

Co. C moved one (1) Plat. to LINNICH; had one (1) plat. in GERECNSWEILER and one (1) plat. in indirect fire position in vic. LOWERICH, which was replaced at 030730 Dec. by one plat. A Co.

Co. B took over support in the northern position of 102d Div on 030730 Dec. Placed platoons in the following positions:

- 1st. 94136356
- 2nd. 93846378
- 3rd. 93466410

One the same day one (1) plat. C Co. moved to GERECNSWEILER to join others in that area.

Co. A took up indirect fire position in LOWERICH, sent one (1) plat. to rear area for maintenance and rest, and one platoon moved vic. EDEREN 952619.

On 4 Dec. all Co's continued to occupy above positions except for 2nd plat. Co. C which moved to LINNICH.

As of 040930 Dec. the Bn. received Letter of Inst. #18 which ordered 771st TD to reconnoiter for possible fords and sites on the west bank of Roer river, in preparation for river crossing by Div., also received Letter of Inst. #19 which contained a request by Div. CG for CO's recommendations for any additional equipment desired for operation of crossing the Roer and establishing bridge head. It was recommended that a dozer (either Bull or Tank) be added to each Gun Co.

As of meeting on 041300 Dec. CO's Co. A-B-C were assigned sectors for Ren. for gun positions in support of crossing Roer River. A Co. received South Boundary Div. Sector to FLOSSDORF incl. Co. B North Edge FLOSSDORF to ROERDORF incl. Co. C North Edge ROERDORF to LINNICH incl.

Co. C 814th (Co. to be attached to 771st in support of River crossing) was to Reconnoiter area North of LINNICH to North edge of Div. sector.

From 4 Dec. to 7 Dec. all Co's remained in position, the only change being movement of 3rd Plat. Co. C to LINNICH.

Ren. Co. on order made reconnaissance of west bank of Roer River for ford sites and bridges. See overlay #3.

On 071200 Dec. two (2) M-10's from Co. B located at 967630 took a Church Steeple CP in TETZ (006639) under fire. Expended 10 rds. HE and 10 rds. APC. No hits observed, but all rounds fell in built up area of TETZ. Co. B was ordered to fire at any targets of their own choosing at every opportunity possible.

During period 071300 - 081610 Dec. 1944, Co. B fired another 40 rds of HE & APC. on Church Steeple CP in TETZ from approximate distance of 4500 yds. Observer was in CP in ROERDORF. Both Church Steeple and Church were consistently hit, but damage could not be ascertained.

AT 082300 Dec. order was given to alert one (1) plat. Co. B to support 1st En. 406th who was relieving a Bn. of 84th Inf. Div. on the high ground to the N & W of LINNICH. Contact was made with CO 406th and arrangements made for plat. to go into position in early morning of 9 Dec. and relieve plat. of 638th TD Unit in that Sector.

On 081600 Dec. Co. A fired five (5) rds. shell illuminating 3" Mk 24, Mod 1 Navy with fuze TSQ M54 & MODS experimently.

Following conclusions were drawn by airobserver:

- (1) Shell not adeptable for marking targets for air strike.
- (2) Using air burst would be of no material assistance in registering.

(3) Further daylight experiments should be made to determine whether flare would explode on impact and to determine incendiary value.

Observers at Guns state that it is excellent for night firing, makes target area easy to observe, shell had lighting effect up to 28 seconds.

Up thru 100900 there were no changes in positions in any of the Companies. The above relief of one (1) plat. 638th TD, which was to be effected was postponed until the morning of 11 Dec. 1944.

had evolved on 11 Dec. and approved by Higher Headquarters that while unit was in active preparation for future offensive, the following would take place:

A Co. was to move two (2) Platoons to LINNICH and relieve Co. C and one (1) plat. to remain in vic. EDEREN in indirect fire position. 2 Platoons of Co. C were to return to rear areas for refitting; one (1) plat. was to remain in vic. GEREONSWEILER. B Co. CP and all platoons to take up positions in vic. EDEREN. Movement to take place between 0500-0700 12 Dec. 1944.

At 102000 Dec. 1944 Co. A fired five (5) Shell illuminating M24 for experimental purposes. Fired at one (1) minute intervals at heights ranging from 1100 ft. to 500 ft. Fired at two (2) known enemy Btry positions - one (1) in North and one (1) in South of GEVENICH; the remaining three (3) shells fired throughout the town of GEVENICH. The infantry was exceedingly well-placed with the result of firing became of the lighting effect on terrain.

Between hours of 0500-0700 on 12 Dec. the Battalion rotation plan went into effect. Co. C moved from LINNICH, placed one (1) plat. at 938657 to support 1st Bn 406th in NW Section of Div. Sector and sent two (2) plat. to rear area for refitting.

Co. A moved two (2) Plat. from EDEREN to LINNICH and occupied following positions: 96906558 and 96546546, assuming responsibility for center and eastern section of Div. Sector. 3rd Plat. went to Rear area for refitting.

Co. B moved all platoons from GEREONSWEILER to vic. EDEREN, 1st plat. at 94476148, 2nd plat. at 94506160, 3rd plat. at 94646160. Sent two (2) M-10's to the rear areas for maintenance.

No change in any position through 14 Dec. 1944. It was decided on 14 Dec. with approval from Higher command that battalion would adopt a rotation plan allowing each Co. to send one (1) plat. to the rear for maintenance, and rest. Co. C was to return two (2) plats. to vic. GEREONSWEILER and send one (1) to rear areas.

No change thru 160600 Dec. 16 at 0600 Cavalry Gp. experienced small scale attack. A & C Co. were alerted. Co. B fired platoon volleys at six (6) minute intervals at following targets: 97586772, 97616788, 97406748, at 1800 all Companies were ordered to stand by prepared to deal with counterattack. Arrangements made to return all platoons from the rear areas on one (1) hr. notice. Co. B to consolidate plans with 405th Inf. who were to make the main stand against counterattack. Plan A - Co. B was to assemble vic. GEREONSWEILER and await orders from CO 405th, to occupy position to the N & E of GEREONSWEILER. Under Plan B - Co. B was to assemble vic. WELZ and await orders to occupy positions to the N & NW of LINNICH. However as of 2400 there was no action on either side. No action or change in plans through 18 Dec. At 1200 CO Co. B requested the move of one (1) plat. to vic. 955629.

On 19 Dec. Plan made for defense of Div. Sector. All other plans and activities were held in abeyance of German offensive, against 1st Army.

Plan of Employment of Tank Destroyers was as follows: All platoons in the line - Co. C to the N & NE of GEREONSWEILER, one (1) plat. to cover BEECK-LINDERN, one (1) plat. to cover LINDERN-ERACHELEN, one to cover East.

Co. B - one (1) plat. APWEILER to East, one (1) plat. GEREONSWEILER to West, one (1) plat. GEREONSWEILER to East N of EDEREN road.

Co. A - 1 Plat. to cover GEREONSWEILER-LINNICH road, one (1) plat. North edge LINNICH, one (1) plat. to cover NW road from LINNICH, Rcn. Co. to maintain attachment of one (1) Rcn. plat. to each Gun Co. (A,B,C,)

Per Div. order as of 191630 Dec. Division was on the defense and all positions were to be dug in; on primary line, on the RRL (FRUMMERUM-GEREONSWEILER), on second line of defense (FREIALDENHOVEN-PUFFENDORF-IMMENDORF-GEILENKIRCHEN).

On 20 Dec. 102d Inf Div. assumed responsibility for 84th Div. Sector, ~~the~~ changing former planned positions. All Companies reconnoitered and occupied new areas as follows: See overlay # 5 & 6.

Co. C CP 92686276 (APWEILER)
 C1 966654
 C2 915634
 C3 937653

Co. B CP 95926188 (EDENEN)
 B1 934674
 B2 932675
 B3 936655

Co. A CP 89806265 (IMMENDORF)
 A1 909670
 A2 91406660
 A3 91206480

Co. Co received area to reconnoiter and prepare gun positions to be moved into on Corps call on one (1) hour alert. Line to be occupied by Co. Co on Corps mission

- (1) SIEMENBUSCH*TEVEREN-FRELEBERG.
- (2) GROTEBRATH-SCHERPENSEEL-MARIENBERG.
- (3) NIEVENHOFF*SCHERPENSEEL-MARIENBERG.

See overlay #7. Each Co. was placed in direct support of an infantry regiment.

Co. C406th Inf.
 Co. B407th Inf.
 Co. A405th Inf.

One Rcn. platoon still attached to each Gun company.

On 23 Dec. Co. C was placed in direct support of 11th Cavalry Group, due to shifting of responsibility in Div. Sector.

During the period 25 Dec. to 31 Dec. all Co's continued to improve their positions in defense lines. 3rd and 4th defense lines have also been assigned. Reconnaissance has been made and tentative positions chosen.

During the entire period the Battalion fired indirectly:

2851 missions expending	5807 HE Ch. N.
and	2327 R&HE Red. Ch.
17 missions expending	41 rds. Shell ill.
2 missions expending	15 rds. Smoke

Fired directly

4 Missions expending	135 rds. HE N Ch.
and	103 rds. APC

During the period the Pioneer plat. Rcn. Co. assisted the Gun Co's in preparation of all positions; swept, reconnoitered gun positions for mines and cleared other obstacles.

3. ADMINISTRATIVE

a. Status of strength of Command and replacements needed:

(1) Officers and Warrant Officers

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Shortage</u>
*Headquarters Co.	15	15	0
Reconnaissance Co.	7	6	1 (Officer)
A Co.	6	6	0
B Co.	6	6	0
C Co.	6	6	0
Med. Det.	1	1	0

*Headquarters Co. is over one commissioned Officer and short one Warrant Officer.

(2) Enlisted Men

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Shortage</u>
Headquarters Co.	105	105	0
Reconnaissance Co.	115	112	3
A Co.	124	112	12
B Co.	124	110	14
C Co.	124	110	14
Med. Det.	15	15	0

b. Casualties

(1) Officers and Warrant Officers

	Killed	Sick, Gassed, Wounded		Captured	Missing
		Evac.	Non-Evac.		
Headquarters Co.	0	0	0	0	0
Reconnaissance Co.	0	1	2	0	0
A Co.	0	0	0	0	0
B Co.	0	0	0	0	0
C Co.	0	0	0	0	0
Med. Det.	0	0	0	0	0

(2) Enlisted Men

	Killed	Sick, Gassed, Wounded		Captured	Missing
		Evac.	Non-Evac.		
Headquarters Co.	0	2	15	0	0
Reconnaissance Co.	0	11	39	0	0
A Co.	0	16	22	0	0
B Co.	1	9	33	0	0
C Co.	0	10	36	0	0
Med. Det.	0	1	8	0	0

c. Prisoners captured: None

d. Evacuation of Casualties has been approximately divided as follows: Fifty percent through attalion Medical Detachment and Fifty percent through Division Medical installations.

e.

(1) The following Officers have been assigned to the organization during the period 1-31 December 1944:

Headquarters Co. Capt. Kenneth H. Van Tassel, Liaison Officer
 A Co. 2nd Lt. Charles T. Hedrick, Platoon Commander
 B Co. 2nd Lt. Frank A. Lindstadt, Company headquarters
 C Co. 2nd Lt. John P. Futler, Company headquarters
 2nd Lt. John A. Bertucci, Platoon Commander
 Reconnaissance Co. 2nd Lt. Thomas W. Cullen, Platoon Commander

(2) The following Officer was lost to the organization during the period 1-31 December 1944.

Reconnaissance Co. 2nd Lt. Milton E. Peoples, Platoon Commander.

f. Decorations awarded during month of December 1944:

- (1) Purple Heart
 - Officers 0
 - Enlisted Men 3
- (2) Bronze Star
 - Officers 1
 - Enlisted Men 1
- (3) Silver Star
 - Officers 0
 - Enlisted Men 3

g. Status of Supply:

The status of supply over-all has been good with the following exceptions which are critical.

1. Quartermaster:

- (a) Boots, combat service of EE widths.
- (b) Combat clothing
- (c) Overshoes sizes 12 and 13.
- (d) Mantles and generators for converted type, gaso-line lanterns.
- (e) Stoves, cooking, 1-burner.
- (f) Heater, water, immersion type.

2. Ordnance:

- (a) Binoculars, M-3.
- (b) Circle, Aiming, M-1.
- (c) M-36, Tank Destroyers
- (d) M-32, Tank Recovery Vehicles
- (e) M-20, Car, Armored Utility.
- (f) Trailer, Ammunition, M-10.
- (g) Tires and tubes, 900 x 20.

~~SECRET~~

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Due to change of new P/O & E the destroyers, armored cars, recovery vehicles and ammunition trailers are very slow in being released.

4. GENERAL

a. During this period the Battalion has had continuously a number of primary weapons, M-1C destroyers, unserviceable. This condition is not due to a lack of company and battalion maintenance, but is due to the poor condition of the destroyers received as replacements for battle losses.

b. During the period the battalion averaged 40 enlisted men under-strength due to lack of replacements. This has a direct bearing upon combat efficiency.

c. Morale has remained excellent in spite of the generally static situation, but it is believed that morale could be further improved by a larger allocation to rest center area.

David Deg Smith
DAVID DEG SMITH,
Lt. Col., FA.
Commanding.