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INITIALS: s/AHL G-2
DATE: 5 March 1945.

Hq 726th Amph Trac Bn
IN THE FIELD, APO 235.
10 March 1945.

Appendix 1 to Annex BAKER to FO 1 ABLE.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY STRENGTH.

a. General.

In any estimate of the limit of the enemy's capability to reinforce his OKINAWA garrison after "L" Day, consideration should be given to the reinforcements available in areas adjacent to the RYUKYUS, namely FORUOSA, SHANGAI, and KYUSHU. Each of these areas may be expected to make an attempt to furnish one division; however, enemy shipping losses from these areas to OKINAWA will undoubtedly be so severe that not more than half such forces may be expected to arrive at the target. In addition to the above, the enemy will almost certainly attempt airborne reinforcement, for which are known to be available three trained regiments in KYUSHU.

b. NANSEI SHOTO

(1) Combat Forces.

Following is the list of the major enemy combat forces believed presently garrisoning the NANSEI SHOTO:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
1 Div	OKINAWA	16,000
24th Div	OKINAWA	16,000
28th Div	SAKISHIMA GUNTO (Div split between MIYAKO and ISHIGAKI; 1 ROT (36th Inf) on DAITO)	16,000
62d Div	AMAMI (15th Ind Inf Bn on OKINAWA)	13,000
44th IMB	OKINAWA	5,000
45th IMB	FUMUKE	4,000
59th IMB	SAKISHIMA GUNTO	4,000
60th IMB	SAKISHIMA GUNTO	4,000
64th IMB	(Split between OKINAWA and AMAMI)	4,000
15th IMR	OKINAWA (3d Bn on IE)	3,000
21st IMR	AMAMI	3,000
1st Arty Mortar Rgt	OKINAWA	1,500
27th Tank Regt	OKINAWA	650
	TOTAL	<u>96,150</u>

(2) In addition to the above forces there are from 25,000 to 40,000 troops of limited combat value, such as headquarters, engineers, AA, naval and laborers. These would bring the approximate strength for NANSEI SHOTO to 115,000 to 130,000 troops.

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e. OKINAWA

(1) Practically all of the 56,000 to 58,000 troops estimated to be present in the OKINAWA GUNTO are concentrated on OKINAWA ISLAND. The only other concentration worthy of consideration is 3,000 to 4,000 on IZUMI for the protection of the airfield there. Estimated strengths and dispositions of enemy ground forces on OKINAWA as of 1 April 1945 are as follows:

COMBAT

<u>UNIT and C.O.</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
24th Inf Div (Lt Gen HAMAMURA, Tatsumi)	16,000
*1 Inf Div	16,000
44th IMB (Maj Gen SUZUKI, Shigeji)	5,000 - 6,000
15th IMR	2,000 - 3,000
27th Tank Regt (Lt Col MURAKAMI, Kinoto)	750
1st Arty Mortar Regt (Col IRIBI, Kaneyashu)	1,500
TOTAL	41,000 - 45,000

*Estimated - will arrive prior to 1 April 1945

LIMITED COMBAT VALUE

<u>UNIT and C.O.</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
32d Army Hq. (CG - Lt Gen MATSUYAMA, Masao) (C/S - Maj Gen KITAGAWA, Kiyomi)	381 rifles, 108 pistols 2 LMG, 2 HMG	750
OKINAWA Area Naval Base Forces	AA & OD guns and small arms (number unknown)	3,000
Army AA Units	25mm to 124 mm AA guns	2,000
Army Air Force Ground Echelons:	2,200 rifles, carbines,	3,600
19th Air Sector Command	350 pistols, 10 LMG,	
Air Transport Hq	50 HMG	
2d Air Sig Regt		
18th Air Sig Regt		
26th Air-Ground Radio Unit		
44th Airfield Bn		
50th Airfield Bn (IE SHIMA)		
56th Airfield Bn		
3d Airfield Co		
129th Airfield Construction Unit		
118th Maintenance Unit (IE SHIMA)		
Branch Depot Tachiarai Air Depot		
Branch 5 Air Repair Depot		
Weather OP		
26th Shipping Engr Regt	1,200 rifles, 12 HMG, 6 37mm AT guns, 6 20mm AT rifles	1,200
25th Ind Engr Regt	900 rifles, 3 HMG	1,000

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<u>UNIT and C.O.</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
1st Shipping Hq OKINAWA Branch	90 rifles,	100
2d Field Fortification Dept (Construction personnel including 323d Construction Bn)	1,000 rifles	3,000
3d Ind Sea Transport Co	200 rifles, 9 HMG	250
	TOTAL LIMITED COMBAT.....	<u>15,000</u>
	AGGREGATE OKINAWA	56,000 - 58,000

(2) Following are the areas on OKINAWA most heavily defended and the probable troop dispositions based on aerial photo interpretation:

<u>AREA</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
YONATAN-KADENA Area	2 bns on each side of river mouth at TOGUCHI plus a fifth bn in position around KADENA AIRFIELD.
NE CHINETO AIRFIELD	1 bn
SW Coast below NIHA AIRFIELD	4 companies along beach
SE Coast SAKIBARU-SAKI to CHINEN-MISAKI	4 companies along beach
NAHAGUSUKU MAN	9 bns deployed for beach defense from YONBARU MAN to KATSUREN MAN.
KATCHIN HANTO (Peninsula)	3 bns
Narrow waist W of CHIMA MAN	1 bn
Peninsula N of NAGO MAN (E of IE SHIMA)	2 bns
IE SHIMA	2 bns
TOTAL	<u>25 bns.</u>

These dispositions are at best an approximation, although they coincide with the known enemy combat strength of two divisions (18 battalions), 1 IMB (6 battalions) 11IMR (3 battalions). These forces, of course, are augmented by the supporting units such as artillery, tanks, heavy mortars, and AAA.

d. Air

There are seventeen airfields in the RYUKYUS - 6 in OKINAWA GUNTO, 6 NW of OKINAWA, 4 NE of OKINAWA, and 1 on MINAMI DAITO. Another strip is under construction south of NIHA at ITOMAN. To a large extent these fields will be untenable to the enemy by and subsequent to "L" Day, although some of them will be used as emergency fields by damaged enemy aircraft. The partial neutralization of these RYUKYU airfields, however, would by no means eliminate enemy fighter activities over OKINAWA, since the KYUSHU, SHANGHAI AND FORMOSA fields are all within fighter range except for short range interceptors. The only conclusion which can be drawn from the above is that we may expect considerably more enemy air activity on OKINAWA than was present in the LEYTE campaign. As previously noted, the enemy has at least three airborne regiments on KYUSHU and may have as many more which he will undoubtedly employ against our rear areas at an opportune time.

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c. Small boats.

The enemy's experience in the LEYTE campaign in the matter of landing reinforcements has apparently resulted in placing more reliance on the use of barges and small boats rather than on ships which were highly vulnerable to our air and surface attacks. Increasing numbers of small craft have recently been noted in the RYUKYUS. The longer distances between OKINAWA and the other islands from which reinforcements may be sent will undoubtedly result in a larger percentage of troops being lost enroute than was the case in the LEYTE campaign.

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