

5. ON 1-20-43 THE COMPLETE A, CO. WENT INTO ACTION WITH FRENCH LEGIONERS AGAINST AN ATTACK OF 47 GERMAN TANKS + INFANTRY B, CO. AND ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST ARMORED DIV. MOVED IN THE NEXT DAY TO HELP. OUSSELTIA - ●

THIS REPRESENTS FRONT LINE
12-1-42 TUNISIA



KAIROUAN ●
M
GERMAN AIR P
R
T

1. A, CO. 601TD. SPENT CHRISTMAS EVE OF 1942 HERE MAKTAR ●

2. 12-26-1942 THE 1ST HEAVY PLATOON HAD THEIR FIRST COMBAT ACTION AND LOST CAPT. STEEL TO SNIPER FIRE! PICHON - ●

3. 12-29-1942 THE 1ST HEAVY TRIED WITH THE HELP OF A PLATOON OF LIGHT TANKS TO BREAK THROUGH TO KAIROUAN BUT GOT THROWN BACK.

FONDOUK - ●

4. 1-10-43 THE 1ST HEAVY PLATOON EXCHANGED FIRE WITH TANKS & INFANTRY

5. SBEITLA ● 2-17-43 MOST OF 601TD WAS CAUGHT UP IN MASSIVE GERMAN TANK ATTACK AND FOUGHT REAR GUARD ACTION.

7. EL GUETTAR ●

THIS IS A CALENDER OF COMBAT ACTION OF THE 1ST HEAVY PLATOON AS I SAW IT FROM 12-24-42 TO

CONFIDENTIAL

URGENT AND CONFIDENTIAL

CP/v

7 Feb 43.

CC "D"

2 Corps	} Who will send copies down to Bdes or CTs or CCs
5 Corps	
19 Corps	

1. The First Army front is divided into three Corps Sectors under American, French and British Command respectively. The Corps Commander in each Sector is in executive command of all troops of all three nationalities who are operating in that Sector. The only exception is in the cases where formations or units are retained under Army control for special missions, even though they may be located in one or other Corps Area. In such cases the Corps Commander concerned will be informed of what powers of command (if any) he may exercise over these Army reserves (see also last para). In every other case, without exception, if the Army Commander allots formations or units from one Corps Sector to another Corps Sector then the formations, or units so allotted come under complete operational command of the Sector Commander in whose area they are operating.

Administratively however the parent Corps will of necessity retain some responsibility for supplies and maintenance, except in the case of prolonged absence.

2. The Army Commander wishes this principle to be made quite clear to all commanders of formations and units. Once a formation or unit has been ordered from (say) 5 Corps to come under orders of (say) 19 Corps, then after the move is complete the Commander 5 Corps (in this particular instance) has no right whatever to issue operational orders to the unit concerned so long as it remains away.

Nor has the commander of the formation or unit concerned any right whatever to move his unit about independently without orders from or even reference to the commander under whose orders he is placed, whatever may be his nationality. No one would dream of so acting within his own army and similar standards will be maintained in Allied Armies. It is not only a matter of courtesy, but of success or failure of our whole campaign.

A serious instance of independent and entirely unco-ordinated action has recently led to a premature attack followed by subsequent withdrawal. The German cannot be beaten by such haphazard methods, and there must be no more cases like this.

The Army Commander is deeply concerned at the lack of close co-operation in some instances between British and French, or Americans and French. Language difficulties are chiefly to blame, but they must be overcome.

3. The case of a formation in Army reserve is different.

It may well be located in a Corps area, but even so it remains directly under operational control of the Army Commander unless and until he releases it or delegates control of the whole or a portion of it to a subordinate commander.

The Commander of the reserve formation will however carry out his reconnaissance and make all arrangements for the successful carrying out of his task or tasks in the most intimate consultation with the commanders in whose Sectors he is preparing to operate - so that, when the time comes, he receives the maximum support from his own and every other possible source.

In the Field

S/ C. W. MC NABB, BRIGADIER,
GENERAL STAFF, FIRST ARMY

COPIES TO:- A.F. HQ
Adv. 1 Army (2 copies)

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS II CORPS, 7 February 1943. TO: Units Listed Below.

For your information and guidance.

By command of Major-General FREDENDALL:

J. A. Dabney
J. A. DABNEY,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

TO: C.G., 1st Armd Div.
C.G., Constantine Div.
CGA
CC

CGD
26th RCT
168th RCT
Col. Butler

II

6-8-2

CONFIDENTIAL

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS II CORPS
APO #302
U. S. Army

MEMORANDUM:

15 April 1943
I- the Field

The following letter received by the Commanding General, II Corps, from the Commanding General, MATCUSA, is published for the information of all concerned:

"With the successful completion of that phase of the Tunisian operations for which I placed you temporarily in command of the II Corps, the time has come for you to resume the command of the 1st Armored Corps. I hope that you will convey to all ranks of the II Corps my very deep appreciation of their fine accomplishments during the entire period they have served under your direction and that you personally will accept my sincere congratulations upon the outstanding example of leadership you have given to us all.

"Upon your departure from Headquarters II Corps, you will turn command to Major-General Omar Bradley,

/s/ DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
General,
Theatre Commander."

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

DISTRIBUTION:

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Hugh J. Caffey
HUGH J. CAFFEY,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

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