

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
807TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
APO 230

4 September 1944

BATTLE OF LE BOURG ST LEONARD - CHAMBOIS 15 to 21 August 1944.

The Battalion (less Co A) moved from the vicinity of ALENCON with the 90th Division, (less 357th CT) on August 15th to relieve the 5th Armored Division in the general area of LE BOURG ST LEONARD - EXMES - NONANT LE PIN - CHAILLOUE. Co A and the 357th CT arrived 17 Aug 44. The 90th Division was to be used to close the last gap in the "FALAISE POCKET".

Initially, the 359th Inf manning the point of the threat was reinforced by Co C plus one platoon of Co B, 607th TD Bn. One platoon was placed in the vicinity of LE BOURG ST LEONARD, one in the vicinity of EXMES, one at NONANT LE PIN and one in the vicinity of CROISELLES. Co B, less one platoon, and the 3d CP were near CHAILLOUE.

Co C made first contact with the enemy near CROISELLES at 0500 16 Aug, destroying one half-track and setting a second one on fire. At 0800 a German infantry attack on LE BOURG ST LEONARD was partially successful but all ground and equipment was regained by noon. A subsequent tank supported infantry attack was even more successful but a determined counter-attack nearly completely restored the American position in ST LEONARD. It is believed the third platoon of Co C aided materially in rallying the infantry by its direct ricochet fire on advancing German infantry which was closely pursuing the Americans forced out of ST LEONARD and by destroying three tanks. Sgt Scott, CPL Shirley, CPL Washabaugh and Pvt Hunsicker were outstanding in their gallantry. All, in the face of tank fire, manned their guns (1st and 2nd sections). Sgt Scott's gun continued to fire until the tank fire was silenced. (See Lt Killeen's report attached).

Aug 17 intense small arms, mortar, artillery and nebelwerfer fire was received throughout the LE BOURG ST LEONARD area, extending 1500 yds eastward. Tank fighting also raged in the area, climaxed at about 1600 by an attack of 6 tanks launched eastward along the road running in that direction and supported by artillery fire. M-10 tank destroyers, which had arrived shortly before, set two afire, two were abandoned by their crews and two dispersed. The platoon of Co C which was also covering this road did not get an opportunity to fire, as the tank attack was stopped before it came into the fields of fire of the platoon's guns. Co B relieved Co C platoons at EXMES and CROISELLES, permitting Co C to concentrate on the LE BOURG ST LEONARD fight. Co B in turn was relieved by Co A when the 359th Inf was shifted to the south and west of LE BOURG ST LEONARD.

18 Aug, the 3rd platoon, having been relieved by 2nd platoon of Co C, the positions of guns were changed to include one gun in ST LEONARD and one gun 500 yds east thereof capable of covering terrain immediately to the north of the east-west road. (See report of the platoon leader, Lt Pendergast). The third platoon was placed on commanding terrain just west of EXMES capable of covering ground just west of EXMES and extending to the road running south from CHAMBOIS. Two tanks were knocked out this day by the 2nd platoon. Co B continued to support the 357th Inf. Co A placed one gun on commanding terrain and effectively stopped enemy fire on the road running east from GAGE.

19 Aug, Co C advanced and 1st platoon north of ST LEONARD. In the evening the 1st platoon was able to enter CHAMBOIS and take positions guarding southeast, northeast and northwest roads. Lt Pendergast volunteered his platoon for this assignment, realizing fully the importance of this road center to both sides. The 3rd platoon took up positions just north of ST LEONARD. Co B's 2nd and 3rd platoons were ably handled

15-24
Aug 44
21041
MAST

307th TD Bn in 'Battle of Le Bourg St Leonard, cont'd)

by their platoon leaders, the 3rd platoon in particular distinguishing itself in support of the 358th Inf attack on ST EUGENIES. A good bag of tanks, wheeled vehicles and personnel were registered (see reports of Lt Johnson and Lt Reynolds). The 1st platoon of Co B, attached to 3rd Bn 358th Inf, placed itself to northeast of CHAMBOIS, prepared to block attacks from the northeast. Co A remained in support of 357th Inf.

On the 20th Aug the enemy furiously endeavored to break out of the trap, which the Poles had apparently closed at long last by their arrival in the vicinity of CHAMBOIS. At 0500 an infantry attack reached the vicinity of the Co C gun guarding the northwest entrance to CHAMBOIS. The presence of a company of M-10 destroyers greatly strengthened the CHAMBOIS defenses and when the armored attack struck the defense, stopped it dead, literally (see account of Lt King for further details). Co C's other two platoons continued their role of deepening the AT defense (see overlay 200800 Aug situation). Co A also was employed to deepen the AT defensive dispositions. No enemy penetration came within effective range of any of these guns. In the 358th Inf area Co B's positions at BON MENIL and ST EUGENIE continued to give overwhelming results. For details see reports of Lt Johnson and Lt Reynolds, attached.

The Aug 21 operations consisted entirely of rounding up stray Germans who wanted desperately to give up. The overwhelming air power and artillery had smashed an unbelievable number of armored vehicles. A skeptical representative of the First Army Artillery Headquarters, Capt Heckethorn, who reported at the Battalion CP for the purpose of checking accuracy of reports, was conducted through the battlefield and shown the Battalion's dispositions. When he departed he declared himself thoroughly satisfied and appeared thoroughly nauseated. It is believed the power of the 8" gun was impressed upon the supported troops. Mark IV and V tanks were destroyed at ranges up to 3200 yds. The majority of the 34 tanks and 19 SP guns were destroyed at ranges over 2000 yds.

TABULATION

	A	B	C	Total
Tanks, Mark IV & V		27	7	34
Self Propelled Guns		20	3	23
Armored half-tracks		8	1	9
General purpose vehicles	6	54	4	64
Horse-drawn artillery		16		16
Total of all types	6	125	15	146
Prisoners	510			

CASUALTIES

EM: 3 killed
 2 missing
 35 wounded (16 hospitalized, 19 returned to duty)

Officers: -wounded and returned to duty.
 - Lt Reynolds
 Lt Pendergast
 Lt Col Sundt

EQUIPMENT DESTROYED

1 half-track (destroyed by shell fire)
 1 3" gun (destroyed by shell fire.)

Incl: 5 statements
 1 overlay

HAROLD S SUNDT
 Lt Col, FA
 Commanding

COMPANY A
607TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
APO 230

3 September 1944

Action of Co A, 607th TD Bn, during month of August, 1944.

On August 3, 1944, Co A, 607th TD Bn was ordered to direct support of 357th Inf Regiment for anti-tank fires. One platoon to move with each Infantry Battalion.

On August 5, 1944, the 357th Infantry with attached units and Co A, 607th TD Bn left LA GONDONNIERE (4815) with the mission to seize and secure crossing of Mayenne River at MAYENNE (8071). The second platoon of Co A marched with the flank guard. The second platoon's route of march was MAYENNE, BUAIS (5797), FOUGEVILLE (5792), DESARTINES (6290), GORRON (6784), and MAYENNE. The flank guard encountered enemy opposition at GORRON. The second platoon went into position but did not engage any enemy armor.

Co A, less second platoon marched with the main body. The main body's route of march was ST HILLAIRE DU HARCOURT (4804), LANDIVY (5192), LONTANNIEVE (5434), ERNEE (5871), and MAYENNE (8071), a distance of about 50 miles. Just before the main body entered MAYENNE, the first platoon went into position West of the town to defend the temporary C.P. of the Tank Force. After the main body had entered the town, the first and third platoons took up defensive positions on roads leading into MAYENNE. One enemy vehicle was destroyed by the third platoon. At 1130 on August 6 the flank guard, with the second platoon, reached MAYENNE.

On August 6, 1944, the 357th Infantry Regiment with attached units and Co A, 607th TD Bn was ordered to march on LE MANS (4036). Co A, less the third platoon, marched with the main body. The main body marched from MAYENNE, MOUAY (8068), COMMES (8064), MONTSUR (8557), ST SUZANNE (0048), VIVIERS (0548), ST SYMPHORIEN (1944), BERNAY (2144), LA QUINTE (2942).

The third platoon marching with the flank guard marched through AVON (8570), JUBLAINS (8965), EVRON (9754), ST SUZANNE, ST DENNIS (0540), COULONS (2738), CHORVAUN (3159) to LE MANS. On the march to LE MANS no enemy armor was engaged by Co A.

On August 9, 1944, Co A, 607th TD Bn passed through LE MANS and assembled in the vicinity of CHATELH (5972). At 1940 it was reported that sniper fire was causing considerable trouble in LE MANS. A small force was organized to re-enter LE MANS to quell the sniper fire. Two guns of the second platoon were ordered in direct support of this force. When the force arrived in town, the situation was under control.

On August 11, 1944, the 357th Infantry Regiment with attached units and Co A, 607th TD Bn marched on ALENCON (3484).

On August 13, 1944, the 357th Infantry Regiment was assigned the mission of securing the high ground in FORET DECOURS (3090). Each Battalion of the 357th Inf was assigned the mission of securing one of the three high hills in the forest. One platoon of Co A, 607th TD Bn was in direct support of each one of these Battalions. The second platoon occupied positions on the high ground overlooking the village of LONGUENCE (2294). From their favorable position the second platoon was able to place devastating fire on enemy infantry in the vicinity of LONGUENCE. The actual casualties were unable to be determined.

The 357th Inf Regt moved from the FORET DECOURS to the vicinity of SERS (4329). The first platoon of Co A, 607th TD Bn occupied positions South of GACE (5549). The second platoon occupied positions in and around EXMES (4046). One section of the third platoon occupied a position on the high ground overlooking GACE. From this position they were able to destroy five enemy vehicles at a range of 5350 yds.

Moving from these positions, Co A, 607th TD Bn, moved and occupied positions East of ST LEONARD (4047). Two guns of the third platoon occupied positions on the high ground SW of EXMES. These guns fired three rounds from these positions at enemy vehicles but due to the extreme ranges, results were not obtainable.

/s/ William J Rodell
/T/ WILLIAM J RODELL
Capt, 607th TD Bn

-Restricted-

COMPANY B
607TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
APO 230

2 September 1944

2nd Platoon, Co B, 607th TD Bn in the "Battle of the Falaise Gap".

On the morning of August 19th, the second platoon of Co B, 607th TD Bn was sent on a mission to supply anti-tank support for Co F of the 358th Inf Regiment. The mission of the Infantry company was to secure the crossroad in the center of the FORET de GOUFFERN and at about 1000 moved from their assembly and into the forest. The second platoon took up anti-tank positions covering the crossroad. The platoon leader received a message from Lt Reynolds requesting ammunition immediately. The second platoon at once moved to Lt Reynold's position to offer any support it could.

Because friendly tanks were in position along the road, blocking the left flank, the platoon could only move three guns into position. They opened fire at once. Meanwhile reconnaissance was made to the flanks and two guns were moved to a position to the right and forward of the village. The other two were displaced to the left of the village. While this reconnaissance was being conducted, the guns had accounted for many German vehicles, including some tanks.

About 2100 the platoon was withdrawn to an assembly area in readiness for a projected move to the next village to the west (BON MANIL) in support of the 1st Battalion. For some reason the move did not develop until the next morning when the Battalion moved into the village, meeting no enemy resistance. The platoon went into firing positions immediately but received orders from the Infantry Battalion commander not to fire until ordered to by him. When the order to fire came, it was followed in ten minutes by a truce, during which enemy vehicles were observed moving in the valley below. As soon as the truce ended, the platoon opened fire, knocking out the enemy vehicles which they had seen moving during the truce. When twilight made observation no longer possible, a tally showed many vehicles and a few tanks had been put out of the action by the platoon and well over 200 prisoners taken.

The following day the visibility was so poor that not a round was fired.

It is the estimation of the platoon leader that no single individual or section deserves more credit than the rest. Every man conducted himself admirably and with courage, often neglecting his own safety in his eagerness to take advantage of the situation and take the enemy under fire.

Following is a list of equipment and armor put out of action:

First Day

4 tanks
3 horse drawn artillery
3 light armored vehicles
2 half tracks
1 ammunition truck

Second Day

5 tanks
3 horse drawn artillery
2 half tracks
9 trucks (1 1/2 ton or larger)
2 dump trucks
1 fuel truck

/s/ Gunner E Johnson
/T/ GUNNAR E JOHNSON
2nd Lt, AUS
607th TD Bn

- Restricted -

COMPANY B
607TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
APO 230

2 September 1944

3rd Platoon, Co B, 607th TD Bn at THE FALAISE POCKET

August 18, 1944 3rd Platoon, Co B, 607th TD Bn was to support the 1st Bn. 358th Infantry with two platoons of the 712th Tank Bn. which formed a combat team under command of Major _____ with the mission of attacking through the Forrest of Gouffern and taking the high ground in the vicinity of St. Eugenie.

August 18, 1944 the combat team was formed with "A" Co, 358th Inf. abreast of "C" Co., 358th Inf., "C" Co, riding the tanks and "B" Co, 358th Inf. on the right flank along a parallel road. The 3rd Platoon, 607th TD Bn, Co B, was to follow the tanks and 1st Bn, AT Plat., 358th Inf. brought up the rear. At 1500 "A" Co., 358th Inf. moved along the road with flank protection 150 yards each side of the road. There was little or no resistance until we reached a point about 3/4 of the distance through the forrest at which time one enemy AT gun opened fire at the lead tank firing 4 rounds and knocking the lead tank out. The tanks were in column and this action halted the entire column. There was light small arms fire including machine gun fire. The enemy laid down a concentration of artillery on the column at which time the command was given for the tanks to back up out of the artillery fire. The withdrawal of the tanks started the general withdrawal of all troops. By the time the confusion was over the total loss (ours) was one tank destroyed, two men killed and four wounded. There was no loss in the TDs. The confusion caused the attack to fail and we dug in along the road starting at Coord. (330472) during the night with the TD guns located in rear covering the cross road at Coord. (332460)

At 0800 the 19th August 1944 the combat team was reformed with Co. "C", 358th Inf. preceding the tanks 400 yards and "A" Co., 358th Inf., along with the tanks. Little resistance was encountered until we reached the town of St. Eugenie (335225). The 1st Platoon of "C" Co. 358th Inf. entered the town and as the lead tank came out of the woods it drew direct tank and SP fire which halted the column. When the column halted, I proceeded forward to the head of the tanks and met the Battalion Commander of the Combat Team. He told me that, "there was one platoon in town and he wanted the TDs in as soon as possible." The Falaise Pocket was a valley which was a gunners dream for fields of fire and observation. There were three (3) roads which ran across our front. One black top which was the main route of withdrawal was 1400 yards from our positions. The roads were packed with every kind of vehicle including tanks and horse-drawn vehicles and guns. The only disadvantage was that we were on a forward slope.

I made a quick reconnaissance and placed the 1st section of my platoon in a temporary position to cover the platoon while the other guns moved through town into position. During the movement into position the first section destroyed one tank, one SP gun which was firing on the platoon, with the expenditure of 3 rds APC and 3 rds HE ammunition. I then placed the 2nd section in position. It commenced firing by the time the trails were spread. Showing the 3rd section their position, I put the 4th section into position. By this time the Infantry had two platoons in town and

-Restricted-

- 2 -

3rd Plat., Co B, 607th Bn at the FALAISE POCKET (Contd)

one to our rear and two tanks had moved into town. There was quite a bit of small arms fire coming from the buildings to the 3rd section's right front and from the hedge row 75 yards to the 4th section's front. The 3rd section fired approximately 10 rds into the hedge destroying one vehicle and reducing most of the small arms fire.

At this time there was some confusion as to the location of friendly troops which were on the other side of the pocket. All fire was stopped for approximately 10 minutes until we received the OK to fire. During this 10 minutes the Inf. brought in and set up their heavy machine guns and also the AT Platoon moved into position beside the fourth section which was still receiving small arms fire. I sent the 1½ ton vehicle back to the Co Cp for ammunition and the security set up around the gun and all machine guns were dismounted and put into position.

All of the above action of going into position and the 10 minute break took about 30 minutes of our time and the enemy foot troops had been pushed out of town. Enemy tank and SP guns were firing direct fire at the two tanks in town and at the 4th section. The 4th section commanded by Sgt. Bowman could not return fire on the enemy tanks and SP gun. They moved under direct fire of tanks and small arms by hand for a distance of 35 yards from concealment and returned the fire destroying one tank, 2 SP guns and four other vehicles allowing our tanks to move into position. Our ammunition truck had not returned and ammunition was low. I radioed for ammunition and reinforcements for there was room for a company of TDs. I ordered the first section to move in position by the 3rd section, since their field of fire was limited and they had fired a good bit from that position. The 3rd section in the initial phase fired on enemy foot troops reducing small arms fire which was from 100 to 600 yards in front of the platoon position and then knocked out an enemy OP in the Church tower at Coord. (333240). The 2nd section fired upon vehicles and tanks along the road and remained in its position through the complete phase. The woods and buildings to our front were fired upon with HE as much as time and ammunition would permit. In the meantime ammunition had arrived also the 2nd platoon and Capt. Nicklas, Commanding Officer of Co "B" 607th TD Bn. Two guns of the 2nd platoon went into position to my right flank covering the same field of fire. I put two guns in with the fourth section and they were hub to hub firing as fast as they could load for there were plenty of targets. By the time the 2nd platoon had been in 20 minutes, both platoons had fired their basic load of ammunition and one 2½ ton truck load of battalion reserve, about 500 rds in all of 3 in. The 150 cal. machine guns were kept going continually on horse drawn vehicles and were getting very good results. The cross roads at Coord. (316514) was called TORPEDO JUNCTION for there was a mass of destroyed vehicles, dead horses and men. They were there bumper to bumper and almost every vehicle burning.

The Artillery laid concentration after concentration in the woods to our front. There were hundreds of foot troops that were trying to surrender but the fire from our position was so heavy that they couldn't come in.

The tanks having moved into position were firing HE in the woods and their machine guns were going steadily. One tank was hit twice with HE, direct fire, but failed to knock it out or stop it from firing. The AT platoon was firing at vehicles as fast as they could fire and had one gun

-Restricted-

- 3 -

3rd Plat., Co B, 607th TD Bn at the FALAISE POCKET (Contd)

to leave the carriage on the first round for it didn't have enough recoil oil.

The Air Force was continually strafing and bombing the enemy about 2000 yards to our front. As the fire had been built up so great and the area so packed with guns, I attempted to move the platoon forward. I moved the 4th section forward about 100 yards to a new position and before we could get into action we were under direct fire of an enemy SP gun, at which time Sgt. Bowman (4th Section) and Cpl. Benzel (2nd Plat. Security) and myself were wounded. The gun had to back out and the Platoon Sgt. Tacha took charge of the Platoon and we, the wounded, were evacuated to the rear. Sgt. Tacha, the Platoon Sgt., statements are below.

* * * * *

Sgt. Tacha

At 3 o'clock Aug. 19, 1944 I took over the platoon. I moved the 4th section from the West side of St. EUGENIE (335225) to the East side of town. From this position they destroyed two tanks, a good number of vehicles and received a good bit of return fire from tanks which destroyed the left tire of the gun but didn't stop the gun from firing and also was replaced in less than 30 minutes. I also moved the 1st section to the East side of St. EUGENIE on the forward slope of the hill from which they destroyed four tanks and two SP guns and six vehicles. After the two gun sections had the hill under control, a platoon of the 712th Tank Bn moved in between the two sections and destroyed a good number of tanks and vehicles. Two jeeps of the section were hauling ammunition from town to the guns and tanks, and this position received several rounds of return fire just before dark. At daybreak we opened fire and received heavy return fire which kept the gun sections pinned down all morning. The 3rd section only fire 8 rds HE during the morning. I moved both sections from that position under fire to the west side of town. From this position the two sections (1st and 3rd caught an enemy convoy at close interval and destroyed many enemy vehicles. The 4th section was under fire throughout the day and could not move around the gun. So after dark I moved this section to a new position in town and they destroyed 4 vehicles from this position. The morning of 20 Aug. 1944 our Battalion Commander, Lt. Col. SUNDT was at 1st and 3rd gun sections directing fire and had a shooting match with the Field Artillery.

At 1345 Aug 20 1944 a truce was called for 45 minutes and it was extended until 1500. At 1500 the enemy laid a heavy artillery concentration on our position and there were several wounded in the Infantry nearby. All day the 20th and 21st of Aug 1944 the enemy came out in large and small groups to surrender.

* * * * *

The action of the 3rd Plat. Co. B, 607th TD Bn at the FALAISE POCKET began on the 18th of Aug 1944 and lasted until the 21st of Aug 1944 with the following results:

- Restricted -

- 4 -

3rd Plat., Co B, 607th TD Bn at the FALAISE POCKET (Contd)

6 wounded (1 officer included)
3 vehicles and 1 trailer damaged (repaired)
1 gun damaged (repaired)

which included a total of 9 flat tires during the operation, either from enemy fire or debris in the roads and fields. The total ammunition expenditures were as below:

3 in. APC	-	232
3 in. HE	-	575
.50 cal.	-	5000
.30 cal.	-	12000

Total enemy vehicles destroyed:
18 enemy tanks
17 SP guns
10 Arty pcs (horse drawn)
41 General purpose vehicles
4 Half-track vehicles
and an undetermined number of enemy personnel killed.

RICHARD A. REYNOLDS
1st Lt., (FA)
Co "B" 607th TD Bn

20 August 1944 at 0900, 2nd Lt Stone took Command of the Platoon and remained in Command for the rest of the phase.

- Restricted -

COMPANY C
607TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
APO 230

2 September 1944

1st Platoon, Co C, 607th TD Bn at CHAMBOIS (4051).

At approximately 1900 hrs. 19th Aug 44, this platoon was ordered from its position in ST LEONARD (4047) to CHAMBOIS (4051) which had been taken by Major Dulls' Bn of the 359th Inf. My security Sgt and I, taking two jeeps, went to the town and made contact with Major Dull. We were given the job of protecting the roads leading NW, NE and E from the town. The town was jammed with enemy equipment of all types, some of it still blazing. Sgt Nash (security) was sent back for our guns, but had to wait about 15 minutes until some ammunition in a knocked-out vehicle on the main street stopped exploding. This vehicle was on the only route leading to the South part of town and we had to pass within two feet of it.

Darkness had set in when the guns arrived and were placed into position. In coming through the town they had to button up as the vehicle which had previously halted us started exploding more ammunition. This was a close in defense because of the impossibility of bypassing knocked-out equipment. Our number 2 gun was set up at (41.2 - 51.0), number 3 at (40.8 - 51.4) and number 4 at (40.6 - 51.5). All positions were located in the center of the road, but were protected to a certain degree by being to the rear or flank of knocked-out armor. All was peaceful until 0400-0500 hrs 20 Aug, when the Germans started an attack. His infantry came into the fields and woods to the left of my number 4 gun. Sgt Gularies' 1st section (their gun was being repaired) rallied around the 4th's left flank as added security. At 0900 a 150MM SP gun nosed around the corner of the road 200 yds off in front of No 4 and Sgt Slenes and Pvt Salyers manning their gun, knocked out the enemy gun. At about 1400 hrs we could hear German tanks to the left of No 4 and an hour later Pvt Shibe and Pvt Bell reported that they had knocked out a Mark IV, 400 yds to the left flank with a bazooka. At this time a lot of small arms fire was going on near No 2. It later turned out that the Polish troops had set up to the West of town and both sides had mistaken the other for the enemy.

Cpl Benner knocked another Mark IV tank out on the road in front of No 4 at 1900 hrs and an armored vehicle at 2100 hrs, then still another armored vehicle at 2300 hrs.

At 2230 hrs Pvt Shibe and Pvt Bell knocked out an SP around the corner of a building 100 feet to the left front of No 4. This had come up through the fields unnoticed, how, no one knows.

Three or four shells had landed to the rear of No 4 at 1600-1700 hrs and Pvt Schurig was hit in the arm by a fragment of one.

On a couple of occasions we fired HE into bushes along the road in front of No 4, and this forced some Jerries out into the open.

At noon on the 22nd Aug 44 we were relieved by British troops - all was quiet.

GEORGE W. KING
1st Lt, AUS
Co C, 607th TD Bn

- Restricted -

COMPANY C
607TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
APO 230

2 September 1944

Action of 2d Platoon, Co C, 607th TD Bn in Battle of Falaise Pocket.

Date: 18 Augst 1944

Place: Falaise Pocket

Weather: Good

Unit Attached To: 2d Battalion, 359th Infantry. Major Dull, Commanding Officer.

The 2d Platoon, Co C, 607th TD Bn in support of 2d battalion, 359th Infantry was ordered to relieve the 3d Platoon at the cross road near ST LEONARD (4047). Two guns were in position in center of town. One covering road from the north, the other gun covering road from the west. The remaining two guns were located near the road junction east of ST LEONARD giving them an excellent field of fire. Sgt Gillespie's gun was able to cover the road that led into CHAMBOIS (4052) and was able to knock out three vehicles, one of which was towing a 20mm flak gun. During that afternoon a FA officer located a tank which the gun could not see so the gun was towed down to the north side of the road to bring fire on it. After several rounds were fired at each other, the tank moved. It was picked up with a BC scope and I told my gun commander I would direct fire for him as he could not see the enemy tank in his sight. After exchanging several rounds at direct fire we succeeded in hitting the tank causing it to smoke, the gun ran out of ammunition and we went about 800 yards and got more. During that time the tank had made a slight move and I picked it up with the BC scope again. We received about twenty rounds of direct fire from the tank, all of it AP. The gun commander and his assistant did not leave the gun but continued to put fire directly at the tank, finally succeeding in knocking it out. Sgt Gillespie and Cpl Chriske were the only men on the gun, I was on the BC scope about ten feet to the right front of the gun. At a later hour another gun was put into position there and Sgt Gillespie's gun was moved back to the south side of the road. Later that evening Sgt Hempel located an enemy tank 3200 yards to his front. After waiting one and one-half hours the tank opened fire revealing its exact position. Sgt Hempel destroyed the tank with one round of AP and then put four rounds of HE into the area around the tank. Also knocked out one vehicle immediately after the tank, on the road at 3000 yds.

WILLIAM PENDERGAST
1st Lt., 607th TD Bn

-Restricted-

COMPANY C
607TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
APO 230

2 September 1944

Action of 3rd Platoon, Co C, 607th TD Bn in Battle of Falaise Pocket.

On August 15th the third platoon of "C" company moved into position in and around the town of LE BOURGE ST LEONARD (4047) in support of "A" company of the 359th Infantry Regiment. (See attached sketch, A, for gun positions and Infantry dispositions).

During the night of 15th August we were subjected to a sporadic artillery and nebelwarfer bombardment. No casualties were inflicted on the 3rd platoon.

On August 16th at approximately 0800 the enemy started an attack on the town of ST LEONARD. The attack was from the west, driving into the town. The enemy was vastly superior in number to our forces, (as was later reported to me by the S-3 of 1st Bn 359th), and succeeded in driving our Infantry out of the west part of town. Due to the fact that the Infantry fell back to a position in rear of the 1st and 2nd guns, we also were forced to withdraw because of the small arms fire. We were able to get the 1st section gun out of town, but the small arms fire and mortar fire was so intense, that the 2nd section was forced to abandon their gun.

The 1st section was put into position covering the road leading east out of town, (see sketch B). There was no enemy tank action at this time.

The Infantry company commander reorganized his unit and went back into the town taking positions on the west side of town. At this time the 2nd of our gun sections went back and took over their gun. The enemy action quieted down for the time being.

At about 1300 of the same day, the enemy started another attack on the western part of the town, this time supported by tanks. They succeeded in taking the town. Our 2nd section had a fire fight with an enemy tank, the gun knocking out the tank, but being disabled also. Cpl Washabaugh and Pvt Hunsicker were manning the gun at the time. The enemy attack continued on toward the east where the 1st section of our platoon was in position.

Some enemy tanks started up the east-west road toward the 1st section. They opened fire at the section and the section returned the fire and was credited with knocking out two tanks, the gun being manned by Lt Col Sundt, who had arrived at our position a short time earlier, and Sgt Scott, chief of section and Cpl Shirley, gunner. Sgt Kaiser also assisted.


After the tanks were knocked out, no more came up this road but the enemy infantry continued to advance. The 1st section gun opened fire on the personnel with HE, stopping the advance and giving our infantry a base of fire by which they were soon able to counterattack, retaking the town. During this action the 4th section was moved to the north to cover the road by flanking fire, (see sketch B).

After our forces had retaken the town, at about 2000, the enemy attacked us from our right flank and rear, overrunning the 3rd section gun. The section drove the enemy off with small arm fire. Then a friendly tank was brought up and drove the enemy back. There was no more action that night.

The next morning, about 0700, the enemy started another attack from the south, driving in behind our infantry in town. The 1st section was forced by small arms fire coming from their left into withdrawing their gun down the main road. (see sketch B). The 4th section was moved also, to prevent their being cut off.

We were subjected to intense artillery and mortar fire for the rest of the morning. We took part in no more action and were relieved by the 2nd platoon of "C" company at about 1230 on the 18th of August. Score - 3 enemy tanks knocked out, estimated 25 or 30 enemy infantrymen killed or wounded. Losses - 2nd section gun, 3 men killed, 2 missing, 11 wounded.

It was later reported to me by the S-3 of 1st Bn, 359th Inf that the enemy had attacked with two battalions of infantry with a total strength of 1100 men. As opposed to this we had "A" Co of the 359th Inf, 2 tanks from 712 Tank Bn, 3rd platoon of Co C



FROM 161000 AUG
TO 170800 AUG 4

LE BOURGE
ST LEONARD

BLUE ARROWS
SHOW MOVE

AT # 0800ALIG

17

2

4

4.

3

23

1

-Restricted-

LOCATION OF GUNS
 60717 D B
 AS OF 180800 AUG 1944
 MAP FRANCE 450,010
 7FB

53
 32
 TORPEDO JCT

1 PLAT
 B CO
 1 PLAT
 C CO

2ND PLAT
 B CO
 3RD
 PLAT
 B CO

43
 48
 3 PLAT
 C CO
 2 PLAT
 C CO
 2 PLAT
 A CO
 3RD
 PLAT
 A CO

- Restricted -