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610th JW Br
(6)

HEADQUARTERS 1ST TANK DESTROYER BRIGADE
Office of the Brigade Commander

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TANK DESTROYER INFORMATION)
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SECTION I

CUMULATIVE REPORT OF TANK DESTROYER UNITS TO 28 APRIL

BATTALION	TOTAL TANKS DESTROYED	TOTAL SP GUNS DESTROYED	TOTAL ARTY & AT GUNS DESTROYED	TOTAL ROUNDS FIRED	ROUNDS FIRED DIRECT	ROUNDS FIRED INDIRECT
602	42	9	73	11011	7492	3519
603	62	53	56	15450	8366	7084
607	58	23	49	62952	9369	53583
629	58 (Includes tanks and SPs)					
631 *						
633 *						
635	4	1	3	230	230	
648 **						
691	8	4	3	16117	3069	13048
704	72	18	42	2196	1552	644
705	43	6	12	22228	7200	15028
773	109	27	64	13647	10479	3168
801 **						
805	20	19	15	45869	6192	39677
807			19	40170	13220	26950
808	15	13	35	40402	8464	31938
811	71	34	23	9054	3673	5381
818	33	9	17	24212	4782	19430
820	9	1				
Others ***	142	22	116	107430	33620	73810

In addition to tanks and self-propelled, anti-tank, and artillery guns destroyed as shown above, Third Army Tank Destroyers have also destroyed 505 machine guns, 801 pillboxes and 1519 other targets including artillery prime movers, general purpose vehicles, CPs, AAA guns, troop trains, ammunition dumps, airplanes, etc.

- * Not yet in action.
- ** No tank action in Third US Army.
- *** Destroyed by tank destroyer battalions formerly in Third Army, but now assigned to other armies.

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SECTION II

TANK DESTROYERS IN COMBAT

603RD TANK DESTROYER BATTALION (M-18):

On 3 April, First Platoon of "C" Company was occupying a hill near BAD SODEN that gave the four destroyers command of a road a few hundred yards away. Along this road came ten German self-propelled guns one behind the other. First Lieutenant Fogwell, commanding the platoon, held his fire until the self-propelleds were only 300 yards away. He then ordered his destroyers to fire on the first two and the last two vehicles in the column. These four self-propelleds were knocked out with the first few rounds. The six self-propelleds in the middle of the column surrendered immediately, no German gun having fired a shot. (Commanding Officer, 603rd Tank Destroyer Battalion)

654TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION (M-36):

On 15 March 1945, this battalion was attached to the ___ Infantry Division. The Division had been given an objective on the East bank of the Rhine River, to be taken on a later date. The Commanding General, ___ Infantry Division, assigned the battalion the following mission to be executed prior to the attack:

- (1) Destroy all visible houses, OPs and enemy positions on the East bank of the river.
- (2) To sink all barges, boats, etc., on the enemy side of the river.
- (3) Tank destroyers to be in "dug-in" positions on the West bank of the river so as to deliver direct fire in support of the attacking infantry before and during the attack.

Since the battalion had supported the ___ Infantry Division in the attack across the Roer River and up to the banks of the Rhine, we knew the terrain thoroughly throughout the division sector, and were able to begin the execution of the assigned mission immediately. Targets to be engaged were promptly spotted from operated OPs and the battalion began its period of "real target practice". The terrain was sloping towards the river from each side and was somewhat open. It was very difficult to pick firing positions unobserved by the enemy, therefore it was necessary to fire a limited number of rounds from a position before moving to an alternate position. The fact that counter-battery was very often received on our firing positions, after we had moved to alternate positions, made the "target practice" much more realistic than previous periods of practice and we had very little difficulty in persuading our destroyer commanders to pick alternate positions prior to firing.

Houses and OPs were engaged from ranges up to 3,000 yards, but in order to engage boats, barges, etc., it was often necessary to move to within 50 yards of the river. However, the missions of destruction were carried out and, although the counter-battery was sometimes very heavy from both artillery and self-propelled guns, the battalion suffered no vehicle casualties in those operations. Very close coordination was maintained with infantry units in the area throughout these operations to allow them sufficient time to be prepared for counter-battery.

Plans for the fulfillment of our direct support mission were put into effect simultaneously. A dike about 10 feet high that extended along the river bank was decided to be the best place for direct fire positions in support of the attack. A sufficient number of positions, both primary and supplementary, were prepared and thoroughly camouflaged. A fire plan was drawn up, assigning certain numbered targets to platoons and data was prepared for nightfiring. An officer and NCO, who thoroughly understood the fire plan, were designated to accompany each assault battalion in the attack in order to control the fire. D-day and H-hour was set for 240300 March 1945, with a one-hour artillery preparation to begin at 0200. At H-hour minus 6 the destroyers moved to the previously prepared positions and began to deliver direct fire, during the artillery preparation, by firing at "close in targets" which the artillery and mortars were unable to engage. The attack went as planned and, by use of the previously prepared fire plan, the officer accompanying the infantry was able to call for and get fire on any target in the path of the attacking infantry in a matter of seconds.

The division had very little difficulty in establishing a "bridgehead" and

654TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION (Cont'd)

reached their objective promptly with a surprisingly low number of casualties. (S-3, 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion)

691ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION (M-36):

The following is an account of the first engagement in which this battalion took part using their new M-36 destroyers:

Company "A", commanded by Captain Robert C. Miller, was carrying a full load of the 2nd Battalion, _____ Regiment's infantrymen into the attack on the town of LAICHESSALZA, when they met their first resistance from dug-in German infantry. The First Reconnaissance Platoon, commanded by First Lieutenant Melvin L. Fizzol, reconnoitered the area and reported large numbers of infantry and probable self-propelled guns and tanks.

Captain Miller sent the Second Platoon, under the command of First Lieutenant Frank J. Ziolinski, and a section of the reconnaissance platoon to the left flank of town, where they ran into a defended road block in a railroad underpass. This was quickly eliminated by Sergeant Walter L. Sobel's destroyer with a couple of rounds, and the platoon moved on into the railroad yards crashing over what was left of the block.

The right flank was taken by the Third Platoon, First Lieutenant Bernard H. Vorweyst commanding, and the second section of reconnaissance under Sergeant Henry H. Struck. Their first brush was with some dug-in infantry that was delivering small arms and machine gun fire on the advancing destroyers and doughboys. This brush resulted in the capture of 40 German infantrymen and 5 bazookamen and enabled the doughs to gain the high ground to the right of the town.

Staff Sergeant Omar Dauplaise, in command of the First Platoon, advanced with his destroyers toward the center of town and encountered a flak-wagon which immediately took the destroyer under fire. Corporal Joseph F. Minster, gunner of the destroyer, was wounded by the 20mm fire but succeeded in knocking out the flak-wagon. A Mark VI tank lumbered around a corner into battle and was as quickly turned to scrap by the wounded Minster.

The Second Platoon proceeded from the road block to the railroad yards, drawn by small arms and bazooka fire which was holding up our infantry. The Germans fled into a large building and refused to surrender. Five rounds of 90mm HE made further opportunity to change their minds impossible.

From this time on the doughs took over the actual mopping up of the town and the destroyers sought out and destroyed all the heretofore untouched military installations in the vicinity. These included an ammunition cache, a factory which was capable of turning out 50 Messerschmidt plane wings per day, and a lightly defended and camouflaged oil dump.

All told, in the brief half-hour that the action lasted, the company, in addition to the above-mentioned, destroyed 20 enemy vehicles, assisted in the capture of 50 more, killed 65 of the enemy and captured 232 more, with the sum total of two men wounded in the company and attached reconnaissance platoon. (S-3, 691st Tank Destroyer Battalion)

803RD TANK DESTROYER BATTALION (M-36):

The first armor in Third Army across the Rhine River was "C" Company of this battalion. Forty-ton ferries were used to transport destroyers in support of the infantry. (Commanding Officer, 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion)

SECTION IIIINTELLIGENCE NOTES1. WOLVES IN SHEEPS' CLOTHING:

a. Apprehension of German soldiers in Civilian Clothing (Source: VIII US Corps. G-2 Information Bulletin No. 34, 1 April 1945, Third US Army)

Inquiries made relative to apprehension of German soldiers in civilian

a. Apprehension of German Soldiers in Civilian Clothing (Cont'd)

clothes have motivated the publication of the following aides to success in this field. These aids have been employed with excellent results by enterprising personnel.

Document Examination: Every German guards his identity documents as he would his life. Since 1924, at the advent of Adolph Hitler, his New World, and his ruthless police, the possession of an identity document has generally meant the difference between freedom and prison. The habit has been ingrained and it can be assumed every German will carry with him some sort of identity document if he has one. Therefore, it can be assumed also, until proved otherwise, that a man carrying no such document is attempting to hide his identity or military-civilian status. Any healthy civilian male 17 years of age or older (of military age) probably will carry one of the following listed identity documents:

Wehrpass: The Wehrpass is a bluish-gray book carrying pertinent personal information regarding the individual. His picture appears on the second page, along with data regarding date, place of birth, etc. It is issued to every man when he reaches the age of 17, and he carries it so long as he is not a soldier. When he is inducted into the Army, he turns in his Wehrpass and receives in return a Soldbuch. Upon his discharge from the Army, the Soldbuch is taken away and his Wehrpass is restored to him. It may be stated safely that a man carrying a Wehrpass is not a soldier.

Soldbuch: Every soldier in the German Army carries a Soldbuch. This is a small yellowish book, with the word Soldbuch printed on the cover. A picture of the individual in uniform appears on the second page. Every man in civilian clothes who carries a Soldbuch is automatically a soldier with no further questions necessary, which is true also of any soldier who turns himself in voluntarily.

Entlassungsschein: This is a white sheet of paper which is issued to a soldier upon his regular discharge from the German Army. At the top of the paper is the word Entlassungsschein. This paper carries the dates of a man's service in the Army. The Entlassungsschein is considered an adequate identity document. However, for some reason, not every discharged soldier is issued such a paper; when a man has a Wehrpass and claims to be discharged from the Army, but has no Entlassungsschein, it is necessary to check the rear pages of the Wehrpass upon discharge.

Ausmusterungsschein: This is a red piece of paper carrying a photo of the individual. When a man reports for induction but is rejected because of illness or some deformity or some other disqualifying ailment, this is the paper he receives to certify that he is 4F. A man who has such a paper on his person is not a soldier.

Handling of Suspects: Question most carefully all young healthy-looking men in their twenties or thirties who, when interrogated, claim that all their papers have been destroyed in bombing raids, fires, etc. Nine chances out of ten they are lying and are soldiers.

Phrasing of Questions: Put the suspect off balance by asking him questions which make him think you know already he is a German soldier; as if some one in the town has informed on him. Do NOT ask "Were you in the Army?" - Instead ask, "Where is your soldbuch?", "What is (not was) your unit in the Army?", and similarly directed questions.

Searching of Suspect: Always search the suspect. A lying soldier often carries his Soldbuch to protect himself against accusation as a spy in the event of detection of his true status.

Preliminary Investigation: If a man is a long resident of a community, his statements can be checked by speaking to people residing in his alleged neighborhood. For instance, a man says he was discharged in 1943 for heart trouble, and has resided ever since at a certain address, but has no papers to prove it. A simple neighborhood check can be made in this manner. Approach about five people who state they know the suspect. Ask, "Was he in the Army?" "Was he discharged?" "When?" "Why?" "Where has he lived ever since?" If all their answers jibe with those of the suspect's, it can be assumed he is telling the truth for it would be extremely difficult for him to prepare every neighbor for the answering of questions in such a way that his statements received general communal backing.

Posters: Military Government, within the limits of its small number of personnel, puts posters in every town instructing German soldiers to turn themselves in at a particular place. This is important because many of these soldiers in the absence of instructions take no action to give themselves up for lack of knowledge of how to do so; many in the absence of a poster, which infers treatment of them according to the Geneva Convention, do not voluntarily turn themselves in for fear of being considered a spy. Posters make the clearing of a town easier. Therefore, if necessary, request the G-5 of your echelon to have posters put up, and, in the meantime, when the situation may be especially pressing, make some of your own and put them in prominent places. In such case, be sure to state where they should report, and obtain clearance with the appropriate G-5 for the action you are taking.

Disposition: Apprehended soldiers in civilian clothes are to be treated as ordinary Prisoners of War and evacuated to the nearest PW camp, the location of which your Provost Marshal can give.

CIC: Call the CIC if you cannot handle a man to your satisfaction by application of appropriate portions of the above or if you apprehend a person who is unduly suspicious. It should be noted that in such instances you may be required to hold the man for 12 hours or over night because there are only a handful of CIC personnel to service the thousands of Corps troops involved. In any event, CIC servicing will always be as expeditious as possible.

Remember, there are among us many of the enemy armed forces dressed in civilian clothes. These men are soldiers and as such have never hesitated to kill Americans. It is highly probable that their change to civilian clothes does not reflect an accompanying change of heart.

b. Rotten Apples in the Barrel (Source: III US Corps. G-2 Information Bulletin No. 39, 8 April 1945, Third US Army)

Hordes of non-Germanic oppressed labor are being overrun in our rapid advance from the RHINE. Frenchmen and Belgians predominate; Russians and Poles are in quantity. Many are former soldiers against the Reich. A dangerous tendency toward indulgence and blind acceptance of these individuals has been observed. In fact, the concern is so small that these persons are permitted to wander at random about the streets of towns where troops are billeted. Troops participate in the evident liberation fever, especially by accepting the perennia wine offered the Liberators by former French and Belgian soldiers and by conversing at length with them. "What could be more natural?" the GI asks. "They are our Allies and on their way home after five years as prisoners of war." Nothing could be more natural - but nothing could be more potentially dangerous.

With few exceptions, the large number of German Gestapo espionage agents recently apprehended have been French, Belgian, Russian and Polish. Within the past few weeks, seven such agents have been extracted from the ranks of these displaced persons who were unwittingly serving as a convenient cover for their spying upon our forces - upon you. Counter Intelligence personnel knows that enemy agents may increasingly employ this cover, but the difficulty of detection is immense. Isolation from military installations and from contact with troops is the surest preventive.

(1) Keep displaced persons, i. e., liberated foreign nationals, away from your installations.

(2) Whenever possible, corral those wandering about and segregate them under guard or get them to the nearest Military Government camp.

(3) Consider every one of these people a potential German espionage agent. Their true status will be determined by trained personnel at the rear following their evacuation.

Above all, don't indulge in soft assumptions. Better to extend the good man's oppression another day than to ease the machinations of an enemy agent

c. Discharges Made to Order (Source: III US Corps, G-2 Information Bulletin No. 43, 16 April 1945, Third US Army)

Among the 43 German soldiers apprehended in civilian clothes by the 203d CIC Detachment today was Gefreiter Walter Jost, member of Landesschutz Battalion 491. He had been ordered to escort five sick French PWs from DUSSELDORF (P39) to LAUEWU (X1909). On arrival there, Jost learned from other German soldiers about a Todt Organization office where members of beaten, disorganized units could receive a "discharge". Jost revealed that several German officers issued and signed discharge certificates on the spot to any German soldier or Todt Worker wearing a uniform; no identification was required to obtain a "discharge" paper. Jost also stated that these "discharges" were being signed and issued by the hundreds. Made by typewriter, these certificates lack official stamps since these (as described in the pass) were destroyed by "enemy" action. Discharges were prepared under the heading of the particular unit to which an individual belonged. All soldiers who received discharges were ordered to return to their homes and report to their local police chief to aid in home town defense. After burning his soldbuch and uniform, Jost tried to return to his home using the "discharge" as identification. He managed to travel over 150 Km before being apprehended.

Any persons apprehended with paper of this type in their possession should be evacuated through P/ channels.

d. A New Enemy Danger (Source: III US Corps, G-2 Information Bulletin No. 44, 19 April 1945, Third US Army)

A new angle in the infiltration tactics attempted by enemy units in the RUHR pocket was related by a P/ from the Tank Repair Company (Workstatt Company) of the 116 Panzer Division. P/ stated that the plan was to have the whole company change to civilian clothing, and then go to one of the large factories in the area and obtain (faked) passes stating that they were regular employees of the armament plant. Thereafter they were to remain in the area to await further orders. Any available equipment was to be buried -- or, in the case of vehicles, hidden and camouflaged - for later use. No exact details about the proposed workings of such units could be obtained - but a close investigation may reveal other instances of soldiers hiding under the cloak of factory workers.

2. SABOTAGE

a. Belt Buckle Pistols (Source: XX US Corps, G-2 Information Bulletin No. 45, 20 April 1945, Third US Army)

A pistol made to resemble a belt buckle has been found in this vicinity. The buckle is black, and has a silver-colored swastika emblem, spread-eagled on the front. The buckle is about 1" x 2 3/4". The cover drops down and by pushing a button, a two-barreled .32 pistol flips out, pointing directly to the front. By pressing two more buttons, the weapon can fire two shots. If a person stood directly in front of the buckle, he would be shot. This weapon is an actuality and has been examined in this headquarters. It is recommended that personnel capturing, or talking to any German with a belt buckle that resembles the above, be careful to make the person hold their hands behind their heads, and to stand slightly to one side of the person.

b. Cigarette Lighters (Source: Supreme Headquarters, G-2 Information Bulletin No. 34, 1 April 1945, Third US Army)

A recently captured German saboteur has reported that agents may be equipped with a cigarette lighter which, if used to light a cigarette, poisons the cigarette smoker. A small spherical pellet about 1mm in diameter, of unknown chemical constitution, is fixed on the lighter near the wick, in such a way that when the wick burns, the chemical becomes heated and volatilizes. The fumes or volatile products are highly poisonous.

The lighter is about 1 1/2" long and 3/4" - 1" wide. The corners are rounded. There is a protective metal cap the color of tin over the top of the lighter. The cap pulls off and is not hinged to the main body of the lighter. The main body of the lighter is made of green bakelite or plastic material. The agent was told that other lighters of the same size existed with a leather removable top.

b. Cigarette Lighters (Cont'd)

RECOMMENDATION: Captured saboteurs should be searched for lighters answering to this description. If found, they should not be lit and should be sent to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters AEF, Main (Attention: Counter-Sabotage Unit), notification by telephone being made in advance.

c. Our Vehicles Booby-Trapped (Source: 30th US Infantry Division. G-2 Information Bulletin No. 40, 9 April 1945, Third US Army)

A booby trap apparently mounted on the spring of a 1/4-ton vehicle cost one soldier both feet and injured another in NEUNKIRCHEN (B 4959) during the period. The explosive was detonated when one of the men stepped into the vehicle, placing his foot between the front seats and an inch or two to the rear. Only a few scraps of brown paper and a battered eight-inch piece of aluminum remain of the bomb, and its precise specifications are not known. Examination of the vehicle indicates that the explosion was not caused by a mine in the road and that the bomb was mounted in the spring or slightly higher in the right rear underpinning of the vehicle. The vehicle was stationary when the explosion occurred and the bomb was evidently a pressure type.

The booby trap is believed to have been placed between 021900 April and 030915 April, while the vehicle was parked outside an American occupied building under the general surveillance of a guard in the vicinity. The vehicle was driven to another part of town at 0015 and parked outside a unit headquarters for approximately half an hour under constant observation of American soldiers standing outside. It was driven a few yards to the center of the road, with the explosion taking place as the other members of the party were climbing in. CIC investigation to determine the responsible parties is still incomplete.

This incident is strong evidence of the need for constant vigilance against sabotage by a hostile native population. Standard military booby traps and materials for mine-shift devices must be assumed to be widely dispersed about this area. All that a would-be saboteur needs for another such act as this is carelessness on our part.

d. Wires Again (Source: VIII US Corps. G-2 Information Bulletin No. 36, 5 April 1945, Third US Army)

On 1 April 1945, at 0845A, the driver and assistant driver of an American vehicle were injured when the vehicle hit a trip wire across the road and detonated two mines on the road shoulder. The road had been used previously by US vehicles up until 2400G on 31 March 1945.

The incident happened on the NIELLEN-BETTENDORF road (MO81811). Investigation revealed the site as on a secondary road used by some drivers having a knowledge of it, to avoid the traffic in LUSTATTEN. The trip wire was suspended between two trees across the road about 4'6" above the road surface. The wire was attached to an 'American' pull igniter to which the mines along the road shoulder were connected by camouflaged primer cord.

A matter of some interest was 8 to 10 objects found on the road surface about 50 yards ahead of the trip wire. These objects on close examination looked very much like large stones (or very much like potatoes) in shape, color and size (3" in diameter and 2" thick). These were carefully scattered in an area about 14 yards long on the road. When examined each of these 'stones' proved to be a composition of 'REX Plastic Explosive' inside of which was concealed one pintment box anti-personnel mine - a real tire buster. The culprits are still at large.

3. ONE VERSION OF REDOUBT PLANS (Source GCB, BTOUAL. G-2 Information Bulletin No. 42, 15 April 1945, Third US Army).

It is reported from a very good source that the Germans have prepared a series of devices conceived along the same lines as the flying bombs. These will enter into action when the siege of the REDOUBT begins. The new arms will have a greater calibre and radius of action than the V-1 and V-2, and from their firing points in the ALPINE REDOUBT should be able to hit the large cities of Central and Western Europe.

3. ONE VERSION OF REDOUBT PLANS (CONT'D):

From another source, it is reported that German Military Experts have convinced HIMMLER that an ALPINE REDOUBT could not hold out for more than 4 to 5 months. For this reason consideration is being given in certain party circles (including Hitler and other high-echelon personages) to flight at the time of the final debacle. If this plan went into effect, the leaders would leave for JAPAN while SS Officers continued resistance in the ALPS.

Another source reports that HIMMLER is about to commit to action several LUFTWAFFE Squadrons, which are presently under his orders. The number of these airplanes is not in excess of a thousand, but according to this source, they would be employed to bombard European Industrial Objectives, especially those in GERMANY, held by the Allies.

Enemy Supplies in the Redoubt. Since the Autumn of 1944, reports have continued to be received from normally reliable sources of the movement of supplies and stores of all kinds (fuel, ammunition, food, engineer and general stores), into the Redoubt Area. These include a report that early in February, HIMMLER ordered 16,000 wagons (about 300 trains) to be made available for the movement of supplies and ammunition to the Redoubt Area. The movement of these supplies was to have priority over normal military traffic.

While it is hard to believe that the enemy has in fact laid up any great stocks of supplies, fuel, ammunition, etc. in this area at a time when the German Army is everywhere being defeated in great part due to the lack of these very supplies, nevertheless the continued and particular reference firstly to the movement of food stocks into the area and secondly to ammunition cannot be entirely discounted. In this connection it must be remembered that unless large scale warfare involving a large military force is envisaged, a vast total of supplies, fuel, ammunition, etc. will not be required. The tonnage of supplies required to maintain guerilla type warfare in mountainous country for a considerable period is no way approximates to that required for normal operations. Especially is this true of fuel.

4. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ARMORED SITUATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT:

During the month of April, the enemy was unable to cope with our deep armored penetrations which subsequently developed into battles of pockets. Enemy armor suffered heavily in these pockets, particularly in the RUHR. In this pocket alone, the 9th, 116th, 130th Panzer Divisions, the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division, and the 106th Panzer Brigade were destroyed. All the other Panzer Divisions committed on the Western Front also suffered heavy losses.

The history-making juncture during the latter part of the month of the Russian and American forces north of DRESDEN (F2090) in effect created two tremendous pockets. This juncture made the characteristic north-south shuttling of enemy armor virtually impossible. However, as the distances between Eastern and Western Fronts grew ever smaller, the enemy's capability of shuttling armor from his Eastern Front gained currency. This became increasingly evident by the identification during the latter part of the month of elements of the 2nd SS Panzer Division, formerly committed as part of the Sixth Panzer Army in the VIENNA (X4095) area on the southeast portion of the Third US Army zone.

The enemy's lack of available armored reserves for the Western Front was demonstrated by the commitment during the month of an impotent "named" Panzer Division and miscellaneous armored units, most of which were virtually destroyed upon commitment. The Panzer Order of Battle at the end of the month was as follows:

21ST ARMY GROUP: Remnants 25 Panzer Grenadier Division

12TH ARMY GROUP:

General SS Army: Panzer Division Clausewitz

First US Army: No major armored unit

Third US Army: 11 Panzer Division

Remnants 2 Panzer Divisions

11 remnants 2 SS Panzer Divisions

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions

6TH ARMY GROUP: No major armored unit.

The total armor tank strength in the West at the close of the period was es-

4. SUMMARY OF ENEMY REPORTED SITUATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT: (Cont'd)

estimated to be 200 tanks and/or assault guns, 100 of which were believed to be in Third US Army zone of advance. (S-2, 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade)

SECTION IV

TECHNICAL NOTES

1. DIFFERENTIAL PINION GEAR SETTING - 76MM GUN M-18

During a recent visit to an M-18 battalion, the unit's supporting ordnance supplied the unit with a transmission assembly. In observing the assembly of the transmission to the differential, it was noted that no instruction had been provided for the proper clearance between the transmission pinion and the differential ring gear. The correct procedure follows:

a. Before the differential is attached to the transmission it is necessary to determine proper gear setting. Adjustment is obtained by using proper thickness of shims (gaskets) between the differential carrier and transmission end cover.

b. The differential carrier has two sets of numbers stamped on top left rear of case. The top number is the measurement from the center of the ring gear to the differential case face (normally 11.xxx)"A" in diagram below). The lower number is the matching number for the pinion (normally C6.xxx)"This number is not used unless transmission and differential are issued together).

c. The distance from the face of the pinion to the face of the transmission end cover is determined by tool (41F - 2994 - 24); if this is not available, lay a straight edge on face of pinion and measure from the straight edge to the transmission end cover. This measurement may be made by making a bar of 4.750" in length and using this bar and feeler gauges to measure the distance "C" in diagram below.

d. Shim thickness is determined as follows:


(1) Measure distance from face of pinion to transmission carrier, i. e. 4.750" plus feeler gauge measurement. (Distance "C" in diagram below).

(2) To the above measurement add the number marked on the face of the pinion. (Distance "B" in diagram below).

(3) From the above sum subtract the upper number stamped on the differential carrier case (11.xxx)"Distance "A" in diagram below).

(4) Thus the required thickness of shims is "D" in diagram below. This is obtained by $B / C - A = D$.

(5) For each shim used, add .001" to make up for compression. Plus or minus .001" is proper tolerance.



2. FIRE IN CARBURETOR AIR SCOOP

It has been noted that new drivers of M-18 gun motor carriages will at times pump the foot throttle before starting engine. This causes flooding and frequently an air scoop fire results. If such a fire occurs, noted by flames coming from exhaust stacks, maintain engine at maximum RPM; do not shut engine off. The impeller will force the fire through cylinders and manifolds, and the fire will burn itself out.

3. USE OF REVERSE SPEED AS A BRAKE

Some M-18 units have not been familiar with the use of reverse speed as a brake. Tactical use of the vehicle at times requires slow descent of steep grades. When the vehicle cannot be held by steering brakes, employ reverse speed in the following manner:

- a. Set hand throttle at 800 RPM to prevent engine stall.
- b. On descent shift into reverse before vehicle reaches speed of 10 mph. This is important, otherwise severe strain is placed on transmission parts.
- c. Control speed of vehicle by use of foot throttle. A steady RPM at the desired speed should be maintained. Careful use of reverse will not injure the transmission. On long descents overheating of transmission may be avoided by careful use of brakes and foot throttle.

4. HYDROSTATIC LOCK

If an engine (M-18) is found to have cylinders locked on prestarting hand cranking, drain by removing lower spark plugs. If lock reoccurs examine check valve in oil reservoir tank for improper seating of valve. Dirt in oil will cause ball to cock open, thus allowing oil to flow into engine.

5. TRANSMISSIONS:

The M-18 with the R975 C4 Continental engine has a transmission transfer gear ratio of 1 to 1.29. This ratio is employed to prevent continuous operation against the governor. However, the R975 C1 engine is sometimes issued as a replacement for the R975 C4 engine. The R975 C1 is a lower powered engine than the R975 C4, so that when installing a R975 C1 engine the transmission transfer gear ratio should be 1 to 1.35 in order to obtain full power. The gears needed for the 1 to 1.35 ratio are: C152133, C152083 and C152132.

6. SUSPENSIONS:

- a. M-18 hulls warp after long usage and misalignment of suspension assemblies results. This misalignment causes a cutting by track guides of compensating wheel flanges from discs. Correction can be made by shimming of the idler assembly. If time is not available for shimming, it is advisable to interchange outer and inner compensating wheels to even the wear.
- b. Final drives may also require shimming to recover suspension alignment. In addition, outer drive sprockets have approximately 80% greater rate of failure than inner drive sprockets. It is recommended that inner and outer drive sprocket be interchanged periodically to obtain more even wear.

7. STEERING BRAKES:

Tight adjustment of steering brakes makes it easier to drive an M-18. Many drivers know this and tighten their brakes accordingly. However, what the drivers don't know is that this tight adjustment also wears the brake linings excessively. Motor officers and motor sergeants should maintain a continuous check to assure that steering brakes are properly adjusted. (Lieutenant Colonel W. A. Wood, Jr., Armored Fighting Vehicles and Weapons Section, Headquarters, ETOUSA.)

8. RATE OF FIRE FOR 3-INCH GUN:

This unit supported artillery fires during the crossing of the RHINE in the Ninth Army zone. Gun tubes heated when firing the first hour at 2 rounds per gun per minute. This rate should not exceed more than one hour duration if over heating of tubes is to be avoided. Firing 25 rounds per gun per hour seems to be satisfactory and could be continued indefinitely without heating under normal weather conditions. (S-3, 807th Tank Destroyer Battalion.)

SECRET

SECTION V

TANK DESTROYER TROOP LIST

The latest available list of Tank Destroyer Brigade, Groups, and Battalions, with their commanders, is furnished for your information below.

BRIGADE

1ST TANK DESTROYER BRIGADE -- Colonel LOGAN C. BERRY

GROUPS

1st TD Group	-	Colonel STEVENS	8th TD Group	-	Colonel CARTER
2d TD Group	-	Lt Col BELL	9th TD Group	-	Colonel DARLING
3d TD Group	-	Lt Col LAYS	12th TD Group	-	Colonel DEERY
4th TD Group	-	Colonel BROWNING	13th TD Group	-	Colonel WHEATON
5th TD Group	-	Colonel JACOBY	20th TD Group	-	Colonel SARGENT
6th TD Group	-	Colonel SABCY	25d TD Group	-	Colonel MARTIN
7th TD Group	-	Lt Col BROWNE			

BATTALIONS

601 TD Bn	-	Lt Col TARDY	703 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SHOWALTER
602 TD Bn	-	Lt Col CONLIN	704 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BIRDWELL
603 TD Bn	-	Lt Col McCURRY	705 TD Bn	-	Major DIBBLE
605 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BUCKWALD	771 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SMITH
607 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SUNDT	772 TD Bn	-	Lt Col McCLELLAN
609 TD Bn	-	Major SHOTOLA	773 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SPIESS
610 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BERGSTROM	774 TD Bn	-	Lt Col STURGES
612 TD Bn	-	Lt Col DEEBLY	776 TD Bn	-	Lt Col MOOREHEAD
614 TD Bn	-	Lt Col PRITCHARD	801 TD Bn	-	Major McKESSON
628 TD Bn	-	Lt Col GALLAGER	802 TD Bn	-	Lt Col MONTGOMER
629 TD Bn	-	Lt Col COLE	803 TD Bn	-	Lt Col GOODWIN
630 TD Bn	-	Lt Col JONES	807 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SMITH
631 TD Bn	-	Lt Col CADENHEAD	808 TD Bn	-	Lt Col McDONALD
633 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BRISSAC	809 TD Bn	-	Lt Col LAWSON
634 TD Bn	-	Lt Col DAVISSON	811 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BROWNFIELD
635 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SMITH	813 TD Bn	-	Major McCUTCHEON
636 TD Bn	-	Lt Col WILBUR	814 TD Bn	-	Lt Col JONES
638 TD Bn	-	Lt Col DAVIS	817 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BARDES
643 TD Bn	-	Lt Col FARR	818 TD Bn	-	Lt Col HALL
644 TD Bn	-	Lt Col GRAHAM	820 TD Bn	-	Lt Col PATRICK
645 TD Bn	-	Lt Col AUSTIN	821 TD Bn	-	Lt Col ARBURY
648 TD Bn	-	Lt Col STEVENS	822 TD Bn	-	Lt Col MAINS
654 TD Bn	-	Lt Col HUNTON	823 TD Bn	-	Lt Col DETTMER
656 TD Bn	-	Lt Col MELDOR	824 TD Bn	-	Major SMITH
661 TD Bn	-	Lt Col MILLER	825 TD Bn	-	Lt Col MEADING
891 TD Bn	-	Major FINLEY	827 TD Bn	-	Lt Col VANDERSWI
692 TD Bn	-	Lt Col MORSE	893 TD Bn	-	Major CARLIN
702 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BEALL	899 TD Bn	-	Lt Col TINCHER
			REFM * TD BN	-	Lt Col VAGGIAR

* Regiment Blindes Fusiliers Marines.

Logan C. Berry
LOGAN C. BERRY
Colonel, Cavalry
Commanding

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- 6 - 802 TD Bn
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- 1 - CG, TD Center
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- 1 - Col Clyburn, G-3, Observers Board, Hq ETOUSA
- 9 - Pres, WD Observers Board, c/o G-3 Section, Hq ETOUSA, APO 887.

NOTE: Please send your contributions in early for June issue.