

UNITED STATES  
No. 9

Unit: 630th Tank Destroyer Bn.  
From: 01-01 February 1945  
To : 282400 February 1945

8432	8522	4314	1:25,000	Sheets	5404, 5405, 5504, 5505.
8433	8523	4276	1:50,000	Sheets	WUM, KOLN.
8434	8524	4316	1:100,000	Sheets	2-1
8435	8525	4278	1:250,000	Sheets	3
8436	8526	4326	1:250,000	Sheets	251

1. ENEMY:

a. Units in contact:

2 Bn, 1055 Inf Regt.,	69 VG Div.
1 Bn, 1055 Inf Regt.,	69 VG Div.
1 Bn, 990 Inf Regt.,	277 Inf Div.
2 Bn, 990 Inf Regt.,	277 Inf Div.
277 VG INTR BN.,	277 Inf Div.



b. Enemy reserves:

The enemy active in this area is not known to have a reserve that it can readily commit. There is a remote possibility that the 62 VG Div could be called to reinforce this front in the event of an attack in this zone.

c. Enemy activity during period:

During the first portion of the period 1-11 February 1945 during operation on the WILHELM STRAIN the enemy engaged in fighting a delaying action consisting of small scale counterattacks in squad and platoon strength supported by one or two 88 guns. As we advanced small groups were left behind by the enemy in hedges, ditches, buildings, or other favorable positions to retard our progress in driving the enemy across the WILHELM. Tanks in groups of one or two were used more as 88 guns than as tanks and were never allowed to close with our troops. The outstanding feature of the enemy activities in this area was his freedom of movement during the hours of darkness and the fact that although the city of WILHELM was well fortified no large scale attempt was made to hold the city. Searchlights against low clouds were again used for illumination on dark nights in German rear areas. During daylight several US 262 fighter bombers made several attempts to destroy bridges in the area.

During the period 12-22 February 1945 the unit was out of contact with the enemy.

From the period 23 February 1945 to the close of the period in operations East of WILHELM along the SOER River the enemy engaged in defending the East bank of the River. Sporadic artillery and mortar fire was received all along the front. Machine guns were used for long range indirect fire along the streets of towns in the forward areas. The outstanding enemy action on this front has been his reluctance to fire on even the most lucrative artillery target even when

visibility has been almost perfect. The main portion of our front area has been under direct observation and all activity can be readily observed by the enemy. Because of his reluctance to fire on our movements to and from these areas it leaves but little to realize that he is either short of ammunition of guns or not to expose his forward positions. Generally patrols were active during first part of period.

d. Enemy strength, material means, morale and probable knowledge of our situation.

The enemy strength on this front is comparatively weak and can be estimated from 1000 to 1500 men who are the remnants of two divisions which have been badly mauled in their last two commitments. The 277 Inf Div was cut up badly in the attack during the breakthrough and the 89 VG Div was severely punished in the HORTON FOREST around YORNBACH from which it has never completely recovered. Both of these units seem to be well equipped with automatic weapons and automatic weapon ammunition but both are far below standard in AT weapons showing much reliance on the LAW-TRUST and other hollow charge or rocket propelled AT weapons. Each of these divisions is supported by both medium and light artillery but either due to rationing of ammunition or the possibility of giving away the positions of their too few guns have refrained from firing at even the most lucrative targets. Troops in this area are well clothed and PW interrogation does not disclose any difficulties by way of rations.

e. The enemy in his present situation does not have any great choice in what his next move will be. With only remnants of two low class divisions to cover a front of 7000 yards with two regiments - his only possibilities are to attempt to retard our penetrations by fighting a series of holding actions designed to slow our advance enough for him to be able to salvage as many of the men and supplies as he can while slowly falling back to the RHINE. Inasmuch as strong and well prepared fortifications, earthworks and infantry diggings exist along the East bank of the ROER River and the fact that the majority of these are well placed on the terrain commanding the river valley it is entirely possible for him to contain, with only a few troops, the advance of a full division. Due to four infantry and two or four Panzer divisions not being identified as being in the line at present it is possible that by combining these forces a counterattack designed to cause us to reshuffle our troops could be launched on this front. However, this is very unlikely as it would call for the commitment of the only reserve known to exist on the entire West front which will no doubt be held to stem the final push against the RHINE. Locally the enemy can only attempt small counter-offensives to divert any gains that we might make in exploiting gains on our right or left. These could be made at any time after our initial advance was underway. It is needless to say that the enemy has a very complete knowledge of his present situation and he can be expected to maintain a "back to the wall" defense until the final collapse of the defense in the area of the ROER River.



2. **GENERAL INFORMATION:**

- a. Does not apply.
- b. See overlay attached as inclosure No 1
- c. Attached to 28th Infantry Division.
- d. **GENERAL OPERATIONS:**

At the beginning of the period, 1 February 1945, the 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed) was attached to the 28th Infantry Division. The battalion was assigned to Twelfth Army Group, attached to Sixth U.S. Army Group, subattached to Seventh U.S. Army. The 28th Infantry Division (+) was attached to III U.S. Corps and under operational control of First French Army.

The 28th Infantry Division occupied positions on a West-East line, facing South, running generally from LEVIGNY to canal just East of HUBERT, FRANCE. Some of the 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion occupied direct fire positions in sectors of Infantry regiments.

On 2 February 1945, Company "B", plus third platoon, Company "A" supported 109th Infantry REG in attack on, and capture of JOUEN, FRANCE, and Company "C" supported limited attack of 112th Infantry REG. Companies "A" and "B" supported Infantry in their advance to SEINE River. Company "C" occupied indirect fire positions in support of 229th T. S. Bn.

On 12-13 February 1945, the 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion assembled in vicinity of STAIN BRUN, FRANCE. On 13 February 1945 the battalion made water search with 28th Infantry Division to new assembly area, battalion closing in area vicinity SEVILLE, FRANCE; at 14430. At 14000 battalion reverted to operational control of Seventh United States Army.

Effective 13 February 1945, 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion was assigned to First U. S. Army, attached to T. S. Corps.

On 20 February 1945 battalion moved with 28th Infantry Division to assembly area vicinity STAIN BRUN, FRANCE.

During period 21-22-23 February 1945, the 28th Infantry Division relieved 2nd U.S. Infantry Division along E-W line. SOUSSE - HUBERT, FRANCE. Companies "A" and "C" occupied direct fire positions in areas of 109th Infantry Regiment and 112th Infantry Regiment, respectively. Company "B" occupied breakthrough positions in rear of Companies "A" and "C". At close of period battalion occupied these T.D. positions in division sector.

e. **DAILY OPERATIONS:**

See daily operations reports, attached hereto.

3. **OFFICIAL DATA:**

- a. Actual Officers - 31; Warrant Officers - 1  
Enlisted Men - 675  
Replacements Needed: Off - 3; WO - 1; EN - 53.
- b. Battle Casualties: KIA - 2 M; WIA - 1 M; MIA - 3 M;  
DIA - 3 M.
- Non-Battle Casualties: W - 37 M; I - 0; Inj - 3 M;  
Sounded - 1 M.



- c. Prisoners Captured: 25
- d. Evacuation: Kernal.
- e. Location of Battalion Supply Point: Vail 6987,  
WCF 15, 2 Mi. SE.
- f. Status of Supply: 2 days rations; 3 days gas; 15 days  
oil; basic load ammunition.
- g. Food not poor. Circulation fair.

4. GENERAL:

The majority of orders given by this command for employment of guns are verbal over radio or through personal contact by Staff Officer with Company Commanders; therefore, orders as inclosures are few.

ALBERT W. JOHNSON  
Lt. Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding.



Hq., 630th Tank Destroyer Bn.  
 ROUEN, FRANCE (V673292)  
 131100 February 1945

**MARCH ORDER:**

**NUMBER 1:**

1. This bn, attached to 28th Inf Div, moves at 131600 Feb 1945, under control of 28th Div Arty (for movement only) to assembly area at VOIE, FRANCE.

2. Atchd for movement only:  
 1 Plat, Cir Co, 103 Med Bn (12 veh).

3. Order of March:

1st M.U.	Bn CP and Co "B"	30 Veh
2nd M.U.	Co "A"	27 Veh
3rd M.U.	Co "C"	23 Veh
4th M.U.	Hq Co (-Maint) plus Rcn	18 Veh
5th M.U.	1 Plat, Cir Co, 103 Med Bn and Bn Maint	16 Veh

4. Route of March: See Route Sketch.

5. a. IP - Bridge at INGERHEIM.  
 b. Route to IP - N93 to COLMAR, N415 to INGERHEIM.  
 c. Head of column crosses IP at 1700.

6. Details of March:  
 a. 3 min int between march units.  
 b. Halts - 10 min before even hours.  
 c. Average Speed - 15 mph.  
 d. Max speed in convoy - 25 mph.  
 e. Max speed for "check" vehicles - 35 mph.  
 f. Full headlights will be used North and West of SIBARI  
 g. Route will be marked by Div MP's, supplemented by  
 Bom Flats.  
 h. Radio silence - radios off.

7. Convoy number (H/5/45) will be put on front of ea veh with chalk or sign.

8. Lead veh of ea H.U. will have sign reading "First Vehicle, \_\_\_\_\_ March Unit, Serial H/5/45/.

Last vehicle of serial will have sign reading "Last Vehicle, Serial H/5/45/.

9. Vehicles of 103 Med Bn will join column at PFAFFENHEIM.

JONES  
 Comdg.

OFFICIAL:

EMILIANUEL

Hq., 630th Tank Destroyer Bn.  
 EUVILLE, FRANCE (VU450190)  
 182000 February 1945

MARCH ORDER:  
 NUMBER 2:

MAPS: Europe Road Map, Sheet 62, 1/2000,000.  
 Route Strip Map, 1/1,000,000.

1. 630th T.D. Bn, attached to 28th Inf Div, moves by motor at 200920 Feb 1945, under control of 28th Div Arty (for movement only) to new assembly area via MON CHAU, GERSLAIN, and prepares for future operations.

2. Atchd for movement only:  
 Ctr Plat, 103 Med Bn (5 Veh)  
 Maint Sec, 728 Ord Co (5 Veh)

3. Route of March: See route sketch.

4. Order of March:

1st MU - Hq & Hq Co (-Maint)	24 Veh
2nd MU - Co "A"	28 Veh
3rd MU - Co "C"	27 Veh
4th MU - Co "B"	25 Veh
5th MU - (Ctr Plat, 103 Med Bn - 5)	
(Maint Sec, 728 Ord Co - 5)	
- (Bn Maint - 5)	15 Veh

5. a. IP - RJ at U36827L.  
 b. Route to IP - EUVILLE - COMMERCY - IP.  
 c. Head of column crosses IP at 1000.  
 d. Veh of 103 Med Bn and 728th Ord Co will join column at COMMERCY.

6. Details of March:  
 a. See attached extract of Annex 1, FC 40, Hq 28th Inf Div.  
 b. Full headlights will be used on march. (Unless ordered otherwise).  
 c. Route will be marked by Div MPs.  
 d. Radio Silence - radios off.  
 e. Serial Number - 14.

7. Security.  
 a. Security Memo, this Hq, dtd 17 Feb 1945 will be rigidly adhered to.  
 b. Code word for march will be given to car commanders at first halt.

8. Convoy Number (S/1002) will be put on front of ea veh with 12

[REDACTED]

(March Order No. 2, This No, dtd 18 Feb 45 (cont'd)

9. Supply:

- a. Two rations per ind will be carried on org trans.
- b. Min of one ration for org strength will be carried on org trans.
- c. Co's will carry approx 100 cans of gas on org trans.
- d. Sufficient water will be carried for entire movement.

10. Convey commanders report time of arrival and time of closing at destination by quickest available means.

JONES  
Comdg.

OFFICIALS:

BERNARDI

S-3