

HEADQUARTERS 776TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
APO 756 U. S. Army

9 May 1945

SUBJECT: Citation of Unit.

TO : The Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 756, U. S. Army.

THRU : The Commanding General, 63rd Infantry Division, APO 463, U. S. Army.

1. Under the provisions of Circular Number 333, War Department, 1943, it is recommended that "A" Company and "B" Company, 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion, be cited in War Department General Orders for outstanding accomplishment in combat during the period from 0700 hours, 16 March 1945, to 2400 hours, 19 March 1945, in the Siegfried line north of Enshelm, Germany to Ommersheim, Germany.

2. Preparatory phase of the action.

On 14 March 1945 the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion was in position with the 44th Infantry Division, screening the left sector of the IV Corps front on a general line from Sarreguemines (451-62) to Hettlingen (472-52). On this day IV Corps launched its offensive and the 49th and 44th Infantry Divisions passed through the 44th Infantry Division. After these divisions had passed through and reached the initial objective, the battalion, having been in action since 23 October 1944, had expected to share the mission of the 44th Division, which was to go into army reserve. After four months of winter warfare and two major counter-attacks, Scheldt 26 November 1944, and the general German counter-offensive of 1 January 1945, rehabilitation and vehicular maintenance were badly needed.

About 1600 hours, 15 March 1945, the battalion was detached from the 44th Infantry Division and attached to the 63rd Infantry Division. The battalion moved to the vicinity of Auerbach, Germany (480-60), by forced march, closing at 0400 hours, 16 March 1945. "A" Company was assigned a direct support mission with the 234th Infantry Regiment, and "B" Company was in direct support of the 235th Infantry Regiment, to support these regiments in their assault on the Siegfried line. Each company commander was informed that the mission of the respective regiments was to make a breach in the Siegfried defenses to enable an armored division to enter the Saar-Palatinate region from the south.

3. Enemy situation.

Prior to the attack of the XII Corps, launched on 15 March 1945, the enemy had withdrawn the bulk of his artillery and rocket guns to prepared positions in defense of the Siegfried line. Following the attack on 15 March 1945, the bulk of the enemy troops, comprising elements of the 49th

Volksgranadier Division, 19th Volksgranadier Division, and many battle groups and fortress battalions, manned the Siegfried line in an all-out effort to stop our attack.

4. Terrain.

The terrain in this area was such that the only avenues of approach were over exposed forward slopes under direct enemy observation from the left, front and right. Between Enschheim (Q54-57) and Bismichheim (Q51-59), the defenses were based on two commanding ridges which overlooked all avenues leading north from Enschheim. Between these two ridges, and in the general area to the north in the vicinity of the 70 Easting, were heavily wooded ravines with no underbrush, which afforded excellent cover positions for enemy emplacements. There were small open clearings from the 55 to the 56 Northing line and also from the 57 to the 58.5 Northing line. To the north of Enschheim and Ommerheim (Q58-59), the first belt of the Siegfried line ran along the crest of a high dominating ridge generally along the 70.6 Easting line, covering the only approaches from the south over open ground with direct and observed artillery and mortar fire. This first belt was anchored at both the west and east ends in heavily wooded ravines. Mutually supporting the first line, approximately 1,000 yards to the rear, was a second belt based on two commanding ridges (Q55-71.4) (Q55-71.6), anchored on both left and right flanks in deeply wooded ravines. In direct support of these belts was a third belt in the area between Ober-Wurzbach (Q61-72) and Hassel (Q59-74), an area of deeply wooded ravines and high ridges affording positions for observation covering the first two lines.

5. Fortifications.

The Siegfried line, built on the terrain features discussed in paragraph 4, was constructed in depth, and consisted of three belts which mutually supported each other. Two mine fields north of Ommerheim (Q57.9-70.7) and Enschheim (Q55-70) guarded the roads and open country approaches to the first belt. Next in line was the row of dragons teeth, constructed of solid concrete blocks, which consisted of a row approximately 50 yards deep and about 3 feet apart, staggered so as to prevent armor from going through. These teeth ran from the wooded ravine northeast of Ommerheim to the area of Bismichheim, with one gap in the deeply wooded ravine directly north of Enschheim. Supplementing the dragons teeth were anti-tank ditches which extended over the same general area, further restricting the movement of armor. Throughout the system of fortifications were barbed wire entanglements restricting any approach to the pillboxes and trenches.

Directly behind the dragons teeth was a complete network of fire trenches. These trenches were interlocking and provided a covered communication route between pillboxes. It was possible to go from one end of the line to the other by following the trench system. This trench system was well constructed, reinforced with logs and boards and stood up well under artillery fire. They were deep enough for the average sized man to walk upright.

Behind the trench system was the network of pillboxes, each

mutually supporting the other. These pillboxes ranged in size from machine gun pillboxes to boxes large enough to accommodate a 75mm anti-tank gun and crew, and were equipped with ammunition and food supplies. Each pillbox was self-sufficient and could continue to resist even though its surrounding boxes were neutralized. The construction of the boxes varied in thickness of wall, from 2 to 6 feet of reinforced concrete, with the major portion of the boxes being below the ground level. To supplement observation from the pillboxes were small observation and control cupolas with observation slits just above the surface of the ground. Also emplaced in the general area of the pillboxes were turrets mounting 75mm anti-tank guns, commanding the approaches to the line.

A hasty reconnaissance after the neutralization of the enemy in this sector revealed at least five such turrets in the area. As the reconnaissance was very hasty, it is probable that more were emplaced in the area. The second belt of fortifications was similar to the first belt with the exception that the approaches were denied to armor by anti-tank ditches rather than dragons teeth. The third belt was generally in the area north of Ober-Wirzbach and consisted mainly of pillboxes in a heavily wooded area with many deep ravines and a few dominating bare ridges, on which observation and flak towers were located. In addition to the pillboxes and fire trenches found in the other belts, it was generally in this area that the bulk of the enemy artillery, mortar and Nebelwerfers were emplaced. Some of these were in concrete emplacements and others were in the cover of the heavy woods, where location by observation was practically impossible.

6. Detailed description of the action.

On arrival at the temporary assembly area at Ansbach, Germany, the company commanders of "A" and "C" companies went immediately to contact the respective regimental commanders. As the regiments were moving forward, contact with the regimental commanders was made at approximately 0900 hours. After discussing plans with the regimental commanders to assault the Siegfried line, the company commanders of "A" and "C" companies immediately ordered their respective companies to move out, "A" company in the general vicinity of Erbsheim, and "C" company in the general vicinity of Grunstein (957-66).

While the platoons were moving to an assembly area, on 18 March 1945, Lt. Alfreds, company commander of "C" company, and his platoon leaders went forward of the infantry outpost line to select positions from which direct fire could be brought to bear upon the town of Heckenbachheim (956-70) and pillboxes directly to the north. This reconnaissance was accomplished under enemy small arms and mortar fire, and could not be accomplished until friendly defensive artillery fire was lifted. At the same time, Captain Gusiak, company commander of "A" company, and his platoon leaders were making a foot reconnaissance of routes of approach and firing positions to bring direct fire on the Siegfried positions north of Erbsheim. During the evening of 18 March 1945, the company commanders of "A" and "C" companies met with the infantry commanders for a final coordination of the plans for the attack the following morning.

At this time the importance of the mission of the division, as

personally given to Lieutenant Colonel Moorhead by Major General Hibbs, was relayed to all members of the command (see annex). In the assembly area that night, both companies were subjected to heavy, intermittent artillery and nebelwerfer fire. Shell fragments damaged two of "G" company's radio antennas, which had to be replaced. At 0500 hours, 17 March 1945, "G" Company moved to the positions which had been reconnoitered the previous day. As the first platoon moved into position directly south of Heckendalheim (56.2-69.3), the noise of their engines brought down upon them an extremely heavy nebelwerfer concentration. At the same time, the second platoon of "G" company moved into position at the edge of the woods (57.4-68.3) south of Ommersheim, and the third platoon moved forward, helping the infantry clear the town of Ommersheim, to positions on the north edge of the town; thus, all three platoons were in position to begin firing on the Siegfried line defenses upon order from the supported infantry commander.

Upon arrival of the first platoon in cover positions, Staff Sergeant Oliver J. Stevens, acting platoon leader, made his way through heavy artillery and constant small arms fire to the fox hole observation post of the infantry battalion commander, on the forward slope, to discuss targets which would give the most aid to the infantry. Throughout the day, Staff Sergeant Stevens exposed himself to intense enemy fire while moving back and forth from the infantry observation post to the destroyers, to relay instructions. Upon prearranged signal the destroyers moved to previously reconnoitered positions and opened direct fire upon pillboxes to their immediate front and upon strong points in Heckendalheim. The enemy reaction was immediate and intense artillery, rocket, and small arms fire forced the infantry to withdraw to the reverse slope. The destroyers, however, continued to maintain their positions and continued to fire until their ammunition was exhausted. They returned to a covered position for reloading and, still without infantry support, returned to their positions and resumed fire upon the enemy fortifications.

During this time, the destroyer crews with carbines, tommyguns, and the anti-aircraft .50 caliber machine gun, on the exposed deck of the destroyers, kept infiltrating infantry and bazooka teams at bay. By late afternoon the destroyers' fire had such effect that our infantry was able to re-occupy the positions they had vacated in the morning. At 0500 hours the third platoon moved through Ommersheim to firing positions at 57.3-69.7 and opened fire on pillboxes in the vicinity of 57.1-70.3 at a range of 1200 yards. While on immediate reconnaissance to guide the destroyers to these positions, Sergeant Robison and Sergeant Gaenther, destroyer commanders, captured three prisoners who were turned over to the supported infantry.

From 0500 hours the destroyers attempted a continuous fire on enemy pillboxes to their front. Meanwhile, the second platoon had been firing continuously on the pillboxes, from their positions to the south of Ommersheim, at a range of about 2400 yards. Lt. Alfreds, knowing that the fire of the third platoon, at a closer range, was more effective than the fire of the second platoon, and as the third platoon was unable to maintain constant fire due to the necessity of pulling back to a covered position to refill with ammunition, ordered the second platoon to move forward and rotate positions with the third platoon. This maneuver was completely successful, since it allowed time for destroyers, which were damaged by

shell fragmentation, to be repaired and return to firing positions without interrupting the stream of fire. As soon as the destroyers occupied a firing position, the area was immediately subjected to observed artillery and mortar fire. In an endeavor to avoid as much of this fire as possible, platoon leaders and destroyer commanders were constantly engaged in foot reconnaissance for new firing positions. Each destroyer, during the day, was in some degree damaged by enemy fire.

Meanwhile, on the left, at 0900 hours, "A" company had moved into positions from Enschheim to the direct support of the 254th Infantry, over an exposed route under heavy enemy artillery fire. Two platoons were on a forward slope, with no defilade or cover, at 954.3-68.4, with the mission of taking under fire and neutralizing a belt of pillboxes on Hill 333 (955.5-70.5) and its slopes, so the dragons teeth could be gapped. One platoon was in position on the forward slope of Hill 361 (955.3-67.8) to cover the two forward platoons. The two forward platoons opened fire on the boxes and immediately received heavy enemy artillery concentrations, but continued their mission to neutralize the pillboxes. The enemy fire came from the front and left rear. The over-watching third platoon opened fire on the Bismarck area and grid squares 33-63 to 53-70 sector, trying to locate the enemy fire and draw the enemy fire off the two forward platoons. In the forward platoons, fragmentation was coming into the open turrets, all the radio aerials were knocked off, two destroyers received direct hits from mortar shells, and one indirect sight in a turret of one of the destroyers was knocked out. The friendly infantry attack during this operation was unsuccessful, and the two forward platoons, after firing all of their ammunition, withdrew over the road, which was under constant shell fire. The over-watching platoon, having made the enemy react by this time, was subjected to an enemy artillery and smoke barrage. Radio aerials in the platoon were knocked off, each destroyer was hit with high explosive shell, and one .50 caliber machine gun mount was broken.

About 1600 hours the attack was again resumed with the three platoons going into positions at 954.5-68.7. This position was under direct observation from the pillboxes, also the right and left flanks. It was necessary to take the road from Enschheim, which was under heavy fire, to these positions. The destroyers opened up and immediately the enemy reacted with accurate registration of artillery plus a small amount of direct fire from the left flank. Two direct high explosive hits were made on the destroyers. They did not burn and the crews continued their mission. The enemy then laid in a wall placed smoke screen, which blinded the gunners, following this with a murderous artillery barrage. The destroyers remained and fired up their load before withdrawing. This time the pillboxes were neutralized by the tank destroyers and the infantry was able to occupy them. The engineers then proceeded to gap the dragons teeth.

When darkness had made it impossible to maintain direct fire any longer, the third platoon of "A" Company moved to the right to support the right flank elements of the 254th in an attack on Enschheimhof Farm (955.3-59.8), from which the enemy had successfully resisted all day by maintaining a base of fire on the right flank of the infantry assaulting the line. Meanwhile, the first platoon of "C" company moved to the

right of Ommersheim to support the right flank elements of the 255th Infantry. During the course of the night, both companies received heavy, harassing, artillery and rocket fire, but, despite this difficulty, all destroyers were refueled, reloaded with ammunition and minor repairs were accomplished in preparation for the resumption of the attack the following morning.

During the night of 17-18 March 1945, the second battalion of the 255th Infantry launched an attack on the Siegfried line, seizing at least two pillboxes. However, due to heavy small arms fire from fire trenches and heavy artillery fire in the area, this battalion was forced to withdraw. At dawn of 18 March 1945, Lt. Alfreds, "G" Company commander, was given the mission, by Colonel Schaezel, the regimental commander of the 255th Infantry, to subject the fortifications directly north of Ommersheim to constant direct fire from as short as possible range, to soften them up for a renewed infantry attack, with the mission of seizing the pillboxes directly covering the dragons teeth so that the engineers could gap the teeth for the passage of armor.

In carrying out their portion of the mission, the first platoon, while moving into position to support the right flank company, received very heavy direct fire from two estimated 75mm emplaced, anti-tank, guns on the left. Realizing that the destroyers in his platoon would be knocked out if they remained in this position, Sergeant Stevens immediately ordered the destroyers back into a covered position and made another foot reconnaissance, despite heavy artillery and mortar fire. After finding a better road of approach, he led his destroyers back into positions and fired on pillboxes to the right of Ober-Munzbach-Ommersheim road with good effect. Throughout the remainder of the day, the three platoons rotated to the advance firing positions north of Ommersheim, and fired at pillboxes at various ranges in order to soften them up for the infantry assault the following morning. All of these firing positions were subjected to heavy artillery, rocket, mortar and machine gun fire throughout the day, and each destroyer suffered from high explosive hits. The concussion from one of these hits stunned Corporal Teddy J. Thompson, a driver of one of the third platoon destroyers. Revived by the crew, Corporal Thompson continued to drive throughout the course of the action, refusing to be evacuated for medical treatment. So heavy was the shower of shell fragments that all of the equipment on the outside of the destroyers was damaged. Two of the anti-aircraft .50 caliber machine guns were damaged and radio antennas and sight apertures on most of the destroyers had to be replaced during the course of the day. Despite the constant heavy shell fire, the crews fired the .50 caliber anti-aircraft machine gun from its exposed position on the deck at enemy infantry during the periods when the 90mm guns had become so over-heated, due to the rapid rate of fire, that they failed to function.

At dusk seventeen of the major enemy pillboxes in this sector had been so neutralized that the friendly infantry assault that night was successful and the engineer demolition squads were able to blow a gap in the dragons teeth.

During the night of 17-18 March 1945, the 254th Infantry received a counter-attack, and the enemy regained most of the ground lost during the

day. On the morning of 18 March 1945, Captain Gusick, "A" company commander, was given the mission of neutralizing the first belt of pillboxes and of going through the dragons teeth regardless of the cost. The 234th Infantry was to resume the attack at 1400 hours to try to regain the first belt of pillboxes so the engineers could bridge the crater where the dragons teeth had been gapped the night before. Captain Gusick, Lt. Britz, and Lt. Lacassie led reconnaissance parties to select firing positions, and each party was subjected to small arms and machine gun fire. About 1100 hours the infantry attacked the Einsimerhof Farm, a strongpoint which had to be reduced before the general attack could begin, and, due to the pulverizing effect of the fire of the third platoon, the attack was made successfully without a single infantry casualty.

From the reconnaissance, it had been decided that one platoon would go into position about 300 yards from the dragons teeth, alternating two platoons so they could bring continuous, devastating fire on the pillboxes. The third platoon went into position to the right at Q56.5-69.7, about 500 yards from the boxes, and alternated in sections. This platoon, immediately upon coming into position, knocked out three, 75mm, high-velocity, emplaced guns, which would certainly have knocked out each destroyer on the line of the two other platoons. All platoons received extremely heavy artillery and mortar fire. This fire was so heavy that two platoons were forced to maneuver constantly to new positions. The enemy artillery and mortar fire did not lessen and successive concentrations were laid on the destroyers until darkness. However, by that time, every pillbox on the line had been neutralized or destroyed, and the infantry had moved in to the left end of the row. As the engineers repaired the crossing at the breach in the dragons teeth, the destroyers maintained their fire and moved through as soon as the gap was passable, occupying night positions within thirty yards of the enemy infantry, to provide anti-tank protection and strongpoints for friendly infantry against night counter-attacks.

By daylight the destroyers' crews had used all their hand grenades and most of their small arms ammunition fighting off enemy infantry attempting to infiltrate our positions. The destroyers' positions were subjected to continuous enemy shelling, and one destroyer received a direct hit by an artillery shell which blew off the radio operator's hatch. During this time the company service personnel reloaded, refueled, and repaired the damage done during the day's shelling, under the most difficult and hazardous conditions. At 0700 hours, 19 March 1945, "A" company resumed the attack, and although the pillboxes had been made untenable, the enemy infantry remained and had even increased their numbers in the trenches which ran between the pillboxes. Lt. Britz' destroyer was knocked out by a panzerfaust, fired from a trench thirty yards in the rear of the destroyers. Lt. Britz was wounded around the face and upper body, but refused evacuation. Lt. Lacassie's destroyer was hit in the same manner, but, fortunately, the rocket failed to detonate and the firer was killed by small arms fire from the destroyer crew. Sergeant Ellies' destroyer was hit by high explosive and he was wounded, but also refused evacuation, and the crew, in spite of the effects of the severe concussion, continued to man their destroyer. Enemy sniper fire was heavy and

continuous. Any member of a destroyer crew looking out of the open turret to adjust fire attracted sniper fire. Finally crew members used the exposed .50 caliber anti-aircraft machine gun, mounted on the deck, to spray the trenches to cut down small arms fire. The upper half of each turret was pock-marked with small arms and shell fragment scars, and most of the periscopes were shattered.

Sergeant Wagner, acting platoon leader of the second platoon, and Sergeant Rossland were killed when a mortar shell struck the edge of the open turret; Pvt Icl Pellicotti was wounded by shell fragments; and Technician 4th Grade Thorne was knocked unconscious by the concussion, but recovered to drive the destroyer to a defiladed position. Lt. Britz and his crew, who had lost their destroyer from panzerfausten fire, manned Sgt. Wagner's destroyer and returned to the fight. Another destroyer was hit by high explosive and the crew was badly shaken up and stunned by concussion, but without leaving their position they continued the action. The rate of fire for the destroyers was so rapid that the recoil systems failed to function and cooling periods had to be allowed while the destroyers were in their exposed positions.

By 1300 hours the second belt was neutralized sufficiently to commence firing on its switch line which ran between the second and third belt. Enemy artillery, mortar and sniper fire continued to be heavy and accurate. This line of pillboxes was neutralized by dark and the infantry moved into it. The destroyers moved forward with the infantry and spent the night in this position. Enemy resistance weakened at this point, many prisoners were taken, and the 253rd Infantry passed through the 254th Infantry meeting little resistance. The Siegfried line in this sector was broken.

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry, supported by "G" company, at 0730 hours assaulted the dragons teeth and the first line of pillboxes. The first and third platoons moved to firing positions overlooking the pillboxes, and fired on them to make sure that they were kept neutralized. The second platoon moved to the gap in the dragons teeth blown during darkness. One tooth in the gap was still intact and passage was impossible. Lt. Ritter and platoon Sergeant Masters went forward on foot to contact the engineers, who had taken shelter in one of the neutralized pillboxes, to secure their aid in completing the gap in the dragons teeth. They were subjected to heavy sniper and machine gun fire from by-passed pillboxes, and captured three prisoners on their journey. The first and third platoons continued firing at ranges of 200 to 400 yards from their positions directly behind the dragons teeth. When the engineers had succeeded in making the gap passable, the second platoon proceeded through it and engaged the remaining pillboxes from ranges of 75 to 100 yards.

Several non-penetrating hits from panzerfausten were received at this time. The first section of the platoon proceeded along the ridge to the right, firing at point-blank ranges into pillboxes and fire trenches, which were still causing the infantry heavy casualties. The second section set up a road block at the road junction leading to Ober-Murzbach at a point which was necessarily completely exposed and under continuous,

observed artillery and mortar fire (557.7-71.5). They neutralized two pillboxes, which had opened fire on them, at point-blank range. Movement in this area was impossible due to anti-tank ditches and fire trenches. As another group of tanks and the first platoon of "F" company moved to reinforce the assault group, a bridge across an anti-tank ditch, (557.7-71.5) collapsed under the weight of one of the tanks. A destroyer crew, led by Sergeant Drinn, attempted to pull the tank from the ditch to clear the road. Unsuccessful in this attempt, the platoon leader, Staff Sergeant Stevens, returned through the dragons teeth under heavy shell fire to secure engineering aid and materials, which were hauled on the destroyers to the site of the caved-in bridge.

The third platoon, supporting "F" company of the 1st Battalion, which was pinned down by extremely heavy machine gun fire from by-passed pillboxes on the left, pulled into an exposed position nearby to draw the fire away from the infantry, and to try to neutralize the pillboxes causing the trouble. Unable to spot the machine guns, Lt. Cohen, in the platoon leader's destroyer, purposely set in an exposed position, drawing fire upon the destroyer so that the infantry might advance. By this time the destroyers, which were across the anti-tank ditch, were running low on ammunition as were the infantry in the area. Staff Sergeant Henry Keaton went on foot through small area fire, mortar and artillery fire to establish to make arrangements to have another destroyer carry ammunition to both the destroyers and infantry beyond the ditch. The destroyers of the third platoon maintained covering fire from behind the dragons teeth to protect the forward platoon as much as possible.

By darkness of the 19th, enemy resistance broke and the breakthrough of the Siegfried line in this sector was accomplished.

7. Map showing disposition of friendly infantry and enemy positions is attached hereto.

8. Nature of terrain:

- a. Described in paragraph 4.
- b. Enemy morale: Very good.
- c. Morale of our troops: Excellent.
- d. Atmospheric conditions: clear with ground haze in morning.
- e. Dates of action: 18 March 1945 to 20 March 1945.

9. a. Number of officers and EM assigned to unit who took part in action: 16 Officers, 287 EM, number of men attached, unassigned:

b. Number of casualties suffered by unit ditch: Killed in action: 2; Wounded in action: 9

c. Strength of Supporting Troops:

68th Infantry Division

70th Tank Battalion (18 March 1945 to 1900 18 March 1945)

740th Tank Battalion (1900 18 March 1945 to 20 March 1945)

d. Character of support:

The 70th Tank Destroyer Battalion was in support of the 68th Infantry Division, and close cooperation was maintained with the infantry, artillery and tanks throughout the action.

10. a. Approximate strength of the enemy: Elements of two German Divisions in addition to battle groups and fortress battalions in sufficient strength to adequately man the Siegfried fortifications and still maintain a reserve which launched nightly counter-attacks in this area. These troops were supported by light, medium, and heavy artillery and many rocket firing weapons.

b. Character of enemy fire: 210mm, 150mm, 88mm, and 75mm artillery, 75mm anti-tank fire, rocket, mortar, panzerfaust, machine gun (light and heavy), and rifle fire.

c. Apparent enemy intentions: To hold the American forces south of the Siegfried line, to prevent a break-through in the Saar-Palatinat, and to prevent a link-up with the 3rd American Army.

d. Losses suffered by the enemy: No attempt was made to take prisoners--those taken were immediately turned over to the infantry.

Known enemy dead: 67

Estimated enemy wounded: 150

5. Enemy fortifications and material destroyed:

5 75mm anti-tank guns destroyed

1 88mm anti-tank gun destroyed

65 machine guns destroyed

78 pillboxes and forts destroyed and neutralized to the extent that the Siegfried line was abandoned.

11. I have personal knowledge of the above described action.

Wright E. Moorhead

WRIGHT E. MOORHEAD
Lt. Colonel, U. S.
Commanding

12 Items

- 1- Proposed Citations
- 2- Situation Maps
- 3- Statement of Lt. Col. Moorhead
- 4- Statement of Capt. Quisick
- 5- Statement of Capt. Alfrede
- 6- Statement of S/Cpt Stevens
- 7- Statement of Sgt Durson
- 8- Statement of W/IV Sear
- 9- Extracts from 53rd Div G-3 Reports
- 10- Extracts from 52nd Div G-3 Reports
- 11- Roster of casualties
- 12- Roster of Personnel