

**S E C R E T**

**HEADQUARTERS 635TH TD BATTALION TOWED  
APO 230, U. S. ARMY**

**SECRET**  
ADJ: AG VII AC  
Initials *Cal*  
Date *Nov 44*

*W-366*

6 November 1944

**SUBJECT:** Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports.  
**THROUGH:** Commanding General, VII Corps, APO 307, U. S. Army.  
**TO :** The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.




1. Pursuant to instructions contained in letter, file 319.1/401 (C), Hq. First U. S. Army, subject as indicated above, dated 13 July 1944, and paragraph 10 (C3) AR 345-105, the following report and copy of Unit Journal is submitted for the month of October 1944.

2. This Battalion has been attached to the 4th Cavalry Group, Mecca, throughout the month, with "A" Company in direct support of the 24th Cav. Rcn. Squadron and the 4th Cav. Rcn. Squadron supported by "C" Company. The 1st Platoon of "B" Company had the mission of defending Roetgen, Germany, while the 2nd and 3rd Platoons of "B" Company were in indirect firing positions in support of the 87th F. A. Battalion. Our primary mission throughout the month was to hold that area in general support of the south flank of the VII Corps, and on 25th October, the Battalion was attached to V Corps for operations only; continuing our primary mission under Group control.

3. Employment of the firing companies was coordinated between Group, Squadron Commanders and Company Commanders, and they have been successfully used in repelling small-scale counter attacks and enemy patrol activity, for combat and observation patrols, OPs, creating and protecting roadblocks, and generally neutralizing German attacks and resistance in designated defense areas. Our firing companies were utilized as infantry because of military necessity, and often a platoon was employed where ordinarily a company of infantry could be used. The combat efficiency of this command is very satisfactory, and has all its equipment except one (1) M-3. Our platoons and patrols had 27 fire fights with the enemy, and aided considerably in the elimination of personnel and obstacle resistance with forward observation for the artillery. The following is a resume of the indirect fire mission by our firing companies and controlled by our own Fire Direction Center - fire was observed both by the 87th F. A. Battalion we supported and by our own officer and enlisted personnel:

- a. 9150 rounds 3" HE ammunition fired.
- b. 444 missions fired, of which 249 were interdiction, the remainder general support and harassing.
- c. Harassing and TOT missions were fired on the following enemy installations: 1 at Huppenbroich, 1 at Eicherscheid, 1 at Klaus, 1 at Hoffelsbach, 1 at Ruhrberg, 1 at Einruhr, 1 at Rollesbroich, 5 at Eosternich and 4 missions at Steckenborn.
- d. 26 missions were fired on foot troops. Observers reported better than average results on most missions with many enemy dead and



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wounded, but could not determine exact number of enemy put out of action. This Battalion does not take credit for enemy dead unless definite proof available.

- e. 7 missions were fired at OP houses and areas. Results - 4 OP houses destroyed and 2 OP areas neutralized.
- f. Vehicles: 1 Armored Car, 1 Halftrack and 2 Personnel Carriers destroyed,
- g. 4 CP houses destroyed.
- h. 9 enemy pillboxes neutralized.
- i. 1 enemy barracks destroyed - number of dead and wounded not observed.
- j. 4 mortar emplacements knocked out and 7 mortar emplacements neutralized.
- k. 1 enemy warehouse destroyed.
- l. 3 enemy machine gun emplacements neutralized.
- m. 1 B-17 bomber destroyed on Corps order. Our plane fell in enemy territory.
- n. 11 preparation missions were fired in support of feint attack by 4th Cav. Group elements to aid the 9th Infantry Division's drive to the south.
- o. 25 counterbattery missions S&F were fired. While results unknown, the enemy stopped firing on numerous occasions.
- p. 3 church steeples, OPs, were destroyed by direct fire.

a. During the month the number of battle casualties suffered by this Battalion are 9 enlisted men killed, 21 enlisted men wounded and evacuated, and 20 enlisted men wounded and not evacuated. Non-battle casualties for the months operations were 18 enlisted men evacuated.

b. The Battalion captured, independently of assistance, 7 enemy prisoners, and we know we were responsible for the Squadrons' capturing more.

c. We have positive proof of killing 7 of the enemy, and are certain we were responsible for the death of a great many more; also many who were wounded and put out of future action against our troops due to our patrol and indirect firing activities. We were, however, not in position to check for definite results.

d. We suffered no serious vehicular casualties during the month. One (1) 1/4 ton was knocked out by shell fragmentation and had to be replaced. Four (4) 1/4 ton vehicles and one (1) halftrack were damaged by shell and mortar fire, but these were repaired by our own maintenance crews. Damage to equipment was also negligible. One (1) radio and one (1) 3" gunsight were damaged and repaired or replaced. We have found it advantageous to dig our vehicle wheels in and sand bag (when available) or place logs around them as tree and air bursts certainly get tires.

e. Incidents: All incidents pertaining to action with or against the enemy are outlined and broken down by days in the attached "Excerpts from Unit Journal".

f. Our firing platoon and CP areas were subjected to heavy mortar fire and enemy artillery shelling throughout the month, resulting in considerable loss of personnel.

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g. The Battalion Commander, continuing as Group Provost Marshall, appointed two officers who had enlisted personnel at their disposal to assist Military Government and Civil Affairs groups in towns and communities not under their jurisdiction but in the Group control area.

h. Pertinent Data of Value for Study:

- (1) 3" sights with plastic lens have given us considerable trouble; parallax, condensation in them; too heavy; our gunners would sooner have the old sight they can carry in their pockets.
- (2) Brake handles are too long (3" towed gun).
- (3) It was necessary to take our wheel segments off for more efficient operation.
- (4) Recommend halftracks or fulltracks to replace the M20 which is road-bound. Prefer full tracked vehicles to tow the 3" gun in place of the halftracks. Speed is not as essential as getting in and out of the positions tactics demand.
- (5) Furnish 2½ ton trucks in place of the 1½ ton ammunition trucks for platoons.
- (6) Substitute 1/4 ton vehicles for motorcycles.
- (7) Recommend a light tank be designed to tow the 3" gun for better protection.
- (8) Recommend wider tires for 3" gun carriage.

1 Incl.  
Excerpts from Unit Journal



WENT SMITH  
Lt. Col., FA  
Commanding

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