c) Miscellaneous: A smoke projecting device, with 360° traverse, is mounted on the offside of the centre portion of the turret roof.

(d) 8.8 cm gun: Brief particulars are as follows:

Elevation: -8° to 15° (nut and screw mechanism)

Firing Mechanism: Electric, incorporating normal safety devices.

Buffer: Hydraulic.

Recuperator: Hydro-pneumatic.

(5) Penetration performance of 8.8 cm gun Kw.K.43

Provisional Ordnance Board estimates for the penetration performance of the gun firing a 22.4 lb. APBC shell are as follows:

1. EQUIPMENT (Cont'd)

(5) Penetration performance of 8.8 cm gun Kw.K.43 (Cont'd)

Range yds	RV f/s	Penetration of homo armor in mm.	
		Normal	30°
0	3280	9.29 in	7.84 in
500	3089	8.58 in	7.05 in
1000	2905	7.87 in	6.46 in
1500	2728	7.20 in	5.91 in
2000	2558	6.61 in	5.35 in
2500	2398	6.02 in	4.84 in

(6) Ammunition carried:

Official German documents give the following details of ammunition carried:

	APCBC	HE	TOTAL
fighting tanks	40	40	80
commander's tanks	32	31	63

(7) Traversing Gear:

(a) Power Traverse:

This is dependant on the running of the main engine. The drive for it is through a vertical shaft driven from the main engine transmission shaft - engine/gearbox - through the centre line of the fighting compartment. This shaft drives a variable-speed gear, and the controls for this unit are:-

(i) a clutch for disengaging the unit from the main transmission shaft. This is situated at the rear of the oil gear on the loader's side.

(ii) a two-speed lever also at the rear of the oil gear but on the layer's side.

(iii) variable range within the limits of the two speeds is controlled by a lever situated towards the front on the near side of the oil gear. This provides for faster or slower speeds and may be presumed to control the oil delivery.

(iv) the final drive control, which is the one operated by the gunner when laying his gun, is in the form of a pivoted rocking plate on the floor of the fighting compartment. This is operated by the layer's feet, so that pressure by the right foot gives right hand traverse and by the left foot left hand traverse.

It is presumed that the gunner selects the optimum conditions for a given target by setting controls (ii) and (iii) and that final laying is achieved by control (iv).

(8) Dimensions:

Hull:

(a) Lengths			(b) Widths		
	ft	in		ft	in
include 8.8 cm gun	32	8	overall	11	11-1/2
exclude 8.8 cm gun	23	10	hull	6	4-1/8
superstructure roof	19	2			

(c) Heights		
	ft	in
overall	10	2
top of superstructure above ground	5	10
driving sprocket centres above ground	2	5

(9) Gearbox:


- (a) Forward speeds. Eight
 (b) Reverse speeds. One (A report from Russia gives 4 reverse speeds).

(10) Tracks:

- (a) Type Alternato main and connecting links. Each main link has two spuds on which there are five chevron patterned $\frac{1}{8}$ inch raised strips to afford better grip.
- (b) Number of links per track - 90.
- (c) Measurements Track width 2 ft 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ in
Front to rear bogie wheel centres . . 15 ft 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ in
- (d) Track pressure Approximately 14.3 lbs per square inch.


b. ARMOR THICKNESS

(1) Pz Kpfw VI, TIGER, Model B



Gun Mantlet is 80-100mm thick.


Armor consists of rolled plate except the cupola which appears to be a casting and the gun mantlet and turret ring protection strips which appear to be forgings.



Armor Arrangement

b. ARMOR THICKNESS (Cont'd)

(2) Pz Kpfw V PANTHER



2. BAZOOKA EFFECT ON MARK V, PANTHER:

a. To ascertain from first hand observation the effect of bazooka fire on the Mark V, Panther tank, sixteen rounds were fired at a knocked out 130 Pz Lehr Mark V, which had been immobilized by the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion's 90mm fire.

b. Conclusions:

"The bazooka will penetrate the armor on the side, rear, and side of the turret on the German Mark V Panther tank. The turret is very effectively penetrated and the blasted particles on the inside most certainly are lethal. The side armor is of less thickness than the turret and can be penetrated more easily.

"The wheels and tracks are not profitable targets. Pieces may be blown out of the wheels or tires out, but the possibility of stopping the tanks is remote.

"The rear armor is profitable target, because the engine compartment is very susceptible to fire, even though the tool boxes, jacks and exhausts reduce the area of vulnerability.

"Upon the front armor, it is difficult to get an effective burst, as the slope of the armor will ricochet the rocket. No perpendicular hits were obtained during the trial." (Commanding Officer, 5th Tank Destroyer Group).

3. ENEMY TACTICS:

a. WE STILL ENCOUNTER DECOYS:

In several instances, the enemy has planted decoys in the form of previously knocked out tanks in obvious target locations. When these decoys draw fire, enemy anti-tank guns and tanks have returned fire on our guns from their concealed locations on the flanks. (Commanding Officer, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

b. NEW GERMAN SELF-PROPELLED GUNS:

This Battalion has met and destroyed some of the new series of German self-propelled guns. A careful study of the weapons indicate that they are not a fighting vehicle as good as the Panther or Tiger tank. They are less mobile, more limited in fields of fire, and are as easily destroyed as the Panther or Tiger. (Commanding Officer, 603rd Tank Destroyer Battalion).

c. TURRET TRAVERSE OF PANTHER AND TIGER TANKS:

A tank battalion commander of the 1st Armored Division has observed that when Panther and Tiger tanks are moving, their turrets traverse very slowly or not at all. In paragraph 1 (7) above it will be noted that power for the turret is taken from the main drive shaft. It is possible, therefore, that the power system of the Panther, or Tiger, does not furnish sufficient power to move the tank and traverse the turret at the same time. If this is so a moving Panther or Tiger is more than usually vulnerable to our attack. Any units gaining formation confirming the above, please inform the 1st Tank

3. ENEMY TACTICS: (Cont'd)


Destroyer Brigade Headquarters so that the information may be disseminated.
(S-2, 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade).

d. CONCRETE "WHEEL-GUIDE" MINE (I.N. #40, SNAEF, 16 December 1944).

(1) This mine or charge has recently been encountered in ITALY and drawings are attached. It is stated to contain approximately 8 pounds of explosive which is loaded through a rectangular hole in the front of the concrete block. The latter is in the shape of a wheel guide such as is commonly found on road borms and curves.

(2) The drawing also shows the tread actuating mechanism, which could be used with either DZ 35 or ZZ 42 igniter connected to the charge by instantaneous fuze.

(3) A hole for an anti-lifting igniter is provided in the back of the concrete block.



Perspective view showing mine and tread board.

e. NEW METHOD OF ATTACK (I.N. #40, SNAEF, 16 December 1944).

(1) According to a recently captured Ft the Germans are now devoting a great deal of time to training in a new method of attack which was copied from the Russians. This method calls for a relatively long-term infiltration of small groups, less than platoon size, mainly at night. Over a period of 3-4 days he hopes to get the bulk of his forces into our MLR, or at least well behind the advanced positions.

(2) During the day the small infiltrated groups lie low, and if caught pass themselves off as ordinary patrols in order to avoid raising suspicion. Before the actual attack itself there is a small artillery barrage, and the assault itself is well-supported by infantry guns, mortars, and bazookas.

3. ENEMY TACTICS (Cont'd)

(3) This type of attack is predicated on the theory that German infantry is superior to Allied troops and that the overwhelming Allied superiority in artillery and planes, which frequently knock out the attack before it is under way, will be relatively ineffective. EDITOR'S NOTE: These tactics have been used extensively during present attack which began on date above document was printed.

4. TIME AND SPACE FACTORS OF ENEMY PANZER UNITS: (Extract, Tactical & Technical Trends, LIT #50, September 1944):

a. "Recently obtained data on time and space lengths of various German armored units are given below. The information should be helpful in making estimates of enemy logistic capabilities.

b. "These figures allow a 100-meter (109-yard) interval between battalions, companies, and equivalent units. They include first echelon battle transport (Gef. Tross I), supply transport, and repair services, but do not include second echelon battle transport (Gef. Tross II) and baggage transport.

Type of Unit	Length of column in yards at 12.4 mph (20 km.p.h.)	Time length of column in minutes at 12.4 m.p.h. (20 km.p.h.)	Speed on the march in good weather on good roads	Distance covered in 24 hours.
Tk Regt	25,910	71.2	By day, 12.4 mph (20 km.p.h.) By night, 7.5 mph (12km.p.h.)	93-124 mi
Tk Bn	7,200	19.7	As above	As above
Assault-gun Bn	6,780	18.6	As above	As above
Pz Gren Regt	14,330	39.3	By day, 15.4 mph (25 km.p.h.) By night, 9.3-12.4 mph (15-20 km.p.h.)	124-154 mi (200-250 km)
Pz Gren Bn (armd)	4,660	12.8	As above	154-186 mi (250-300 km)
Pz Gren Bn (mtz)	5,660	15.4	By day, 18.6 mph (30 km.p.h.) By night, 12.4-15.4 mph (20-25 km.p.h.)	As above
Pz Ren Bn	8,190	22.5	Same as for Pz Gren Bn (mtz). For troops in Volkswagen: By day, 21.7-24.85 mph. (35-40 km.p.h.) By night, 15.4-18.6 mph (25-30 km.p.h.)	154-186 mi (250-300 km) Units in Volkswagen up to 217 mi (350 km).
AT Bn	3,010	8.4	Same as for Tk Bn, Pz Gren Bn (armd), or Pz Gren Bn (mtz) respectively, according to type of equipment used in unit.	
Armd Arty Regt	17,830	48.9	Same as for Tk Bn or Pz Gren Bn (mtz) respectively, according to equipment.	
AA Bn	6,020	16.5	Same as for Pz Gren Bn (armd) or Pz Gren Bn respectively (mtz), according to equipment.	
Armd Sig Bn	3,720	10.2	Same as for Pz Gren Bn (armd) or Pz Gren Bn (mtz) respectively, according to equipment.	
Armd Eng Bn	7,870	21.6	Same as for Pz Gren Bn (armd) or Pz Gren Bn (mtz) respectively, according to equipment.	

8. GERMAN DESCRIPTION OF OUR ANTI-TANK SHELLS:

According to a telegram of the LXXXIX A.K. (Abt. Ic) on 21 October the Germans have admitted that some Panther tanks have been hit by a new type of shell.

The tank, pierced at once, burns inside like a torch. The situation of the point of impact makes no difference.

All parts of the body which are uncovered suffer serious burns of the 2nd and 3rd degree, whereas clothing is only slightly harmed. The shell apparently does not scatter phosphorus particles.

The shell is fired by Sherman 7.6 cms or 7.62 cms. The 7.5 shell resembles the 39 anti-tank shell. It is of special steel with an aluminum cap.

Unexploded samples of these shells are being sought for study at Kummersdorf by the Heereswaffenamt Wk. Prof. 1.

9. GERMANS MAY HAVE ILLUMINATING SHELL AND HVAP AMMUNITION:

When the German attack came on 16 December illuminating shell and HVAP for VIII Corps tank destroyer units was on an ammunition train. This train has disappeared and may have fallen into enemy hands. Watch out!

SECTION V

TECHNICAL NOTES

1. 81MM MORTAR:

Higher headquarters have turned down requests for 81mm mortars for tank destroyer units in Third Army because: (1) Infantry and Armored Table of Equipment requirements and battle losses are not being met, (2) Ammunition supply is not adequate for Infantry and Armored units now equipped with mortars.

2. PREMATURE FUNCTIONING OF SUPERQUICK FUZE IN HEAVY RAIN:

a. "Recent tests have shown that if P.D. fuzes of the M48, M57, and M51 series and the time and superquick fuzes of the M54, and M55 series are fired during extremely heavy rainfall, premature functioning of the superquick elements may occur which will result in an air burst. The exact position of such bursts is not predictable. Actual firings with 90mm ammunition under such conditions result in bursts anywhere from 100 to 11,000 yards from the gun position. The occurrence of such bursts is more likely to occur with higher velocity weapons such as the 90mm, 3-inch, or 155mm guns than with lower velocity weapons such as the 105mm and 15mm howitzer.

b. "If necessary to continue firing under such conditions, this occurrence may be prevented with the M48 and M51 series of fuzes by setting the fuzes for delay action, in which case the superquick element is inoperative. However, the M54, M55, and M57 series cannot be remedied because the superquick element is always operative after firing." (War Department Technical Bulletin, TB 9-1901-4, 4 September 1944).

3. MAXIMUM RATE OF FIRE FOR 90MM GUN:

Combat has shown that the maximum rate of fire for the 90mm gun on the indirect fire secondary mission is 20 rounds per hour. As a result of difficulties in the recoil mechanism of the M-36s in the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion, tests have been conducted under the supervision of ordnance personnel which established this rate of fire. At the present time the detailed report of this test has not been completed but will be forwarded to you when it is finished. (Commanding Officer, 5th Tank Destroyer Group).

4. CAN THE 90MM AA TUBE BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE TUBE ON THE M-36 TANK DESTROYER?

a. The 90mm Gun M3 (TD) is the 90mm Gun M1 (AA) with the following modifications: the elimination of side rails for sliding support of the gun

4. CAN THE 90MM AA TUBE BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE TUBE ON THE M-36 TANK DESTROYER?

and carriage, and provision of a cylindrical surface on the tube for that purpose; and the addition of a handle for manual opening of the breech. The workings for gun are located at the top of the breech ring. (T-9-375, 11 September 1944).

b. The above paragraph answers the question frequently asked, as to whether the 90mm Gun M1 (AA) can be exchanged for the 90mm Gun M-3 (on the M-36). The modifications necessary to convert an M-1 90mm to an M-3 90mm require extensive 4th echelon ordnance shop work.

5. 3" SHELL, ILLUMINATING, MARK 24, NAVY (MODEL 1):

a. Recently this organization, along with other Tank Destroyer organizations, was issued fifty (50) rounds of Shell, Illuminating, Mark 24, Navy, (Model 1) for use in illuminating desired areas. Due to the limited amount of this ammunition available it is planned to use these flares only on call from the Combat Team Commander. It is difficult to fire the shells at a close range due to the limited maximum elevation of the 3" gun on the M-10 carriage. In order to obtain maximum results it has been found advisable to place the destroyer firing the shell in a previously selected position. This position is normally in the area of the artillery unit with the Combat Team. Thus the data necessary for indirect fire may be furnished by the artillery unit. Because of the limited amount of this ammunition available and since the organic mortars of the Infantry regiments can illuminate areas up to approximately 3000 yards, it has been recommended by this battalion that these shells be used only to illuminate areas that cannot be reached by mortar flares. As a measure against possible night attack by paratroops, a position is selected normally in conjunction with the medium artillery battalion so that any area within the Division sector may be illuminated. (Commanding Officer, 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

b. The night of 12 December '44 between 2200 hours and 2330 hours, the 2d Platoon, Company "A", 691st Tank Destroyer Battalion, fired three (3) rounds of 3" illuminating shell.

The recoil of the piece was normal; the flash of the gun was less than with other types of ammunition; the distance fired at was correct; the illumination of the shell averaged 15 seconds of light.

The enemy fired on the light with anti-aircraft guns.

Armored Force observers reported results very good. Plans are being laid to place a few guns in rear positions with pre-planned areas to be fired on by call. Field artillery observers described the lighting quality and accuracy as perfect. (S-3, 691st Tank Destroyer Battalion).

c. On the night of Thursday, 14 December, the 3rd Platoon of "A" Company fired one gun over three targets in the vicinity of BITCHE at a burst height of 1500 feet. Three rounds were fired over each target at 1800, 2200 and 2400 for a total of nine rounds.

Reports of observers follow:

398th Infantry: "Area lit up like a ball park". "Fired at ground targets but results were not observed".

3rd Sound and Flash Battalion (Field Artillery): "Light was insufficient to observe ground objects, because of ground haze and burn out of shell at 500 feet." "At lower height of burst, giving illumination down to ground level with perhaps a multiple of shells fired, would give better results".

The illuminating shell used:

Fuze T and SQ M54

Muzzle Velocity - 2600 f/s

Height of Burst - 1500 ft (normal)

Time of Burning - 25 seconds

Speed of Descent - 40 f/s

The battalion is prepared to fire this illuminating shell again on call and the necessary factors can be varied to supply the proper light for the weather conditions and terrain. (Commanding Officer, 824th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

6. OPERATION OF TANKS IN COLD WEATHER:

"Officers of other units sometimes do not realize the problems of tank operation in cold weather. Some of the difficulties which should be understood are:

a. "A solid footing must be found for each tank if it is to be left in position for several hours. If this is not done it will freeze to the ground as though it were cemented in cement. A strenuous effort to break out will result in track failure.

b. "In cold weather batteries will not start the engines unless fully charged. It is, therefore, necessary that the somewhat noisy auxiliary generator be run the greater part of the time that tanks are not actually engaged in combat.

c. "The proportion of tanks needing maintenance will be greater during cold weather because of the additional load on the batteries, engines and electrical systems." (Commanding Officer, 749th Tank Battalion).

7. FUEL CONSUMPTION:

It has been found that the fuel consumption of an M36 is approximately 2 gallons per mile. This is an increase over the Technical Data Circular published by Ordnance, which states that fuel consumption is $1\frac{1}{2}$ gallons per mile. (Commanding Officer, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

8. STORAGE LIST AND TIRE PRESSURE:

a. War Department Technical Bulletin, TB ORD 143, which has just been published, is the latest equipment storage list for the M-10 and M-10A1.

b. War Department Technical Bulletin, TB ORD 139, prescribes tire pressures of 45 pounds for the 8-inch gun carriages M1 and M6.

9. 500 SERIES RADIOS FOR TANK DESTROYERS WITH ARMORED DIVISIONS:

Third United States Army has made available twelve SCR 510 radios for each Tank Destroyer battalion attached to an Armored Division. These radios will enable the Tank Destroyer battalion not to become a part of the Armored Division net. This improved system of communications will make the Armored Division and attached Tank Destroyer battalion a much more efficient fighting team.

10. EXTENDING ANTENNAE ON M.C.S. RADIO:

When it is found to be desirable to establish the command post in a building, we have made it SOP to extend the antennae on the M.C.S. radio by placing it on the roof of the building. As a result our communication has been considerably improved. (Commanding Officer, 854th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

SECTION VI

FIELD EXPEDIENTS

1. 691ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION:

"Little Thunder-Bug" is a modified car, armored, utility, M-20, used as a light wrecker and recovery vehicle for battalion maintenance.

"The modifications were very simple, consisting of two pieces of U-Bar iron, 8' x 5", which were fastened to the rear bracket of the ring mount and supported by a metal post in the center. Two pulley wheels were placed between the two pieces of U-Bar iron, one at the extreme end and the other in the center. A hand operated winch was installed, using the M-20's tow cable as the winch cable. The U-Bar iron, pulley wheels, and hand winch were found in the field near one of our bivouac areas, which means it cost the Government nothing.

"Little Thunder-Bug" has become one of the most useful pieces of equipment that we have. It can go places that the ten-ton wrecker cannot;

1. 691ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION (Cont'd)

also, it is a much better vehicle to take on the battlefield. It has recovered at least forty jeeps, five 3 1/2 ton Dodges, and six 3" guns. In the past month it has been working overtime, pulling our vehicles, any type including half-tracks, and guns out of the mud. Little 'Thunder Bug' gets no rest. While in the shop it is used as a hoist to lift heavy units, tracks, and vehicles." (Commanding Officer, 691st Tank Destroyer Battalion).

2. 610TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION:

"By wiping oil and grease from the turret ring and mechanism during freezing temperatures, the turret has been kept from freezing, thus preventing faulty traversing." (Commanding Officer, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

SECTION VII

COMBAT TIPS

1. INTERROGATION OF PATROLS:

"Returning patrol members should be carefully questioned by experienced officers. On one occasion a patrol reported that nothing of value had been observed. Questioning revealed that one man had seen a number of dead sheep. Another patrol was sent to this area and found a minefield." (S-2, 1106th Engineer Combat Group).

2. BASIC TRAINING:

a. "The two most serious losses sustained by this battalion in combat were caused, in my opinion, by members of the command disregarding a very important element of basic training during the course of battle.

(1) "An officer gathered around him five enlisted men for a conference during battle within sight of the enemy. Result--a mortar shell--4 men killed. Basic--Don't gang up on the battlefield.

(2) "An officer took a section of destroyers over the crest of a small rise without taking a look to see what was over the hill. Result--4 men killed. Two destroyers lost to anti-tank guns. Basic--Take a look before jumping in.

b. "It is believed that the basic principles of war taught at Hood are most sound, and that, if followed, will result in much destruction to the enemy and minimum loss to ourselves". (Commanding Officer, 603rd Tank Destroyer Battalion).

3. GERMAN EXPLOSIVES PLANTED WITH-TIMING DEVICE FOR DETONATION:

"The Reconnaissance Company of this battalion established its command post in a large building in the city of NEUMUNSTER, FRANCE on 17 December 1944. A thorough search of these premises revealed a colossal "Booby Trap" consisting of more than a ton of German explosives camouflaged under a pile of potatoes. Near the bottom of the pile a firing device was discovered. Forty-two (42) boxes of dynamite each weighing approximately fifty (50) pounds were uncovered. According to the Engineer officer, who made investigation on request of this unit, the explosion would have occurred in three days. This timing device was made of plastic." (Commanding Officer, 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

SECTION VIII

TRAINING REPLACEMENTS

1. 603RD TANK DESTROYER BATTALION:

"The quality of replacement officers and men has been good. Many of the men, Tank Destroyer trained, have not been up to the standard desired in this battalion, and many of them including officers have never seen an M18. This battalion has found that it is well to run all gun company replacements through a week to ten-day schooling on the M18 within the Headquarters Company

SECRET

1. 603RD TANK DESTROYER BATTALION (Cont'd)

before the men are turned to the gun company. A very careful and studied program of making a new soldier feel at home in the battalion is paying big dividends, and the inexperienced soldier is shielded from enemy action as much as possible until he has "Cut his teeth". (Commanding Officer, 603rd Tank Destroyer Battalion).

2. 654TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION:

"To solve the problem of driver replacements for the M10 Tank Destroyers, Company "C", this battalion, has initiated its own driver training program. Instructions are given by the Company Executive Officer and the Company motor sergeant using the T-2 recovery vehicle as a training vehicle". (Commanding Officer, 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion).

SECTION IX

TANK DESTROYER TROOP LIST

The latest available list of Tank Destroyer Brigades, Groups, and Battalions, with their commanders, is furnished for your information below.

BRIGADE

1ST TANK DESTROYER BRIGADE -- Colonel LOGAN C. BERRY

GROUPS

1st TD Group	-	Colonel STEVEN'S	8th TD Group	-	Colonel LARTER
2nd TD Group	-	Colonel ELME	9th TD Group	-	Lt Col DARLING
3rd TD Group	-	Lt Col HAYS	12th TD Group	-	Colonel DEERY
4th TD Group	-	Colonel BROWNING	13th TD Group	-	Colonel WHEATON
5th TD Group	-	Colonel JACCOY	20th TD Group	-	Colonel SERGEANT
6th TD Group	-	Colonel SEMROY	23rd TD Group	-	Major BAKER
7th TD Group	-	Lt Col BERGSTROM			

BATTALIONS

601 TD Bn	-	Lt Col TARDY	704 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BIDWELL
✓602 TD Bn	-	Major COLLIN	705 TD Bn	-	Lt Col TEMPLETON
603 TD Bn	-	Lt Col McCURRY	771 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SMITH
605 TD Bn	-	Lt Col DUCKWOLD	772 TD Bn	-	Unknown
607 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SUNDT	773 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SPIESS
609 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BROWNE	774 TD Bn	-	Lt Col STURGIS
✓610 TD Bn	-	Lt Col JEFFREY	776 TD Bn	-	Lt Col MOOREHEAD
612 TD Bn	-	Lt Col DEELEY	801 TD Bn	-	Lt Col HORSEFALL
614 TD Bn	-	Lt Col FRITZGERD	802 TD Bn	-	Lt Col MONTGOMERY
628 TD Bn	-	Major GALLAGER	803 TD Bn	-	Lt Col GOODWIN
629 TD Bn	-	Lt Col COLE	807 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SMITH
✓630 TD Bn	-	Major JONES	808 TD Bn	-	Lt Col McDONALD
✓631 TD Bn	-	Lt Col HATHAWAY	809 TD Bn	-	Lt Col LAWSON
634 TD Bn	-	Lt Col DAVISSON	811 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BROWNFIELD
635 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SMITH	813 TD Bn	-	Major McCUTCHEON
636 TD Bn	-	Lt Col FUNDY	814 TD Bn	-	Lt Col JONES
638 TD Bn	-	Lt Col DAVIS	817 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BARDES
643 TD Bn	-	Lt Col FARR	818 TD Bn	-	Lt Col HAIL
644 TD Bn	-	Lt Col GRIMM	820 TD Bn	-	Lt Col PATRICK

TANK DESTROYER TROOP LIST (Cont'd)

645 TD Bn	-	Lt Col AUSTIN	821 TD Bn	-	Lt Col ARBURY
648 TD Bn	-	Unknown <i>C. Burn H. Stevens</i>	822 TD Bn	-	Lt Col MAINS
654 TD Bn	-	Lt Col MINTON	823 TD Bn	-	Lt Col DETMAR
656 TD Bn	-	Lt Col REARDOR	824 TD Bn	-	Unknown
691 TD Bn	-	Major FINLEY	825 TD Bn	-	Lt Col MEADING
692 TD Bn	-	Unknown	827 TD Bn	-	Unknown
702 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BEALL	893 TD Bn	-	Major CARLIN
703 TD Bn	-	Unknown	899 TD Bn	-	Lt Col TINCHER
			RBFI * TD Bn	-	Lt Col MAGGLAR

* Regiment Blindoo Fusiliers Marines.

Logan C. Berry

LOGAN C. BERRY
Colonel, Cavalry (TD)
Commanding

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1 - CG, TD Center
1 - G-3, SLEEF
1 - AT O, 5th Army.

NOTE: Please send your contributions in early for February issue.