

SECRETHEADQUARTERS
825TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

RDF/jfs

APO 655, U.S. Army
4 January 1945

Subject: Monthly Report of Activities.

To: Commanding General, Special Troops, 12th Army Group, APO 655, U. S. Army.

In compliance with Section I, Administrative Bulletin Number 71, Headquarters, Special Troops, 12th Army Group, dated 24 October 1944, the following report is submitted:

DECEMBER

During the month of December 1944 the 825th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less detached units) was stationed at Luxembourg, its primary mission being the perimeter defense of Headquarters Twelfth Army Group TAC. On 16 December an enemy break-through was reported in the vicinity of Berdorf, Lauterhorn, Osweiler and Dickweiler. Security and anti-tank defenses were immediately tightened. Armored car patrols were ordered to operate continuously on probable avenues of approach, within an eight-kilometer radius of the city; the balance of the battalion was alerted for employment as ordered. On 19 December the first and second platoons of Company "C" occupied prepared gun positions; the third platoon remained in reserve. Road blocks were installed to halt and identify all traffic; armored car patrols were ready to provide gun crews small-arms protection in the event of attack. By 28 December the German threat to Luxembourg had diminished, and those elements of the battalion stationed in the city returned to their normal status.

Company "A" was alerted by Headquarters "T" force at 1130 hours 17 December 1944 and notified of a German counter-attack. Orders followed at 1600 hours directing movement to Malmedy, Belgium, attachment to the 526 Armored Infantry Battalion for the move, and occupation of firing positions east of the town. At Malmedy the Commanding Officer, 526 Armored Infantry Battalion, attached the first platoon of tank destroyers to Company "A", 526 Armored Infantry Battalion; this force was ordered to proceed to Stavelot, Belgium under the command of Major Solis, S-X, 526 Armored Infantry Battalion, to take up gun positions defending three Engineer-constructed road-blocks. As a result of orders received from the Commanding Officer, 99 Infantry Battalion, Captain Dibert ordered his second and third tank destroyer platoons to positions in the vicinity of three road-blocks near Malmedy. Defenses were set up and guns in position by 0430 hours 18 December. At 0605 hours the first platoon under the command of Lieutenant Jack Deherly met and held a numerically superior enemy force (see incl. 1 for description of this action extracted from The Stars and Stripes, 20 December 1944; from this battle Lieutenant Deherly's men emerged with credit for having destroyed four (4) Tiger "Royal" Tanks, six (6) houses harboring machine gun nests, six (6) enemy pillboxes and for having killed or wounded an undetermined number. The first platoon reported ten (10) casualties (missing and wounded), three (3) three-inch guns, three (3) half-tracks, one (1) $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck, two (2) 610 SCR lost to enemy action. Three (3) of the enemy dressed in civilian clothing were captured in Malmedy on 19 December; the third platoon was subjected to mortar and small-arms fire but suffered no casualties. On 21 December all troops were alerted at 0300 hours; at approximately 0700 hours the sound of what was believed to be a sizeable enemy armored column indicated its approach on the road covered by the second tank destroyer platoon. As Lieutenant Harper set his gun crews for action, an American $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck carrying German reconnaissance personnel appeared over a curving crest; a landmine laid by members of the second platoon exploded demolishing this vehicle. An American half-track appeared next followed by a German Mark IV tank; Lieutenant Harper's guns trapped the half-track between the $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck and the tank by first destroying the tank, then methodically placing fire on the half-track. One other enemy-operated American $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck was put out of action in

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the battle. Later on this same date the second platoon captured two (2) additional enemy-operated $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks and one (1) light armored car M-8; artillery and small arms fire fell on the third platoon. (During the remainder of the month Captain Dibert improved his position and refitted equipment which had been damaged.)

Since 22 October 1944 elements of the first, second and third platoons, Company "B" have been assigned security missions with Twelfth Army Group VHF radio stations operating in First and Third Army sectors. At Baraque Fraiture, Belgium on 18 December, Lieutenant Decker received orders to evacuate with two radio stations, the second destroyer squad of the second platoon and third squad of the first platoon to Nassogne, Belgium. Lieutenant Decker met Sergeant Cloutier with the fourth squad of the first platoon when he arrived in Nassogne at about 2100 hours. On the following day in compliance with order the second and third squads were moved to Jemelle, Belgium to secure a telephone repeater station; two (2) VHF stations were moved to Hill 561 with half of the fourth squad as security. At noon 20 December one platoon of Company "G", 3rd Battalion, 29 Infantry Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Phillips joined the second and third squads at Jemelle. Rumors of the enemy's presence were numerous on 21 and 22 December; Lieutenant Decker through personal inspection found enemy reconnaissance units to be present in the vicinity of Ambly and encountered enemy machine-gun fire north of Jemeppe. Privates Barrows and Peters reported enemy armor and what were believed to be American ambulances moving west across their front at 1000 hours 23 December; while these men had been observing, the third squad had opened fire on a locomotive which the enemy had commandeered and started toward Jemelle from the North. Two (2) rounds of 88 had knocked it out at a range of six hundred to eight hundred yards. Privates Barrows and Peters had reconnoitered the northeast flank and reported the presence of a large number of German soldiers dressed completely or partially in American uniform at Harsin. At 1300 hours the repeater station closed down and evacuated with the second and third destroyer squads to Rochefort, Belgium in accordance with instructions received from Major Ball, 3rd Battalion, 335 Infantry Regiment, the two squads took up temporary positions in the town square. At about 2200 hours an attacking enemy infantry force was completely wiped out by the combined machine-gun and small-arms fire of the second and third squads; shortly after this battle, three (3) M-18 self-propelled Tank Destroyers and one (1) Infantry rifle company joined Lt. Decker's force. At about 0100 hours 24 December the third squad with the assistance of one M-18 compelled a German tank to withdraw on a side street by which it had approached. Sporadic fighting continued through the night. In the morning at 0830 hours three (3) attacking enemy tanks put the second squad and its gun out of action in a fire fight; the third squad which had entered the fight from an unfavorable position was forced to abandon its gun and join the infantry with small arms. At about 1345 hours those who were able to withdraw left by foot going cross-country in small groups to reorganize at Givet, France; Lieutenant Decker reported to his Company Headquarters with these men on Christmas Day (for more detailed description see inclosure 2 "Oral Report by Lieutenant Decker"). Since 21 December the fourth tank destroyer squad had secured VHF stations which had continued to operate on Hill 561 despite the enemy's presence on the same hill. But on 26 December numerically superior German Troops closed in. A prearranged plan for evacuation in small groups was executed and all members of this unit had reached their Company CP by 30 December (for more detailed description see Inclosure 3 "Sergeant Cloutier's Report"). (Other detached units of Company "B" did not encounter the enemy and were disposed as follows:)

16 Dec 44 1st Squad, 2nd Sec, 2nd Plat, moved from Crevels, Luxembourg to Fraiture, Belgium.

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- 16 Dec 44 2nd Squad, and $\frac{1}{2}$ of Hqs Security Section, 1st Platoon moved from Cour, Belgium to Spa, Belgium.
- 17 Dec 44 2nd Squad and $\frac{1}{2}$ Hqs Security Section, 1st Platoon moved from Spa, Belgium to Beaufays, Belgium.
- 17 Dec 44 2nd Squad and $\frac{1}{2}$ of Hqs Security Section, 3rd platoon moved from Verdun France to Malancourt, France.
- 17 Dec 44 1st Squad and $\frac{1}{2}$ Hqs Security Section, 3rd Platoon moved from Nancy, France to vicinity west of St. Avold, France.
- 19 Dec 44 4th Squad and $\frac{1}{2}$ Hqs Security Section, 3rd Platoon moved from Malancour France to Sandweiler, Luxembourg.
- 20 Dec 44 1st and 3rd Squads and $\frac{1}{2}$ Hqs Security Section, 3rd Platoon moved from vicinity West of St. Avold, France to Verdun, France.
- 21 Dec 44 1st Squad, 1st Platoon moved from Beaufays, Belgium to Leaves, Belgium.
- 21 Dec 44 2nd Squad and $\frac{1}{2}$ Hqs Security Section, 3rd Platoon moved from Malancour France to Verdun, France.
- 22 Dec 44 2nd Squad and $\frac{1}{2}$ Hqs Security Section, 3rd Platoon moved from Verdun, France to Stonne, France.
- 24 Dec 44 2nd Squad and $\frac{1}{2}$ Security Section, 1st Platoon moved from Beaufays, Belgium to Tongres, Belgium.
- 25 Dec 44 1st Gun Squad, 3rd Platoon moved from Verdun to Rockroi, France.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROGER D. FEE,
Capt, 825th TD Bn,
Adjutant.



3 Incls:

- Incl 1 - Extract Stars & Strips (3)
- Incl 2 - Oral Rpt by Lt. Decker (3)
- Incl 3 - Sgt Cloutier's Rpt. (3)

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COMPANY "B"
825TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALIONAPO 655
26 December 1944ORAL REPORT BY LT. DECKER

Baraque Fraiture, Belgium: On the 18th December 1944, I received orders to evacuate with the radio station and move to Nassogne, Belgium with LOVE radio (S/Sgt. Hall's crew) and report to ROGER radio station. We loaded our equipment and found that we had too much for our vehicles to carry. I asked two men to volunteer to stay behind with the remaining equipment and Privates Roach and Mc Connell volunteered. The 7th Armored Division Service Train had moved into Baraque Fraiture, Belgium. I gave the men instructions that in the event the trains evacuated before we returned with transportation, to destroy the equipment and leave with the trains.

We left Baraque Fraiture at 1545 hours and arrived in Nassogne, Belgium at 2100 hours, 18th December 1944. When we arrived there, Sgt. Cloutier informed me that I was to leave the next morning for Maas tericht, Holland; that I was to depart as early as possible, at about 0515 hours, 19 December 1944, I received a call from a Col. D. M. Schute ordering me to disregard previous instructions; to leave the radios LOVE and BAKER at Nassogne, Belgium, take the two squads that were with me and secure the repeater station at Jemelle, Belgium. I left on a reconnaissance at about 0545 hours to Jemelle and returned at about 0715 hours. I was told that Major Halpin had called and ordered LOVE radio and BAKER radio to move to Hill 561. Sgt. Cloutier received instructions to send half of the security group from ROGER radio to accompany LOVE and BAKER as their security.

I moved my two guns to Jemelle getting them into position at about 0830 hours. We spent the day organizing our position.

We spent the 20th doing routine duty. At noon of that day Lt. Phillips of Company "G", 3rd Battalion, 29th Inf. Regt. reported to me with one platoon of infantry to assist in securing the installation at Jemelle. I visited Nassogne that day. I also visited the set-up at Hill 561.

The next day, 21 December 1944, at about 0830 I received information from an MP that tanks had been in Marche last night or real early that morning. (At this time I am doubtful whether he was an MP and think that he may have been one of the enemy spreading rumors. As we were later informed the enemy was doing things of this sort). Lt. Dietrich, the signal Officer, in charge of a repeater station reported this to Col. Trcw at ADSEC who in turn must have reported it to Eagle Main. I immediately went to Marche and investigated the report. I found that it was untrue. At about 1400 I was instructed by Col. Lee of Eagle Main (by telephone) to report to G-2 of Monarch

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the information that I had received, in detail. I then went out to find Monarch and at about 1700 I found Monarch at Neufchateau and reported to the G-2. I returned to Jemelle at about 2030. Rumors were flying thick and fast but none of them proved to have any basis although we checked all of them as far as possible. I was unable to trace the source of any of them.

On the morning of the 22nd I went on a reconnaissance toward Marche to further check rumors of the enemy. Again I found nothing although I accumulated more rumors from civilians that had been given to them by soldiers dressed in American uniforms. At about 1400 I again made a reconnaissance from Jemelle toward Ambly where I was met by a British reconnaissance unit who said they had seen enemy reconnaissance in Ambly. I checked it personally and found two light reconnaissance vehicles and one light tank. I turned back to Jemelle and went up the road from Jemelle toward Marche to Jemeppe and then turned east toward Harsin. In Harsin a Belgian boy stopped me pointing toward a small road leading north to Marche. He said, "Boche tank". I saw four tanks. One looked like an American tank. I returned to Jemeppe and continued my reconnaissance toward Marche.


In Marche I reported my information to the 84th Inf. Div. G-2 who informed me that they (the 84th) had just moved in that day and had set up a reconnaissance screen part of which was moving in the direction of Harsin.

I started back toward Jemelle and encountered light machine gun fire without ill effect about a mile north of Jemeppe. I arrived in Jemelle and doubled the guards. At about 1615 Lt. Brown (Signal Corps) came down the same road from Marche and reported that he also had been fired on and that his driver was wounded in the hand. We immediately telephoned this information back to the G-2 of the 84th Div. thru a civilian phone. During the night we could hear a lot of firing and sounds which indicated that tanks were in a battle northeast of town. Nothing came our way that night.

On the morning of the 23rd at about 0830 I again went on a reconnaissance toward Ambly. I proceeded to the edge of town where I encountered enemy machine gun fire. I came back to Jemelle and went out toward Harsin where I saw, from the top of a hill, a small infantry battle between about a company of our infantry and an undeterminable number of enemy infantry. I went back to Jemelle and sent Corporal Barnette out to the railroad track to see what he could see from there. He came back and said that nothing could be seen from there. By this time we could hear vehicles moving across our front toward the west. I asked for volunteers to go to the top of the hill to observe the enemy's movement. Pfc Barrows and Pvt. Peters went. I told them to return with as much information as possible without engaging the enemy. They returned at about 1000 and reported seeing a column of about 8 enemy tanks, several light armored vehicles and several ambulances which they thought were American. They said that an American plane had knocked out two of the vehicles. During that time we

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were told by a Belgian that the Germans had commandeered a locomotive and were coming toward us with it from the north. The engine came in to sight, paused for a second and then proceeded. After it had gone another hundred yards, I ordered Sgt. Cavanaugh to open fire on it. They fired two rounds of HE and knocked it out at a range of between 600 and 800 yards. A few minutes later we saw three German soldiers on foot going away from us over the crest of the hill from the direction of where the tank column was moving. I then sent Barrows and Peters out to reconnoiter our north east flank. They by-passed several forward positions of the enemy and went right into Harsin. Their report was as follows: "In the village we saw large numbers of enemy soldiers many of them dressed in American uniform and parts of American uniforms. Their disguise was given away by their black German boots and other articles of German clothing and equipment. While in the village we were fired on. We crossed a road to the protection of some hedges. We saw three Germans come to a door of a house about 30 yards from us and opened fire on them. Barrows hit the three of them. We were leaving the village and Peters shot one who had evidently heard the shots and was running down the street. In leaving the town going cross-country we jumped down a cliff and Barrows hurt his ankle there (we found later that he broke a bone in his ankle). We returned to the gun positions without further incident." They returned at about 1100.


At about 1300 our position began to look very critical since we were by then flanked on three sides by the enemy so I called Col. D. M. Schute and reported the situation to him asking for instructions. Lt. Col. Mieding called me at 1335 and ordered me to withdraw to the northwest where I could find a stronger force. The communication people cut their wires, dismantled the equipment and evacuated. Immediately thereafter, I withdrew my 3" guns under the cover of infantry fire. We headed to Rochefort and arrived there at approximately 1415. I reported to Major Ball of the 335th Infantry, (3d Battalion) who told me he had just received instructions to send a platoon to hold Jenelle and assist me. He called and told his Colonel that his present position prevented immediate compliance but that he would comply as soon as possible. This was of course then impossible since we had evacuated Jenelle. Major Ball ordered us to pull our guns into the town square into what we intended to be temporary positions. We never got them out. We waited for a tank attack to come but it did not. Everything quieted down for a while. Major Ball, upon my asking him, said to leave the guns in their present positions until further instructions could be given. At about 2000 that night, Capt. Phillips, Company Commander of "L" Company, asked me to make a reconnaissance to see if I could get one of the guns into position near the road on the north edge of town. I went out and found that our infantry had a 57MM AT gun there and to do any effective firing from the only available position, I would have had no infantry support and a very limited field of fire. I returned to Capt. Phillips with that information and he said, "It's best to stay where you are anyhow."

At 2130 we were disposed as shown on the sketch.


At about 2200 enemy infantry came into the square from north and started to set up a machine gun opposite us.



C O N F I D E N T I A L



- 1. Sgt. Cavanaugh's gun
- 2. Sgt. Wright's Gun
- 3. Sgt. Wright's Half track
- 4. Sgt. Cavanaugh's Half Tr.
- 5. Enemy Infantry
- 6. Single Tank
- 7. Sgt. Cavanaugh's gun later
- 8. Hotel
- 9,10,11 Infantry Machine Guns



C O N F I D E N T I A L

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At the same time about 40 or 50 infantrymen came down opposite sides of the street from the north. Sgt. Cavanaugh challenged them. They did not respond. We let them get within 30 yards of us and I ordered the men to open fire. The infantry also opened fire on my command with all machine guns and small arms. The enemy were completely wiped out. A few minutes later enemy soldiers came down a hidden street and we could hear them talking and firing an occasional few rounds which fire we tried to return (some of the conversation in the German ranks was in English).

At about 2300 hours, three M-18's and one rifle company came into town and moved into a street as shown on the sketch.

At about 0100 a tank pulled into town coming across country onto a side street. It was very dark then and we could hardly see it at first. Sgt. Cavanaugh's gun fired round and precipitated all the other firing. After the second round was fired, the tank fired two rounds in return which missed the crew and hit the hotel behind them. By then Pfc Charlie Russell's 50 Cal. Machine Gun had opened up illuminating the target with tracers. This enabled the gunner to see his target somewhat better. Russell kept firing until four more rounds had been fired by the gun crew. After the fourth round the tank was silent.



One trail spade of this gun was set against the stone curb and the other in a hole in the street where we had removed a cobble stone. On the fifth round the trails must have jumped out because on the sixth round the recoil drove the gun back into a tree temporarily putting it out of action. During this firing, Cpl. Barnette was wounded in the left shoulder by a mortar shell fragment. The gun squad immediately took up position with the infantry firing their small arms. In the meantime, Sgt. Cavanaugh went to the alley under fire where the M-18's were and led one forward to where it could fire on the tank. The M-18 fired two rounds. The tank rolled back down the side street from which it came. I do not believe it was able to leave the town because it was disabled. From that time until daylight, there was comparatively little activity except for occasional sniping, machine gun fire, mortar fire, 88's and hand grenades.

Tec. Gr. 5 Hunt our medical aid man, many times, went out under fire to bring wounded men aid. Often these men were not of our company.

At about 0830 enemy tanks came down the street from the north. The first two were on opposite sides of the street putting them in position where they could both fire into the square and at the same time cover each other with cross-fire. The third tank was a little behind them and could barely be seen. It seemed to be an American tank. We opened fire with Sgt. Wright's gun. By this time Sgt. Cavanaugh's gun was back in firing position but this time since the tanks came from the north, they shifted the trails rapidly and opened fire. Sgt. Wright fired about 6 or 8 rounds. In the meantime the tanks were returning fire. The first round landed between the two guns. Pvt. Gregoire went down and did not move any more. The second round which struck near us hit the tree over Sgt. Wright's gun crew and the third round at almost the same time landed between the wheels of the gun putting gun and crew out of action. The following casualties resulted:

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KILLED

None

WOUNDED

Sgt. Wright
 Cpl. Boutin
 Pfc Adkins
 Pfc Breedlove
 Pfc Komar
 Pvt. Moore
 Pvt. McGrath



At this time, pfc Brooks left the vicinity of the gun and started across the street to the halftrack he was wounded with shrapnel while crossing the street.

Sgt. Cavanaugh opened fire and on the first round the trail spades of the gun failed to take hold and the gun was driven backwards by the recoil. The gun was reloaded and immediately pushed forward to a firing position by the crew. On the second or third round they fired, Cpl. Millican was pinned under the wheel when the gun slid back in recoil. We released him and he immediately took his position again although badly bruised. Each time the gun fired we pushed back into position so it could fire again.

During the firing Tec. Gr. 5 Padgett and Pfc Brooks both carried ammunition from the halftrack across the street to Sgt. Wright's gun while under fire. All during the fire-fight all the men that were with the guns had no protection from enemy fire except for the shield of their guns.

By now the tanks had come well up on our gun position and I asked Capt. Klein whether I should destroy my gun. He said, "No, better leave them." One M-18 prepared to take the tanks under fire as they advanced across the square. I had my men join the infantry and we fought with them for the rest of the action. We were not cut off from our vehicles by machine gun and sniper fire. All we had with us were our personal arms and the ammunition we were carrying.

At about 1330 Major Ball ordered us to withdraw. We tried to get our vehicles then. I went across the street to try to get one. I managed to get across although the enemy had machine guns covering the entire street from both directions. I had told Tec Gr. 5 Fluri to try to get his jeep and he was standing across the street from me waiting for me to signal him to come across. I saw several men get shot down while trying to cross the street so I told him not to cross. I finally got back across the street again at about 1345 and gathered up those of my men who were available along with some infantry who were with me. Most of us left by foot going cross country in small groups and we finally regrouped in Givet, France.

NOTES

During the night-firing, the Germans used flares to great advantage by shooting them into the air to give them target visibility. We

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believe that if we had at least had flare pistols we could have fired at the tanks or targets thereby blinding the enemy and giving us light to shoot by.

During the daytime we noticed that bazookas had little effect on the tanks. The tanks seemed to have a coating of concrete which we believe was held on by a sort of reinforcing mesh wire. This coat seemed to nullify the major effect of the bazooka shells.

The screaming Mini, a German sort of mortar shell, made a terrific noise which seemed to have great disturbing effect on the men.

The morale of all the men all through the action was superb. Cooperation among the men seemed to be completely automatic.

STATISTICS



ENEMY

Enemy soldiers killed by individuals	7	
Enemy soldiers killed by our fire combined		
with Infantry fire40	possibly 50
Tanks knocked out	1	
Tanks possibly knocked out	2	
Locomotive	1	

OUR

Men missing in action10	
Wounded (hospital)	3	
Wounded (duty)	1	
Injured in action4	(3 MEN 10)
Uninjured11	

EQUIPMENT LOST:

- 2 Halftracks
- 1 Ton and a half truck
- 2 Quarterston trucks
- 2 Three inch guns
- 1 One ton trailer
- 2 .50 Cal Machine Guns
- 1 .30 Cal Machine Guns
- 2 Rocket Launchers
- 3 610 Radios

C O N F I D E N T I A L



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COMPANY "B"
825TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

AFPO 655
1 Jan 1945.

SERGEANT CLOUTIER'S REPORT

My squad was at Nasogne, Belgium acting as security for VHF Radio Station ROGER since 24th November 1944. On the 21st December there were reports of the enemy in our vicinity and we were ordered to pull back into the woods at Hill 561 about four miles east of Nasogne. We departed Nasogne at 1700 and arrived at Hill 561 at 1730.

On the 23rd December we were doing usual duties, Cpl La Porte, Pfc Caries and I were on the outpost.

At about 1530 Caries left for the tents. At 1535 I heard some vehicles. We waited till they got right opposite us. One German jeep had six men in it. Behind it was a German Command Car with some men, behind was a motorcycle. They traveled up the road toward a nearby sawmill.

Cpl La Porte and I went back to the station and on the way we met Pvt. Eriksen who told us to pull in the outpost. He had received a call from the Company Commander to draw our outpost close in to our radio tents at 1430 hours. At that time the radio crew called Luxembourg saying, "The Germans passed by at about 300 yards from us." We went off the air. We were ordered at 1715 to go off the air and come back on in an hour if all was O.K. We were afraid that the noise of the power unit would attract attention so we kept it off all night.

That Night we saw two more German patrols.

On the 24th December, the next day, we went on the air at 0900. We saw no Germans near the radio station that day.

On the 25th December we saw some Germans thru field glasses at the chateau which was about 500 yards from our position.

On the 26th December at about 1515 Pfc Caries saw a German who was walking in the open field near the radio station. We reported it and went off the air. We got the glasses and saw a large group, about 10 or 15 more.

We had already made our plans on how to get away. We planned to leave in four groups of four men and one of five men, each with an NCO in charge. At that time two groups were ordered to take off. The radio crews left next because the Germans were practically at our front door. We had then seen about fifty. We left from the rear of the area. Our group consisted of Caries, Kirkland, Rueff and me. There was no opportunity to destroy equipment.

The first two groups arrived together at Florenville, Belgium 1530 hours 27 December 1944, reporting to the AT Officer, 8th Corps, who called the 825th TD Bn for transportation.

Our second group of men after waiting fifteen or twenty minutes met the group of radio men who joined us. We arrived at a little country railroad station at about 0330 on the 27th of December. We left there at about 1000 hours. We continued our walk until about 1930 when we stopped at a farm house to make inquiry of our position. We found we were in friendly territory. That night we stayed in a nearby hotel where we were given food and bed to sleep in. We stayed until 1400 hours 28 Dec/44 and were given a ride by some British to a nearby

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