

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 1ST TANK DESTROYER BRIGADE

Office of the Commanding General

SECRET

:Auth: Col. 1st T.D. B. Co.
:Init: *W.L.*
:Date: 1 November 1944

At: 403, U. S. Army
1 November 1944

W.L.

*All Companies
Read & Return
to 5-3*

TANK DESTROYER
INFORMATION LETTER

NUMBER

A
B
C
Re

I. CUMULATIVE REPORT OF TANK DESTROYER UNITS LISTED BELOW TO DATE:

BATTALION	TOTAL TANKS DESTROYED	TOTAL SP GUNS DESTROYED	TOTAL ROUNDS FIRED	ROUNDS FIRED DIRECT	ROUNDS FIRED INDIRECT
602	21	2	2920	1598	1322
603	1	4	5246	2347	2988
607	43	25	17602	2794	14808
609	0	0	9717	0	9717
610	31	0	794	794	0
654	27	9	2313	2116	197
691	1	0	1774	334	1440
704	45	2	904	487	417
774	5	5	18679	25	18654
807	0	0	10781	386	10395
808	0	0	8383	599	7784
818	18	0	15929	1709	14220
773	75	16	2510	1962	528
705	0	0			
802	0	0	10263	6452	3711
813	16	0	2828	1443	1385
814	8	0	1220	1137	83
612	0	1	87	87	0
821	0	0	1761	0	1761
644	0	2	1243	1243	0
628	0	0	20	20	0

III. TANK DESTROYERS IN COMBAT

In addition to the tanks and SP guns destroyed as shown above, the above US Tank Destroyers have also destroyed 77 anti-tank guns, 64 artillery pieces, 232 machine guns, 128 pill boxes, and 507 other targets including artillery prime movers, AF vehicles, boats, SPs, AA guns, troop trains, ammunition dumps, air lanes, etc.

The above data is accumulative to 23 October 1944.

II. T-105 FUZE (Extract Artillery Information Letter No. 3, 7th U. S. Army).

The T-105 Fuze has great penetrating power against concrete and is the ideal fuze for attacking pillboxes and concrete fortifications. The T-105 is used with the standard HE shell; the percussion fuze is removed and the concrete piercing fuze is installed. The forged steel construction of the fuze prevents the fuze from shattering on impact and allows the shell to penetrate the concrete some distance before the fuze-action detonates the shell. In cases of thin walled pillboxes, the shell may completely penetrate the wall before the shell explodes. Its penetrating ability against concrete is as great as armor piercing shot with the additional advantage of the high explosive shell. This fuze will fit any standard artillery HE ammunition, from the 75mm Pack Howitzer to the 240mm Howitzer, inclusive.


SECRET

III. TANK DESTROYERS IN COMBAT

1. The following is a report from the 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion covering one of the more interesting actions to date and is unusual in that it covers an action between Tank Destroyers and enemy tanks in a town.

"First Lieutenant JOSEPH P. DION, moved two M-10 Tank Destroyers into the town of MEXIMEUX, on the reported threat of an enemy tank attack. The two tank destroyers were positioned near the center of town, with approximately 100 yards between destroyers. Both tank destroyers were partially protected by near buildings on the left hand side of the street; however, two-thirds of the vehicles remained in the street. At 1340B, approximately ten minutes after the tank destroyers had taken up this position, the tank attack started. The main street of the town was very wide, and two Mark V enemy tanks were observed moving up abreast at rapid speed, firing their machine guns. One Mark V moved ahead of the other and had almost reached the center of town, near the "Y" intersection (see diagram below), when the leading tank destroyer fired one round of APCBDF. This projectile hit the tank just above the right track, penetrating the right hull near the front. The range was approximately 75 yards, which immediately set the tank afire. The tank rolled for another 25 yards before it finally stopped. The gunner had the second tank in his sight and was ready to fire only a few seconds later. He fired at a range of about 100 yards, hitting the tank almost identically in the same place. One round of APCBDF was fired, which set this tank also on fire. The second tank drove itself deep into a building, setting the building and adjoining houses on fire. The other three tanks were described as almost "flying" when they passed the first tank destroyer. The leading tank of these three was almost on the second tank destroyer before the tank destroyer fired. The range was reported as being 25 yards or less. One round of HE was fired at this Mark V tank, which immediately headed into a nearby building. The crew attempted to evacuate the disabled tank, but were either killed or captured by our infantry. A closer inspection of this tank showed the drivers periscope completely shattered, and severe damage to accessories inside the tank. This tank did not burn; however, the projectile hit the center front, between the driver and lap gunner's compartment. The armor of this tank showed no signs of penetration, but fragment marks covered the entire front. The fourth and fifth tanks passed the second tank destroyer at full speed, and one of the two stopped at a bend in the road, approximately 50 yards away from the tank destroyer, to take it under fire. This tank turned around and began to move up to engage this destroyer, when the tank destroyer fired a round of APCBDF, hitting the Mark V tank in the right track. This was the only part of the tank exposed to the tank destroyer when it fired; however, this hit resulted in immobilizing the enemy tank. The tank was only able to move a couple of feet forward and backward. The tank destroyer continued to fire in the direction of the Mark V to keep it from moving forward enough to return the fire. The infantry began to lay 81mm mortar shells on the tank, and the crew attempted to evacuate, which resulted in their being killed or captured." (Arty Info Ltr, 7th U. S. Army).

NOTE: 5 Mark V's passed the first TD and 2 passed the second with less than one foot clearance; the entire action took place in less than 5 minutes.



SECRET

2. Reinforcing Armor Plate on M-8 Scout Cars. On the 16 September an M-8 Armored Car from the 3rd Provost Marshal Reconnaissance Squadron came upon a mine on a road near AFGSDV233. The concussion set off mines on vehicles and other mines which had been laid on the side of the road. 16 of the men in the vehicle were killed outright, though one was seriously injured. An officer standing nearby had both legs broken. The M-8 had been reinforced with additional armor plate on the under side. It was badly damaged but the incident is noteworthy in that there were no outright fatalities. (Arty Info Ltr, 7th U.S. Army)

3. Some Mark "Kills" As of 6 October, 1944, the American Tank Destroyer Battalions which have inflicted the following losses on the enemy. (Arty Info Ltr, 7th U. S. Army).


	TANKS	VEHICLES	AIR CRAFT	ARTY PIECES	AT GUNS	AA GUNS	OTHERS	PER-SOONNEL KILLED
601 TD Battalion	1	101	1	9	7	2	3	477
636 TD Battalion	9	82		8	4	12	22	666
645 TD Battalion	15	27		4	3	1	3	82
813 TD Battalion	25	22			2		12	

4. After Action Report - 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion. The following excellent report was submitted by the 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion. Reports of this type are of considerable value as they furnish accurate and detailed information of the effectiveness of our weapons in battle.

"One M-10, A Company, situated on high ground vicinity 196794 (Sheet 15J) took under fire 2 Mark IV Tanks mounted long barreled 75mm guns, moving on road vicinity 195804 (Sheet 15J) at 17:53 10 September 44. The first Mark IV was stopped with one round AFGSDT hitting the right sprocket. The second was stopped by one round hitting the front hull. A total of eight rounds AFGSDT and 12 rounds HE were expended at 1100 yards range until the two tanks burned. There were no enemy infantry with the tanks. The tanks were not firing. No other fire was being put on the tanks, and the M-10 drew no return fire. From its position, the M-10 was locking down on the Mark IV's. The terrain in the M-10's position was good and firm. Sight used was M-70. Weather was clear and visibility good.

"Personal inspection disclosed penetrating hits shown on the diagram below. The round entered at an angle of 60 degrees. The tanks were completely burned out and there were no traces of enemy tank crews in the vicinity and none were observed in the tanks. Front, above section where hits are shown, was blown out in each tank. The machine gun of the first tank was blown out and was lying on the ground." (Arty Info Ltr, 7th U. S. Army)

Penetration in 1st tank



Penetration in 1st & 2nd tanks

Penetration in 2nd tank.

5. Tank Engagement - 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

"On 19 September 1944, near ARRACOURT, FRANCE, at 0900 an enemy attack was reported on the right flank of CC "A", _____ Armored Division. platoons of Company "C", 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion, were ordered to take position to repel the attack. These two platoons constituted the armored reserve of the combat command and at the time they were ordered into position Company "C" of the _____ Tank Battalion was heavily engaged by enemy tanks attacking on the Combat Command front. The enemy tank attack which the two platoons of Company "C" 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion, were assigned to repel threatened to encircle the tank company.

"The Third Platoon took up positions on the left with the First Platoon on the right. On the approach march at 0930 in thick fog the first enemy tanks were encountered by the Third Platoon at 50 yards distance. The leading destroyer of the Third Platoon opened fire destroying two enemy tanks before it was put out of action. The remaining destroyers withdrew to positions on a ridge 350 yards to the rear. The enemy then concentrated an attack on the right flank of the Third Platoon committing approximately forty (40) Mark V and Mark VI tanks.

"In the ensuing action which lasted until about 1500 the First and Third Platoons held their positions and catching the enemy with flanking fire destroyed nineteen (19) of the enemy tanks. This action broke up the attack and forced the enemy to withdraw. In the action the Third Platoon accounted for eleven (11) tanks and the First Platoon eight (8) tanks.

"The two platoons held their positions until relieved at 1000 20 September 1944.

"In this action three destroyers in the Third Platoon were put out of action, two because of hits received on the gun barrels. Our casualties were one (1) man killed and four (4) slightly wounded.

"The Commanding Officer of CC "A", _____ Armored Division declared in the presence of the Commanding General, _____ Armored Division that the action of the two tank destroyer platoons saved his command from threatened encirclement and possible annihilation CC, 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

IV. TANK DESTROYER FIRE ON MAGINOT LINE FORTIFICATIONS. (Opns Report)

One gun of the 1st Platoon, B Company, 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion fired on Maginot Line Fortifications as a test on 6 October 1944. This test was not extensive, however the following facts were developed:

- a. There is little difference in the effect of GP fuzed ammunition and APC
- b. Penetrations as published in current tables are correct.
- c. If the fortification has a door, it presents a weak point in the fortification. A large hole may be obtained by firing approximately one (1) foot from the door. This affords a ready means of entrance into the fort.
- d. Concrete dust caused by breaking up of the concrete is nauseating, acrid dust, which penetrates into fortifications and can be considered as a definite harassing agent to any troops in the fort.

V. REDUCTION OF STRONGPOINTS.

A method of reducing "small-town" strongpoints by use of TD support has been developed and used by the _____ Armored Division. Tank Destroyers are brought forward into direct fire positions from which they can blast the upper stories of buildings in the town. This drives the enemy into basements. Engineers and Infantry then go in, supported by tanks, and drive the enemy out of the basements with fragmentation and incendiary grenades.

VI. NEW WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT.

1. Carriage, Motor, 90mm Gun, M-36. (TM 9-758, 15 April 44)

The M-36 Tank Destroyer consists of a 90mm gun mounted on the M10al

SECRET

VI. NEW WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

1. Carriage, Motor, 90mm Gun, M-36 (Cont'd)

carriage. The open turret carries a much larger counter weight than the M10. It is fitted with racks in which eleven (11) rounds, of the normal vehicular load of forty-seven (47) rounds of ammunition, are carried. The balance of the ammunition is carried in the sponsons. The turret is power operated and is controlled so that the gunner can quickly and easily lay on and follow a rapidly moving target. A manual traversing wheel is also provided for emergencies.

The fire control instruments of the M-36 consist of a three-power telescopic sight (M7CP, M760, or M768) for direct fire and the azimuth indicator and elevation quadrant for indirect fire.

The power for the M-36 is furnished by a 500 horsepower Ford V8 gasoline engine. This is more power than is developed by the twin diesels of the M10 but the top speed for the two vehicles is about the same.

Comparison of the 90mm and the 3-inch guns:

	<u>90mm</u>	<u>3-inch</u>
Caliber	90mm	3"
Length	15' 6"	13' 2.1"
Muzzle Velocity	APC (2670 fs) HE (2700 fs)	APC (2600 fs) HE (2800 fs)
Range	19,000 yds (HE)	13,900 yds (HE)
Weight (tube & breech)	2,260 lbs	1,990 lbs
Ammunition	Fixed	Fixed
Types	HE, AP, APC	HE, AP, APC
Weight		
Complete round	-(47.64 lb APC 42.04 lb HE)	-(27.24 lb APC 24.91 lb HE)
Projectile	-(25.00 lb APC 23.40 lb HE)	-(15.44 lb APC 12.87 lb HE)
Powder Charge	-(7.32 lb APC 7.31 lb HE)	-(4.62 lb APC 4.87 lb HE)

2. Amphibious Tank Destroyers. (Field Artillery Information Letter No. 8)

Two 76mm Gun Motor Carriages M-18 are being modified into amphibious vehicles. This modification consists of removing the hull plate down to the sponson line and substituting a large amphibious type hull of lighter construction. The same gun and turret are to be used. The first pilot is to be propelled in the water by the tracks and the second pilot by twin 26" screw propellers.

3. Use and Advantage of 90mm Gun. (Executive Officer, XIX Corps Artillery)

We'd like to have a 90mm battalion attached to us when a lot of artillery is to be used. They are fine against a target on which we want surprise. We like the 90mms to hit the target about 10 to 15 seconds ahead of the heavy stuff. The heavy shells can be heard coming, but the 90s are on them without warning. Their rate of fire is another distinct advantage in their use against targets of opportunity. They are very valuable for interdiction fire, particularly along long straight roads on account of their ricochet effect.

VII. COOL HURDING.

The 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion had a good week from 11 September to 16 September while in support of the ___ Infantry Division's bridgehead over the MOSELLE RIVER.

On 12 September the battalion moved across the MOSELLE.

On September 13th the enemy counterattacked in the vicinity of the 3rd Platoon, Company C positions, in the town of STE. GENEVIEVE. The platoon held

VII. GOOD HUNTING (Cont'd)

their positions against Infantry and tanks, knocking out two tanks. In the counterattacks, tanks advanced on the roadblock of the 1st Platoon, Company B. The platoon held their fire, thinking the tanks were friendly as it was dark and very dark. At this moment the tanks shot forward, hitting the 1st Platoon. The enemy opened up with machine guns and small arms, forcing the platoon to withdraw after destroying one tank. The 3rd platoon, Company A, in position 2 miles south of LOISY destroyed two of the tanks that broke through the roadblock of the 1st Platoon.

On September 15th the enemy counterattacked ROUSSOU HILL in the vicinity of the 3rd platoon, Company A positions. The platoon was subjected to terrific machine gun, mortar, and small arms fire, but the 1st section advanced to the top of the hill with the Infantry. The route selected by the 2nd section was blocked and surrounded by Germans, which resulted in the loss of two guns. The two prime movers made a successful dash to the top of the hill, and most of the crews escaped by swimming the river. Another counterattack came in the vicinity of STS. GENEVIEVE, where Headquarters Section and the 3rd platoon, Company C, held their position against Infantry and tanks, destroying 2 tanks with bazookas, and 2 tanks with TDs. In the afternoon, the Germans counterattacked again with tanks. The 1st Platoon, Company C, moved to positions on the hill overlooking the tanks advance and supporting the 3rd Platoon, Company C. The 1st Platoon knocked out eight (8) tanks from this position. Later in the day, B Company moved to positions in the vicinity of LOISY.

On September 16th the enemy counterattacked again in the vicinity of the 1st Platoon, Company B, north of LOISY. Five of the enemy tanks were destroyed in this action.

VIII. FIRST FIRE TO FALL ON GERMANY FROM THE THIRD U. S. ARMY.

On 13 September 1944, the 2nd platoon, Company C, 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion, under Major SOLOWAY, Captain LONG, and Lieutenant FENBERGER took one reconnaissance section and the 2nd gun of its platoon forward of the Infantry position to a temporary position at (899945) 200 meters west of RASSE FARM (899954). From this position the gun manned by Sergeant THOMAS and his crew fired ten (10) rounds into GERMANY. The target was a steeple in PELL (0295). This fire was conducted between 1823 - 1829 hours. These were the first rounds fired by the Infantry Division into GERMANY, first rounds fired by the Corps into GERMANY, and it is believed that this was the first fire to fall into GERMANY from troops of the THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY.

IX. INTELLIGENCE NOTES.

1. Pz Kpfw VI Tiger II (Armored report, Twelfth Army Group)

General:

The following information has been received concerning a Tiger II which was captured at LE PLESSIN GERMAIN, 11 August 1944. At first glance the vehicle resembles closely the Panther Model "G", but when examined more closely the old wedge shape of the Tiger I hull becomes apparent, as also does the fact that the turret and hull are not as steeply sloped as on the Panther.

Turret:

The turret is perhaps the most remarkable feature of the tank as it is of tremendous length and has a large overhang at the rear. The cupola is placed almost centrally in the broadside view, and is so far over to the left that the turret wall bulges slightly to accommodate it. This cupola is similar to that seen on recent models of the Tiger I and Panther, but is shallower and is rather large in diameter. The mantlet is relatively small and quite unlike that seen on any other German tank, being square in shape and forming part of a heavy armored jacket which covers the first 9.9 inches of the gun. The turret sides sloped at 20 degrees from the vertical and the rear at approximately 30 degrees. The roof slopes gently from the front and rear, with the cupola at the highest point. There are two hatches in the roof, in addition to the cupola.

IX. INTELLIGENCE NOTES (Cont'd)

Hull:

P.S.

The hull is very similar to that of the Panther, but has a shorter glacis plate and is less steeply sloped. In addition, it is wedge-shaped in the side view and in a manner similar to the Tiger I. The tail is undercut like the Panther, with the exhaust pipes in the rear held in heavy armored sockets. The shorter glacis plate produces a deep nose plate - it was not possible to estimate its thickness, but it was undercut at approximately 35 degrees. As on Panther Model "G" there is no driver's vision slit, and there is a hull MG 34 in the usual hull mounting. Driver and hull gunner have periscopes and exit hatches as for the Panther.

Armor:

Hull - Front	150mm at 45 degrees
Sloping side plates	80mm at 20 degrees
Vertical side plates	80mm
Rear deck	40mm
Turret - Front	100mm
Mantlet	105mm at thickest
Sides	100mm
Roof	30mm

Suspension:

This closely resembles the old Panther - Tiger suspension in principle.

Main Armament:

The gun is 8.8cm KwK 43 (L/71) with vertical falling breech and has an overall length of approximately 21 feet 6 inches. The gun is electrically fired and has molecular sighting. The new type double baffle muzzle brake is 1 foot 9 inches long.

2. Characteristics and Weaknesses of the Panther Tank from a German Document Issued to Tank Crews by the Inspector of the Armored Troops (Armored Report, Twelfth Army Group).

Panther is not invulnerable. Sides and rear can be perforated by AT guns. Therefore, its flanks and rear must be protected by Pz Kpfw III and IV tanks. It is recommended that the Panthers lead followed by Pz Kpfw III and IVs.

Panthers cannot cross minefields without immunity.

The large fuel consumption of Panthers makes it necessary to consider whether the mission is worth the cost.

Economic use of ammunition is particularly important with Panthers. Well trained gunners are therefore essential.

Panthers should be used only in conjunction with Panzer Grenadiers, trained in cooperation with tanks.

No attack will ever be carried out without preliminary reconnaissance. This will often have to be done by tank crews on foot.

Panthers are not suitable for fighting in wooded country. In low built up country they are best employed from dominating positions.

Panthers must be protected at night.

Immobilized Panthers must not be recovered by other Panthers unless the ground is under fire.

Panthers must seek alternate positions after firing, but the new position must not be so far away that the unit becomes separated.

Due to its superior range, the Panther is not suitable for supporting Panzer Grenadiers in mopping up overrun enemy. Use Pz Kpfw III, IVs or assault guns.

The great fire power of the Panther must not lead to increased spacing between troops as this makes the provision for mutual support more difficult.

The high performance of the Panther gun makes it possible to engage the enemy tanks at long ranges.

IX. INTELLIGENCE NOTES (Cont'd)

3. Espionage. (Periodic Report XII Corps)

Evidence indicates that the enemy is conducting organized espionage for Frenchmen in espionage. The fact that these espionage agents may be French complicates the problem of detection and apprehension. Only constant vigilance will mitigate the situation. IT IS THE DUTY OF ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL TO INVESTIGATE EVERY SUSPICIOUS PERSON OR INCIDENT.

4. Civilian Aid.

Two best enlisted men of a Corps unit recently accepted an offer from a civilian to guide them. He led them straight to a German CP where they were interrogated and interned. They later managed to escape and return to our lines. The incident illustrates that a complete lack of faith in civilians is necessary for adequate security. -- 30th Division G - 2 Report.

5. Panzer Brigades. (Intelligence Notes, SHARP)

It seems possible from the available material that at least two definite series of Panzer brigades exist. The first, running from 101 to 110 consists of remnants of Panzer-Grenadier divisions formed into brigades having only one Panzer-Grenadier and one tank battalion, while the second series beginning with 111 has a two-battalion Panzer-Grenadier regiment, formed from Panzer-Grenadier replacement units, and a tank element consisting of one (Panther) Battalion from a Panzer division plus an organic tank battalion of Pz IVs formed from tank replacement battalion contributions, without having a tank regimental staff to control the two. What the ultimate fate of the brigades will be remains to be seen, but 112 is reported dissolved and incorporated in 21 Panzer Division, 111 (possibly combined with 113) is under command of 11 Panzer Division, and 105 has been under XI Corps with 9 Panzer Division for some time, and may have been incorporated in it.

X. CHANGES IN TANK DESTROYER T/O & E's.

1. CP Tents.

Each Tank Destroyer Battalion is now authorized one command post tent in addition to the one authorized by present T/O & E's. This tent is intended for use as a fire direction center tent, and is authorized by 1st Ind., Hq, Third U. S. Army, APO 403, U. S. Army, File AC 424 - GIBCO - 4, dated 20 Oct 44, to 1tr, Hq, 1st TD Brigade, APO 403, U. S. Army, File AC 475 (44), subject: "Extra Equipment" (Tentage), dated 12 Oct 44. Requisitions for additional tents will be submitted citing the above first indorsement as authority.

2. Mortars and 1/4 ton trucks.

A request for authorization of an additional two (2) mortars for Tank Destroyer Battalions, and substitution of 1/4-ton trucks for motorcycles has been made. No action has been received on this request as yet.

3. Personnel.

A recommendation to increase the strength of self-propelled battalions by 35 basic privates, and that of towed battalions by 29 basic privates has been disapproved.

4. Reorganization.

a. Authority for reorganization of self-propelled battalions under T/O & E of 15 March 1944 is expected shortly from ETO, USA;

XI. TANK DESTROYER NOTES.

1. Digging in the M-10. (OO, 644 Tank Destroyer Battalion).

It has been observed by me that it is the standard practice for M-10

S E C R E T

VI. TANK DESTROYER NOTES

1. Digging in the M-10. (Cont'd)

crow to die themselves in beneath the vehicle and to make no effort to dig the vehicle itself. This practice will be discontinued and the following procedure become the rule: Dig in at least the tracks of the vehicle first. Then make holes underneath and other digging may continue. This practice will quickly set the silhouette lower and the crew is safe with the armor of the M-10 as protection.

2. Damage Inflicted by Tank Destroyers (5th Tank Destroyer Group).

The damage inflicted on enemy materiel in the BIELEWIS - FAHISE pocket during the 24-hour period by two Tank Destroyer Battalions is tabulated as a matter of interest:

<u>20 August 1944</u>	<u>TANKS</u>			<u>ARTILLERY</u>		<u>WGs</u>	<u>MOOR TRANSPORT</u>
	<u>Mk VI</u>	<u>Mk V</u>	<u>Mk IV</u>	<u>SP</u>	<u>TD</u>		
773 TD Bn (SP)	0	9	35	15	10	2	142
607 TD Bn (T)	4	14	6	19	9	0	41
Totals	4	23	41	34	19	2	183

The comment of a platoon leader in the 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion is quoted:

"We fired until we had to let the guns cool off. Targets could be seen as far as the eye could see, and seen we got particular and wouldn't fire at anything but armored vehicles and artillery pieces . . ."

3. Tank Destroyer Gunnery. (12th Army Group Battle Experiences, 21 Oct 44)

The following consolidation of a report from the 623rd Tank Destroyer Battalion indicates that even at extreme ranges the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank is vulnerable to the M-10 Tank Destroyer. A platoon commander reports the following results, within a thirty minute period of a recent action in Germany:

a. "No. 1 gun hit its first tank at a range of 1800 yards. The enemy crew abandoned the tank and four more rounds of APC were fired at it, three of which could be seen to bounce off the front plate. The fourth round hit the gun shield and ricocheted down through the top of the tank. Two rounds of APCBM were then fired which exploded on the front of the tank. A second tank at the same range was hit with two rounds of APCBM which caused it to burn. Both enemy tanks were facing directly towards the gun that knocked them out. Later a third tank was knocked out by a hit on the side from a range of 3000 yards.

b. "No. 2 gun knocked out one tank by getting three hits with APC in the rear of the tank at a range of over 3200 yards.

c. "No. 3 gun knocked out one Mark VI tank with three APC hits in the side at a range of 1900 yards."

4. Test Firing, M-36 (90mm) Tank Destroyer.

Test firing of the M-36 (90mm) Tank Destroyer gun against concrete fortifications was conducted by . . . Corps on 20 October 1944. Pillbox was 75 feet wide with exposed walls 20 feet in height. Exterior walls varied in thickness from 3 feet 6 inches to 5 feet 6 inches and the concrete was not reinforced.

Results with APC M82. Complete penetration of 4 1/2-foot main wall of pillbox, crumbling of exterior wall at point of penetration and flaking of interior wall to depth of 12 to 18 inches. Several rounds were fired simultaneously at the same wall area. The net results appeared superior to aggregate results of the same number of rounds fired individually. Some rounds passed completely through exterior walls and penetrated interior walls from 8 to 10 inches. Concrete fragments which were scattered throughout interior of fort would have been a definite casualty agent against personnel.

Results with HE Fuze M105. The results of this type of fuze approximated the results obtained with APC. Two and three rounds fired simultaneously caused the wall section on which fired to crack and break into six sections approximately 4 feet by 2 feet.

XII. A SOLUTION TO THE BAZOOKA BATTERY PROBLEM.

BA-20 Batteries may be drawn in lieu of bazooka batteries, which are not available at this time, and the 100 shells are then utilized for the bazookas. This is a satisfactory and authorized expedient.

XIII. INTERESTING NEWS ITEMS.

The 591st Tank Destroyer Battalion has initiated a system whereby every front-line soldier gets a 24-hour rest period approximately every six days. This is accomplished by drawing 1 to 2 men from each gun crew and security section each day. These men are brought to the rear and can bathe, clean their clothes, and a reading and writing room is provided for them. This Battalion has destroyed a Mack V2 Tiger tank with a 3-inch gun at 800 yards range. Penetration of armor was made on both front and side armor. On 11/5 1942 at the 3rd Platoon Company C, knocked out an enemy half-track at a range of 3500 yards with the first round fire.

XIV. TANK DESTROYER TROOP LIST.

The latest available list of Tank Destroyer Brigade, Groups, and Battalions with their commanders is furnished for your information below.

BRIGADE

1ST TANK DESTROYER BRIGADE — Brigadier General EARNEST

GROUPS

1st TD Group	-	Colonel STEVENS	7th TD Group	-	Colonel HEYMAN
2nd TD Group	-	Colonel BLANK	8th TD Group	-	Colonel MARTER
3rd TD Group	-	Colonel HAWTHORNS	9th TD Group	-	Lt Col LAWING
4th TD Group	-	Colonel BROWNING	12th TD Group	-	Colonel PERRY
5th TD Group	-	Colonel JACOBY	20th TD Group	-	Unknown
6th TD Group	-	Colonel SBRUY	23rd TD Group	-	Colonel SERGENT

BATTALIONS

601 TD Bn	-	Unknown	704 TD Bn	-	Major ALMIS
602 TD Bn	-	Lt Col KOPSZAK	705 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BEMPLETON
603 TD Bn	-	Major McGUIRE	771 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SMITH
607 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SMITH	772 TD Bn	-	Unknown
609 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BROWNE	773 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SEISS
610 TD Bn	-	Lt Col JEFFREY	774 TD Bn	-	Lt Col STURGISS
612 TD Bn	-	Lt Col DRELEY	801 TD Bn	-	Unknown
614 TD Bn	-	Lt Col PRITCHARD	802 TD Bn	-	Lt Col MONTGOMERY
628 TD Bn	-	Major GALLAGER	803 TD Bn	-	Lt Col GOODWIN
629 TD Bn	-	Lt Col COLE	807 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SHAW
630 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BURGESS	808 TD Bn	-	Lt Col McDONALD
631 TD Bn	-	Lt Col MATHAN	811 TD Bn	-	Unknown
634 TD Bn	-	Lt Col DAVISSON	813 TD Bn	-	Major JEFFRIES
635 TD Bn	-	Lt Col SMITH	814 TD Bn	-	Lt Col JONES
636 TD Bn	-	Lt Col FORDY	817 TD Bn	-	Lt Col REEDS
638 TD Bn	-	Lt Col DAVIS	818 TD Bn	-	Lt Col HALL
643 TD Bn	-	Unknown	820 TD Bn	-	Unknown
644 TD Bn	-	Lt Col GRAHAM	821 TD Bn	-	Unknown
645 TD Bn	-	Lt Col RUSSELL	823 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BETHAR
654 TD Bn	-	Lt Col HUNTON	824 TD Bn	-	Unknown
691 TD Bn	-	Major FINLEY	825 TD Bn	-	Lt Col READING
702 TD Bn	-	Lt Col BEALL	827 TD Bn	-	Unknown
703 TD Bn	-	Unknown	893 TD Bn	-	Lt Col KAYS
			899 TD Bn	-	Lt Col TINCER

SECRET

XV. INFORMATION LETTER ITEMS. PAJ

All Tank Destroyer Units are invited to send in items which might be of interest to others for publication in this letter. Rough notes and sketches are sufficient. Address all communications to Commanding General, 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade, APO 405, United States Army.

Richard H. Wilson
RICHARD H. WILSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding.

DISTRIBUTION:

No. of Copies

- 1 - CG, Third Army
- 1 - G-3, Third Army
- 1 - G-2, Third Army
- 1 - Arty O, Third Army
- 1 - Historical Section, Third Army
- 1 - AT C, III Corps
- 1 - AT C, XII Corps
- 1 - Arty O, XII Corps
- 1 - Each Div G-3
- 2 - Each TD Bq
- 6 - Each TD Bn
- 1 - CG, TD School
- 1 - Pres., TD Board