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General Background

In WW11, I spent most of my time with Co. A of the 602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion. In combat, we spent about 99% of our time as a part of Gen. Patton's Third Army in Europe.

When L.L.Gill, Tank Destroyer Ass'n Historian, requested I put some thoughts on paper relative to that experience, my first impulse was that it would serve no useful purpose. However, after a period of time, this initial view began to change for several reasons.

When you subtract 1944/1945 from 1987 it is obvious that a lot of time has passed. However if you are a believer in basics, I'm sure the lessons learned in WW11 are as valid today as they were then.

From the day Co. A landed on Omaha Beach until V-E Day, a record of company events was maintained. After the war, this was mimeographed into a 29 page booklet. Appropriately it is entitled "Attached and Detached". In it is recorded such details as: "last night we crossed the Rhine River", "_____ knocked out 3 enemy tanks", "_____ took 8 prisoners", "attached to the _____ Cavalry", "became attached to the _____ Armored Div.", etc, etc, etc. Our Bn. History, reproduced in 29 pages also, lists such events from a battalion point of view. I understand both of these have been provided to the T.D. Ass'n. Therefore, when asked to submit my thoughts relative to the role of a Tank Destroyer Company Commander in WW11, I saw no purpose of reviewing all the day to day activity but instead decided to document my memories with a broader perspective,

In an over-simplification, I came up with the 3 most important factors I think result in a successful unit. First is the personnel making up that unit, the level of training and the time necessary to get that training.

However, this list of 3 must be expanded when you consider all the other elements needed to have a combat ready organization. But, more on that later.

In the early '40's, the 2nd Inf. Div. was stationed at Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas. They had been reorganized from a square division into a triangular division. Then it was decided they should have an Anti-Tank capability and a provisional anti-tank battalion was formed. In turn this became the 602nd Tank Destroyer Bn. on or about Dec. 17, 1941.

From Jan.'41 until Mar. of '42, I was a member of the 2nd Inf. Div.'s. 12th F. A. Bn and then went to Officers Candidate School. I joined Co. A of the 602nd as a 2nd Lieut., out of Fort Sill/Arty., in June of 1942. My first assignment was Platoon Leader. Later I became the Co. Exec. which was followed by a move up to the C.O.'s spot.

Having been drawn from the 2nd Inf. Div., most of the key personnel of the 602nd had already served many years of service and, as a result, were already very proficient in their positions.

Personnel Training

First of all, our Bn. was extremely fortunate in having as its commander, Peter J. Kopscak, a West Point graduate (and All-American end on its football team for 2 years). His first priority was stressing the proper chain of command. He also stressed a strong sports program within the Bn. I'm sure he felt the teamwork and competitive nature of sports would later be reflected into conduct effecting a combat situation.

Because of various circumstances over a period of time prior to becoming the C.O., I was assigned as the acting company commander. As such, within our overall training program, I was able to initiate many actions which may not have been considered normal at that time.

Here are several examples:

The First Sgt. had been a First Sgt. for several years. In his position there was little if anything he did not know about his assignment. So I gave him what amounted to an overall supervisory role. Each month I had a Plat. Sgt. as acting First Sgt. In each platoon several people would move up to "acting" positions. Thus was an in-depth training process started.

The Mess Sgt. had been in that role for several years and was most competent. The T/O called for 6 cooks who traditionally worked 1 day on, 2 days off. This was changed as follows. Each month 1 or 2 cooks were put in different assignments and men from the platoons were assigned as trainee cooks.

Similar rotation changes were made in areas of supply, armor, motor pool, communications and administration.

I was a firm believer in Service School attendance to the point that I had an understanding with the Bn. Adjutant never to turn down a quota given him from Division. He knew that if he couldn't get enough people from the other companies, I would provide someone. I had noticed other Co. C.O.'s at times thought they couldn't spare a key person. My position was the opposite. Get people better trained and move someone up into an acting role. Then when that person came back from a Service School, you had two that much more skilled in their positions.

As I recall, this inter-company program was highly concentrated in a four month period of time while some of it went on over a longer period of time. The end result was that we had cooks that could drive T.D.'s, T.D. drivers who were mechanics, T.D. gunners who understood communications equipment, Communications people who could handle machine guns, T.D. crew members that could act as cooks, etc, etc, etc.

Another example of this expanded training for each individual was a week that Co. A spent on the firing range before going overseas. The Bn. prescribed the necessary training but there was plenty of ammunition (which had been augmented by a strange set of circumstances) and time for training under the company commander's control. Instead of confining each individual to only his specialty (ie T.D. gunners to T.D. gunnery), I set up all weapons and separated the men into sub-groups so they rotated through training and firing of every weapon that we had. This further developed

confidence in the men because they had been trained and had fired all the weapons within the company from the 76mm to the 45 pistol.

Another key factor in our development in this 1942-1944 period was that we provided some cadres for the forming of other T.D. Bn's. Thus we were able to provide trained personnel for new formed units and to then very selectively assign new people coming to us into their company positions. As much as possible, individual skills and backgrounds were very carefully evaluated in the assignment of men into M.O.S. slots.

Special Environmental Training

The 2nd Inf. Div. was selected to go through a winter of "Winter Warfare Training". The 602nd T. D. Bn. was included.

After the 1942 summer Louisiana maneuvers we were one of first units to move into Camp Hood. After a training period there, we left Texas and rejoined the 2nd Inf. Div. at Camp McCoy, Wisc. We high-lighted our training with Winter Maneuvers held in the upper peninsula of northern Michigan. There we were, out in the woods, 30 degrees below zero and no where to get in out of the cold. There we learned that to conduct military exercises, first, you had to learn how to survive.

Training for Secondary Missions

In WW11, a T. D. Co. had as many tubes as an Arty. Bn. (12). Each platoon as many tubes as an Arty. Btry. (4). Our Bn. C.O. had the foresight to anticipate being used as Artillery so we had specialized training to accomplish this mission.

Company headquarters personnel were trained to operate a Fire Direction Center. Platoon leaders/sgt's were trained to act as Btry. C.O.'s as to laying in the guns, conducting indirect fire, etc.

General Training

Of course, while all the above was taking place, we went through all the prescribed training. Physical fitness, gunnery, map reading, maintenance, night training, etc. (If I had it to do over, I would put greater emphasis on night training. Fortunately we had a lot of it. But, in combat, I think there was more night movement than had been anticipated).

Seperation from the 2nd Inf. Div.

After the winter warfare training period, the 2nd Inf. Div. and the 602nd continued regular training at Camp McCoy. In July of '43 we both were alerted for an overseas movement. About the time the last units of the 2nd were leaving, we were detached from them and were advised we had been selected to field test a new vehicle (designated as the T-70) which was later to become the M-18 Hellcat T. D.

Field testing of the T-70 had 3 phases. Training at McCoy in the summer and fall. Tennessee maneuvers in November and further training at Camp Forest, Tenn. The 602nd left Camp Forest for an overseas destination on Mar.22, '44.

We never did rejoin our parent unit.

Combat Experiences

It must be kept in mind that my comments only pertain to me in my role as a commander of a T. D. Co. Other Co. C.O.'s may have had similiar experiences. Other C.O.'s may think this took place at some other place or at some other time. In any case, I'm sure no two experiences were exactly alike. So, my comments are only as I remember what took place and based on my ability to pass along my thoughts to others.

Now move forward to the summer of '44. We have landed on the beach and we are now in France. We are a part of Gen. Patton's Third Army. Question: How now shall we apply that which we have learned up to this date?

It soon seemed apparent that we were to be a separate battalion in Third Army, becoming attached and detached to different units as many times as circumstances dictated. This called for speed of maneuver and resulted in wide dispersion of units.

From the beach to V-E Day here are the units Co.A was attached to or in support of at one time or another:

- Third Army
- Eighth Corps
- Twelfth Corps
- 4th Armored Div.
- 11th Armored Div.
- 101st Airborne Div.
- 17th Airborne Div.
- 26th Inf. Div.
- 28th Inf. Div.
- 87th Inf. Div.
- 89th Inf. Div.
- 90th Inf. Div.
- 42nd Cavalry
- 2nd Cavalry Group
- 6th Cavalry Group
- 7th T. D. Group
- 9th T. D. Group
- 101st F. A. Bn.
- 137th F. A. Bn.
- 783rd F. A. Bn.
- 5 Separate Task Forces
- First Army

It became obvious that with the best of training and anticipation, situations develop for which you do not have a preplanned program. Two major items come to mind. Duffel bags and field kitchens.

Duffel bags had become a logistical burden so on Sept. 4, '44, the Bn. C.O. ordered them all stored in a big barn in the vicinity of Vitry-Le-Francois, France, with some walking-wounded left to guard them. These people were rotated from time to time as their health improved by others who required a recuperating period. The Bn. Surgeon had a hand in this process. In this way we didn't lose people by having them get out of Bn. control. From that day on everyone lived out of field packs. We didn't see those duffel bags again till after V.E. Day.

At the same early date, two other problems became equally obvious. We could not feed the troops from field kitchens and we needed more transport for gas and ammunition. The bulk of the field kitchen stoves ended up in storage at the same time as the duffel bags. The solution of one problem helped solve the other. The "mess" truck became an additional "ammo" carrier.

Our ability to travel light and move fast became two of our main characteristics.

Each T.D. crew, jeep crew, half-track crew, etc, became its own food/feeding unit. Fortunately we had the small individual gas burning stoves that could be used to heat food, make coffee, etc, inside the T.D.'s or whatever. Rations received were broken down and delivered to the platoons for subsequent breakdown to the various vehicle crews.

Because of the American G.I.'s ability to use his initiative, it didn't take long for each vehicle to have its own collection of frying pans, coffee pots, etc. With no need for a complete mess crew at Co. Hq., cooks were assigned to the security sections of the platoons (for which they previously had some training) to act as platoon cooks when situations allowed or act in a tactical role as riflemen, machine gunners, etc.

From the very beginning it became apparent the emphasis on chain of command training paid big dividends. This resulted in the ability of platoons and sections to operate on their own. Throughout the war, because of the Attached and Detached nature of our orders, companies were widely dispersed from Bn. Hq., and platoons were widely dispersed from Co. Hq.

Example: When Co. A was attached to an Inf. Regt., inevitably the platoons were further attached to the Inf. Bns. Seldom were the T.D.'s assigned their basic T. D. mission under company control. In this case, I felt the company commander had to be especially alert so as to keep the "Company" functioning as a coordinated unit. It being imperative that I knew where each platoon was at and what they were doing at all times.

The key tactical unit thus became the platoon and how well it functioned. (This is where I felt all the dual training and cross over of specialties paid off.)

I think this is further demonstrated by the following.

When we arrived in France we had all five officers: C.O. Exec., 3 Plat. Ldrs. On Nov. 9, '44 we came up short one Lieut. as a result of combat action. As a result of a night time vehicle accident we lost another Lieut, on Nov. 21, '44. The company

operated with a C.O. and the two remaining Lieuts. stayed with the 1st and 3rd platoons. The Plat. Sgt. (H. Haynes) ran the 2nd Plat. I felt it was far more important that the officers continue to operate at the Plat. level so instead of moving one up to Co. Exec., the First Sgt. functioned in that role. Our first officer replacement arrived on Jan. 6, '45 and was assigned to the 2nd Plat. Our second officer replacement arrived on Feb. 8, '45 and was assigned to the 1st Plat. The Lieut. that had the 1st Plat. then moved up to the Co. Exec. Results: The 1st and 3rd Platoons always had an officer as Plat. Ldr. The Plat Sgt. ran the 2nd Plat. from Nov. 9, '44 to Jan. 6, '45. The 1st Sgt., in effect, was the Co. Exec. from Nov. 9, '44 to Feb. 8, '45.

I forget the date, but later on, our 1st Sgt. went to Bn. Hq. as the Bn. Sgt. Major J. Wilson, 3rd Plat. platoon Sgt. became the 1st Sgt. (again - for which he had prior training).

I do not wish to diminish the role of the company communication chief, motor sgt., armorer, etc. But with the level of training of the platoon personnel, they were able to keep their platoon functioning at times these other key people were not immediately available to them.

Another result of this constant Attached & Detached use was the great amount of time spent "on-the line" in a continual combat role. Example: We would be attached to an Armored Div. for a few days. They would be relieved by an Infantry Div. We would be detached from the former - attached to the latter. In a few days, or a week, that division would be relieved by another. We would be detached - attached and resume the attack the next day with the new unit. Here is a quote from our company history: "It will be noted that at one time (with the exception of one day) this organization spent 131 days 'on-the-line' without rest or relief."

Battle of the Bulge

On Dec. 20, '44, from the Saar region in France, our Bn. was ordered northeast to become involved in what was to become known as the "Battle of the Bulge". To my knowledge, we may have been the first Third Army unit to make contact with the enemy. In character with our orders up till then, each gun company had a separate mission. Co. A's mission was "to get to Neaufchateau (Belguim), proceed to Bastogne if we could get there and to report to 8th Corps if we could find them".

We motor marched all night of the 20th, passed through Neaufchateau on the 21st and headed toward Bastogne. Several miles short of Bastogne, vicinity Petite Rosieres, we came upon some troops of the 28th Inf. Div. Their C.O., Gen. Cota, was there setting up a defensive position with whatever personnel he could pull together. He asked who we were and where did we come from? We replied and advised him of our orders. He gave what had become the standard response whenever we reported to a unit we had just been attached to: "Boy, are we glad to see you!" We then asked: "Where are the Germans?" He advised they were just over the rise in front of us. We then blended into the defensive position being established.

In the meantime we had located 8th Corps (to whom we were attached) Hq. in a schoolhouse in Neaufchateau.

I would have to say our timing was most fortunate. The next morning, Dec. 22, '44, the Germans attacked along the Bastogne/Neaufchateau highway and were stopped in their tracks. I'm sure historical facts will bear out that the 1st Plat. of Co. A, 602nd T.D. Bn, (under Lt. R. Whitman & Plat. Sgt. J. Orsak) were primarily responsible for their defeat.

In the early morning of the 22nd it was foggy and visibility was very poor. Vehicles could be heard approaching the defensive positions. As they came into view at very close range, the Plat. Sgt., looking through field glasses, identified the troops in the vehicles and shouted "they're Krauts" and the T.D.'s started firing. They never knew what hit them. A tank and three personnel carriers were immediately destroyed and an estimated 30 of the enemy were killed. Late in the day the Germans attacked again. Five enemy tanks were fired on with two believed damaged as the T.D.'s supported the tactical withdrawal of the troops from Vaux les Rosieres to the vicinity of Longiver which was East of Neaufchateau.

From Dec. 21, '44, and for several days the 602nd T. D. Bn. was the only intact combat organization operating on the 8th Corps front.

Needless to say there was a big change from the mild weather of the Saar to the cold weather of the Bulge. The past "winter warfare training" began to pay off in hours. Liberated lime and paint soon camouflaged the vehicles. Liberated sheets provided for camouflage parkas, etc. Care required for proper personal hygiene, care of hands and feet, proper sleeping, etc. became second nature. In this context, I would say our transition took only 24 to 48 hours with the resultant lack of casualties due to weather. And now that I try to recall the events, I do not remember putting out any instructions to that effect. It just naturally happened.

Other Secondary Missions

We had prepared to be used as supporting artillery and were used in that role with no difficulties at the company level.

As might be expected, various commanders (not at our own Bn. level) did not see fit to always employ T.D.'s as outlined in the basic T.D. Manual. Again it became apparent at an early date our activity would involve 4 other major roles for which we had no specific training. "Attached to" or "in support of" Cavalry, Armored, Infantry or as a part of Special Task Forces.

It seemed the Cavalry loved us because our M-18 gave them greater fire power (high velocity 76mm compared to their regular 75mm) and we had the speed to keep up with them. We blended in very well especially when they took the time and trouble to work out communications with them. A case in point: On Feb. 27, '45, we were attached to the 6th Cav. to support their mission to take Waxweiler, Ger., cross a bridge over the Prum River and advance to the high ground on the other side. The T.D.'s were to support by staying on the high ground on the assault side of the river and fire into the town and over it as observed or as called for.

Across the river a road ran from lower left to upper right and then up over the higher ground. A machine gun emplacement and an O.P. about half way up that hill and along the road were giving the Cavalry a hard time as they attempted to work their way through the town. A radio call came to me from the Cav. C.O. asking if we had a T.D. in position that could see this road. Upon checking I found out one of our platoons was in position but could not visually pick out the enemy positions referred to. The Cav. C.O. requested a round fired to land along the road about half way up the hill. From his observations we then moved the fire so that after a few rounds his message was "cease fire, the white flag is up, they're coming out". In addition, as a part of that action, we destroyed 1 vehicle, 4 mortar positions, took 7 P.O.W. and killed an estimated 20 of the enemy.

With the Armor, we provided a fast moving vehicle with high velocity anti-tank capability either as flank protection or as direct over-watching fire.

The Infantry looked on us basically as another tank. In some operations this proved workable to extremely workable. In others, a complete loss. When an Infantry Company disappeared up a ravine or a creek bed, it was impossible to have an 18 ton vehicle follow behind. Result: Contact and thus support was quickly lost.

Special task forces (usually armored or mechanized) posed no particular problems. The missions were clearly defined, communications were established, the mobility and fire power of the M-18 was utilized.

Ordruf

I think one other event deserves special mention. In what is now East Germany, there is a town named Ordruf. On the outskirts there was a concentration camp. We didn't know it was there but our Bn. played a key role in breaking into this camp. To my knowledge it was the first such camp liberated by Allied Forces. I've been told such people as Eisenhower, Patton, etc. came to see for themselves that such places existed. As for the men in Co. A, this is the comment found in our company history. "We came away more aware of what we were fighting for".

Company Commander Responsibilities

Co. A was made up of three gun platoons of 4-M18's each. Total 12. A Hq. Platoon. Authorized number of vehicles, weapons, etc.

On any given day, as the Company Commander, I felt my primary responsibilities were to accomplish our mission(s), kill or capture as many of the enemy as possible, destroy the maximum amount of enemy tanks/vehicles and/or material, and have the same M-18's and the same men to do the same thing again the next day.

This brings me to the word "mistakes". I guess you can say you train men to do things right. The better you train them the better they'll do it. The opposite side of that is to train men so they'll not make mistakes - or more specifically - stupid mistakes. In combat there is little or no room for mistakes. In

view of the losses inflicted on the enemy, Co. A had, in turn, exceptionally low losses. I attribute this to good training and absence of mistakes.

Command contact. In many cases, aside from my own battalion, I had to establish and maintain contact with many different headquarters. Radio contact was easy but not used as much as I thought it could have been. Personal contact, while necessary, was very time consuming. This was due to the general nature of our missions. Distance between units usually was many miles.

Co-existent with this requirement was the desire and need to maintain close daily contact with the company platoons. Many times, when time and distance required it, platoon leaders were required to come to the Co.C.P. position for orders, maps, overlays, new check points, etc, etc. My personal desire, when possible, was to visit the platoons giving them all the necessary updates and making my presence known. Additional platoon contact was maintained by mail, ration, fuel/ammunition delivery as well as visits by the Co. Exec. for various administrative details and visits by supply, motor maintenance, communication and armament personnel.

It seems that all I'm doing is re-confirming my view that - in our combat situations - the platoon was the key tactical unit deserving and requiring the maximum support possible.

Training Weaknesses

Having never been a company commander in combat before, here are a few things we might have done different/better if we had to do it over again. (I've already commented on "night training").

After landing in France, we soon began to learn the "sounds" of combat. I soon learned to pay a lot of attention to what I was "hearing" at any particular moment. We had heard machine guns firing over our head on the obstacle course. That's a lot different than hearing German rockets being fired at your position. Knowing by the boom-boom-boom, boom-boom-boom, boom-boom-boom, that you had just a few seconds to find some cover that might save your life. With a little stretch of the imagination, I feel we may have been alerted to what "incoming" sounded like. Too many people learned the hard way.

It may seem odd in view of all of the above, to find from later experiences, that I believe the need for reporting information that would have lead to better combat intelligence was not adequately stressed.

And now with the passage of time and with 20/20 hindsight, I do not think the need to record significant events was given sufficient attention. To have done so would have provided more historical data for later day study and review. Right now our Bn. Historian is trying to compile a more complete combat history. Perhaps the biggest problem he has is finding specific reference of the 602 T.D. Bn's actions while attached to other units in the histories of those units. Example: In the 28th Div. history that covers our period of action with them in the early days of the Bulge, there is mention of T.D.'s but no mention of the 602 as it applies to the specific combat actions. Yet we have a letter of

commendation from their Gen. Cota to our battalion covering that period.

Another example: One Division History refers to a specific incident that took place in Zwickau, Ger., at the Mulde River on Apr. 17, '45. It mentions a specific man by name and rank who played a heroic role in preventing the demolition of a bridge. He was wounded but continued his mission until completed and was subsequently awarded the Silver Star for his action. The Division's History sounds as if it was one of their men involved in this particular event. As a matter of fact, we know it was a Sgt. in the Rcn. Co. of the 602nd T. D. Bn. which was attached to them at that particular point in time.

A couple of years ago, our Bn. Historian used a phrase in one of his newsletters as follows: "There were a lot more heroes in the 602nd than the number of medals issued." Because of the grind of day to day events, I wasn't tuned to the need of recording special events and then acquiring special appropriate awards for exceptional dedication and courage. This is one aspect of my experiences that I have regretted over the years.

Another regret is that I wasn't alert to the proper communications with the families of our casualties.

I was alert to the possibility of advancing key personnel through the battlefield commission process. And I tried. However, I found to my disappointment that Plat. Sgt's. with many years of regular Army experience were reluctant to consider such a promotion.

Motivation

To this point I have not touched on motivation. Three key factors come to mind.

First. Basic patriotism and love of country.

The second one I'll list is pride. I believe each individual had the basic desire to do his best. That then had to be developed into a company pride to be the best.

Third, but underlining everything else, a religious belief in God and that somehow God would see us through. I can't speak for all the men in Co. A, but in combat when I was looking for help and protection, I know I sure did a lot of praying.

Conclusion

In general, and more so in combat, I felt that whenever someone did something, at that particular moment he was convinced it was the correct thing to do. There was little or no time for second guessing. Good training led to the proper action being taken.

Going into combat, it was my view that Co. A. was a very unique organization with extremely talented personnel. Nothing during that period or since has altered that view.

In closing, all I can add is that I was very fortunate and privileged to have been a part of that unit and the men in it.

After-Thoughts

After typing the 10 pages - correcting typographical errors - and re-reading a couple of times, the following thoughts have occurred to me that may be pertinent enough to add some after-thoughts.

I mentioned the use of our own slightly wounded or ill personnel as guards on our duffel bags/field kitchen equipment. Along those lines, our Bn. Surgeon also maintained his own "Bn. Hospital" to care for those who needed medical help but didn't require evacuation. We did not want to lose our people in the medical evacuation/replacement pool process. This way people were retained and upon recuperation rejoined their units.

In speaking of dispersion of units, we had several cases where even platoons were split into sections or had the security section used for some other purpose. Here are a couple of examples from our company history.

9-15-44. "At Blainsville we received a message requiring us to send the 3rd Plat. Security Section back to Lamath to guard the remains of the bridge".

11-17-44. "The 2nd Plat. is in the vic'y of Hampont. Its mission at present being to protect the 26th Inf. Div's.C.P. Sgt. Haynes' section of the 2nd Plat.is with the 26th Cav'y Rcn. unit".

This may come under the heading of "sounds". It seems many units liked to move into and stay in towns and villages. To do so, on most occasions, subjected you to day and night shelling. Whenever possible, we would avoid this by selecting the proper side of a sloping field a quarter of a mile away and then "listen" to the shells as they went over us and into the town. In my opinion it was much safer that way.

On page 6, my comments about the 1st Sgt. acting as the Co. Exec. are not 100% accurate. I've stated "in effect" he performed that role. Actually, Bn. Hq. loaned us a 2nd Lieut. from 12/13/44 to 2/22/45 to act in that capacity. It was understood he would not take over a platoon and might be called back to Bn. Hq. at any time. He performed many functions that were helpful. However, the 1st Sgt's experience (going back to 41/42) was used to keep all the duties of the Hq. Plat. functioning at the level that was necessary. Nothing written here is intended to downgrade that Lieut's performance. He did a good job for us.

And last, how little things can mean so much. Here is part of our company history entry for 4/27/45. "We were issued 4 bottles of Coca Cola per man today at 5¢ each. Boy was it a treat. It was the first thing civilized that we had to drink for a long time".

Footnote:

WW11 service ran from Jan.'41 to Jan.'46.

After discharge from the service in '46, I became an active member of the 28th Inf. Div., Penna.Nat'l Guard. I was on active duty with that unit during the Korean War (1950-1952). From 1952 to 1964 I remained active in the 28th Inf. Div., P.N.G., Assignments within the Div. were Regt'l S2, Infantry Battalion Commander and A. C. of S., G2.

Now a retired Lt. Col. living in Arizona.

Bertrand J. Oliver
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