

ANTI-TANK DEFENSE OF ANZIO BEACHHEAD

1. Planning Phase.

a. Operation Shingle.

- (1) VI Corps was withdrawn from the vicinity of VENAFRO in the early part of January 1944 and began planning for Operation "Shingle". High lights of coordination of AT defense included:
  - (a) Coordination with G-3 as original beachhead objective was not suitable for AT defense. As a result, the projected line was extended to the MOLETTA River which gave a more suitable road net and at the same time afforded a better natural obstacle on the left flank.
  - (b) Coordination with the Engineers as to priority of demolitions, mine laying and roadblocks.
  - (c) Coordination between British and American units to insure adequate protection of boundaries.
  - (d) Directives to units to insure that they embarked adequately equipped with AT means; to assist units having insufficient equipment.
  - (e) Assurance that the landing plans were such that AT weapons should be unloaded early in the landing.
  - (f) Check on ammunition supply and recommendation as to the ratio HE to AP. It was decided that 80% HE and 20% armor piercing (with base detonating fuze) would be a proper percentage. This allotment of types has proved satisfactory throughout the operation.
  - (g) Plans for AT defense from units to determine that all avenues of tank approach were adequately covered.
  - (h) Close liaison with all units to insure dissemination of all pertinent information.
- (2) As a result of this phase of Operation Shingle the necessity for the following appears:
  - (a) The Anti-tank section of either division or corps should be included in any planning group from beginning to completion of plans.
  - (b) Constant association of the AT Officer with G-3, G-2, and G-4 are imperative in order to advise the General Staff of capabilities and limitations of TD's, of other AT means, and to assist them in their planning estimates.
  - (c) The antitank units involved must be informed promptly of changes and modifications in plans, since the smallest change in plans will affect AT dispositions.
  - (d) All units involved in an operation must be informed of the AT plans of the other units so that complete, detailed coordination can be attained.
  - (e) The Anti-tank defense portion of the Corps Order must include specific instructions as to locations of demolitions, mines and other passive means of defense.

2. Operations Phase.

a. Landing Phase.

- (1) Only one TD Bn, the 601st TD Bn attached to the 3rd Division, landed in the assault wave just after dawn. The first 24 hours were spent in unloading and assembling the battalion in the area designated. Due to the soft, marshy ground, considerable work was required before all guns reached the area. Dewaterproofing was accomplished and by the morning of D-1-1 the Bn was ready for operations. During this period the British 81st AT Regiment was in floating reserve and quickly available in case of need.
- (2) During this phase organization of the beachhead was the primary concern. Reconnaissance of the area by all units was made, positions located, and occupied, and AT positions along boundaries closely coordinated. As new units landed constant readjustment of gun positions and boundaries was necessary.
- (3) The landing of the 894th TD Bn on 26 January coincided with the enemy counterattack on the 1st Inf Div (Bn) in the CARROCCETO area with approximately 20 tanks. Two companies of the 894th (under Corps control) were placed in support of the 1st Div and Ranger force who were operating in the CARROCCETO area. Two days later the third company was placed on the left flank under corps control.

b. Offensive Phase.

- (1) On the 28th of January the 1st Inf Div (Br) started its drive toward the north with C Co, 894th attached. M-10's were employed as assault guns as well as anti-tank guns and worked with the infantry battalions. During this period fighting was heavy with numerous counterattacks; the lines fluctuated; units were cut off and then contact rejoined.
- (2) On the 30th of January the 3rd Division began its attack on CICISTERNA. The 601st TD Bn supported the attack as assault guns as well as anti-tank.
- (3) In both instances targets of Tank Destroyers included personnel, houses, strong points, machine guns, vehicles, guns, tanks and SP guns. 50 cal. machine guns were used by M-10's constantly and the M-10's were employed in the front lines of the infantry continuously.
- (4) Beginning 4 February 1944, offensive operations, other than counterattacks, ceased and the VI Corps assumed the defensive.

c. Defensive Phase.

- (1) During this period most of the hostile tank action occurred in the ANZIO-ALBANO axis from the 2nd to the 19th of February the enemy employed elements of six divisions on a 3000 yard front, and gained approximately 10,000 yards. An estimate of the enemy armor employed is 125-150 tanks, including both Mark IV and Mark VI types.
- (2) From the 2nd to 16th the 894th TD Bn had two companies employed in the ANZIO-ALBANO sector. Guns were placed well forward to cover vital roads and avenues of approach. Hostile artillery and mortar fire was intense. By the 5th of February, C Co, which had been in heavy action since the 29th of January was depleted to approximately 50% in strength in both M-10's and personnel. The balance of the Company was near exhaustion. B Co took over some of the positions of C Co so that some relief could be affected. A lull in fighting took place for a few days and from the 11th to the 16th the 645th completed relief of the 894th in this sector.
- (3) From the 16th through the 19th the Germans made an all out effort. During this period all 36 M-10's of the 645th battalion were employed with seventeen of them lost. As a result of these losses one platoon of A Co, 894th, which was still committed on the left flank was attached to the 645th. Also A Co of the 701st (A & C Company arrived on 9th Feb, balance of Bn on 23rd) was placed in direct fire positions in vicinity of the overpass to reinforce the 645th. In addition, the balance of A Co, 894th was alerted and B Co 894th was attached to the 56th Div (Br) which was on the left flank of the 45th Division. The 645th TD Bn destroyed 25 tanks in these 3 days and the 701st destroyed six. In addition, all TD's fired at enemy personnel with 50 cal. MGs and 3" guns. Other targets were houses, machine guns and mortars.
- (4) On the 19th the 1st Armored Division counterattacked with C Company of the 701st attached to overwatch the tanks. The action was successful and C Co destroyed two tanks.
- (5) After the counterattack the enemy fighting was reduced to local attacks and patrol skirmishes until the 26th when the enemy had regrouped and struck the 3rd Division along its whole front. The usual enemy tactics of tanks supporting infantry was employed. The attack lasted for five days during which approximately 75-100 tanks were employed by the enemy. The 601st destroyed 25 during this period with the loss of no M-10's although some were damaged.
- (6) Due to the wide front of the 3rd division and the amount of armor available to the enemy, C Co of the 701st TD Bn was attached to the 601st to provide depth to the defense as all guns (36) of the 601st were committed in direct fire positions. On 4 March one platoon of B Co was sent to 3rd Div area to protect the canal crossing NE of CONCA. Thus, a total of 43 M-10's were available in the sector of the division. (C Co, 701st had only 8 guns). In addition, C Co of the 894th was alerted for possible employment, and the balance of the 701st TD Bn was in reserve.
- (7) From 5th of March until 25th March only local actions have taken place. As of 25 March TD units in VI Corps are with units as follows: 3 Co of the 894th is attached to the 5 Inf Div (Br) on the left flank, A Co of the 894th is attached to the 1 Inf Div (Br) on the right flank of 5 Div (Br) and C Co is in Corps Reserve prepared to back up either forward Company. The 645th is with the 45th Div.

The 601st with C Company of the 805th TD Bn (which arrived on the beachhead March 11th) is attached to the 3rd Div. The 805th TD Bn (-C Co) is attached to the 1st SS Force on the extreme right flank. The 701st TD Bn is attached to the 1st Armored Division, in Corps Reserve with the Division. This arrangement of units covers all avenues of approach and provides an adequate TD reserve.

d. Conclusions.

- (1) One of the important points brought out in this operation has been the necessity for rotation of TD personnel. Formerly the conception of the role of Tank Destroyers has been that of a mobile reserve to deepen the static anti-tank guns and to move to the area where the greatest threat developed. In the perimeter defense of the ANZIO Beachhead it has been necessary to place M-10's in the front lines often under intermittent rifle, MG, mortar and artillery fire. The continuous presence of enemy tanks in the area necessitated that TD crews be alert constantly. Losses in crews and M-10's were heavy. As a result considerable reserve had to be maintained not only to reinforce, but to replace individual guns or units.
- (2) The use of TD's as anti-tank guns sited behind a house or in a hull defilade position waiting for tanks to appear has been the chief method utilized. Terrain of the beachhead is frequently bare of cover and ground is often marshy. This condition has restricted TD movement chiefly to roads and prevented movement to meet the tanks has been impracticable. Against the mass of artillery, mortar, SP and tank fire that the enemy employed during his attacks the only sure way to cover a route of enemy tank approach was to actually have the AT gun dispersed in mutually supporting positions to cover approaches.
- (3) It is pertinent here to point out a weakness in our present anti-tank means. We assume that an infantry anti-tank gun once placed in position will be there when the enemy tanks approach. However, no provision is made to maintain communication (other than visual) with these guns. Thus, if a 57mm crew or gun is knocked out or overrun there is no way of knowing about it and an approach that seems to be well covered may actually have no protection. Wire is not satisfactory as it cannot be maintained. Accordingly, it appears advisable that each infantry or towed anti-tank gun crew be equipped with a radio to enable communication with the platoon and company commander. In the case of the Tank Destroyers a radio in each M-10 provides this necessary communication.
- (4) Another problem of anti-tank defense is the necessity of giving close support to advancing or withdrawing troops. It has proven impractical to move towed anti-tank guns in forward areas in daylight due to thin skinned prime movers and inadequate protection for crews while going into positions. During the hours of darkness only can the towed anti-tank guns be placed in forward positions.
- (5) Another problem is the limited traverse of the towed anti-tank gun. In several instances attempts have been made to move the trails to fire in another direction with the result that the gun crew was destroyed or neutralized by hostile fire. With emphasis on concealment and minimum of movement it must be appreciated that the towed gun generally can only fire in the direction in which it is sited at time of attack. It follows therefore that the M-10 is the most economical AT weapon due to its ability to fire promptly in any direction.
- (7) The tactics of the enemy in employing infantry and tanks together necessitate our placing a large number of anti-tank guns and TD's on or near the front line in order to be in range of the tanks following the infantry. In many cases the Boche tanks follow at a distance of approximately 1000 yards and as many were Mk VI's only the 3" gun could fire on them with effect. During the major German attack, enemy infantry overran the anti-tank positions before they could fire a round at enemy tanks. Also, several attacks were made at night with no tanks involved and AT gun crews were overrun. As a result, two suggestions are made which might alleviate this difficulty.

- (a) Every anti-tank gun should be able to fire on enemy personnel with HE. Approximately 10% of the fighting personnel of a regiment are anti-tank crews. The added fire power in support of the infantry might save a critical situation and keep the gun in operation.
- (b) Anti-tank guns must be able to fire at night. To permit observed fires, some type of flare should be devised in order to see what the enemy is doing at night and allow AT gunfire as in the daytime. It is pertinent that the enemy has a yellow flare which lights up an area for about five minutes.
- (7) One of the most interesting developments in tactics is the artillery-Tank Destroyer team. Throughout this campaign tank destroyer OP's frequently observed for division and corps artillery on all types of targets. In one instance a TD Company Commander, while his TD's were firing on tanks at closer ranges, adjusted corps artillery on tanks out of range of his own TD's and in 9 days destroyed 15 tanks and damaged several others. In another instance the artillery and TD's were tied in so well that the artillery fired a concentration on enemy tanks and infantry to cover the TD's who moved into firing position and destroyed 3 tanks and dispersed the rest. Wherever the enemy uses tanks and infantry together such TD-Artillery teamwork is essential to break up a determined attack. This is also a reason for the reserve company of a TD Bn to be in indirect fire positions so that it can cover the forward companies who are in direct fire positions.
- (8) As teamwork is the essence of success, the attaching of a TD Bn to each division on a continuous basis is essential. Only by constant working together can the tricks of combat be refined and confidence in one another be established. For example, a TD Company had destroyed several tanks but the enemy was retrieving them during the night. By getting together with the infantry a trap was laid, on the next night, when the Germans attempted recovery the infantry mortars put up some flares while the TD's shot up the enemy recovery crews. Another example is the employment of this same Company's guns on roving gun missions during the night. Prisoners of War state it is very effective.
- (9) This operation provides innumerable examples of the TD's being used in other than anti-tank roles. It has been a frequent occurrence for an infantry company commander to ask the TD's to shoot-up a house containing enemy personnel. This is accomplished by indirect fire when possible, otherwise from direct fire positions. Utilizing HE-delay fuze, armor piercing with a base detonating fuze and HE-fuze-quick, excellent results are obtained. Such missions should be encouraged so that full advantage of the weapon can be taken.
- (10) A variety of communications are essential to obtain maximum coordination and efficiency. Every TD Bn can be reached by telephone through two different channels. The Corps Anti-tank Warning Net is maintained 24 hours a day with all battalions in the net. Each Bn is on the division net with the divisions to which attached. Liaison officers with radios are at these headquarters also. In addition, roving liaison officers contact all other TD units daily. An average of 3 OP's per battalion are also maintained. All of these channels of communication are desirable to keep Tank Destroyers abreast of the situation.
- (11) Passive means of anti-tank defense have been used extensively here. In the constant shifting and regrouping of units required in any similar operation, indiscriminate mine laying, demolitions and road crating must be closely controlled. Careful planning and wide distribution of information is necessary to ensure against casualties of our own personnel and equipment. Responsibility for executing demolitions must be clearly defined and all persons operating in the area informed of the plan.

### 3. Summary.

a. Regardless of the echelon involved, it is essential that the following be recognized:

- (1) The AT Officer must be informed promptly of enemy information, of contemplated operations and plans, and must be included in all planning. Conversely, the recommendations of the AT Officer should be required in all matters pertaining to anti-tank defense. Otherwise his



usefulness as a staff officer is nil; confusion and inefficient protection will result. The foregoing necessitates frequent consultation of the AT Officer by the commander and action on the part of the various staff sections to insure that the AT Officer is continuously in the picture. This cannot be accomplished by the energy and initiative of the AT Officer alone.

- (2) In order to be efficient the defense against hostile armor must be a planned disposition which incorporates all available means after weighing enemy capabilities. Maximum protection will only result: from careful utilization of terrain for siting of weapons and as obstacles to enemy tanks; from careful integration of all anti-tank weapons in accordance with their capabilities; from maximum use of demolitions and mine fields carefully coordinated with weapon locations and natural obstacles; from the closest cooperation on the part of local infantry groups; and from intimate integration not only into the artillery plan but, equally important, the fire plan of all infantry weapons.
  - (3) In order to accomplish the foregoing it should be exceptional for Tank Destroyer units attached to a division to be further attached to regiments or lower units. The anti-tank defense of the division must be a divisional disposition in which all division weapons are disposed according to their capabilities to include the bazookas, the 37mm and 57mm guns and the cannon companies.
- b. Missions should be given to tank destroyer unit commanders in terms of areas, routes or localities, and the disposition of the guns left to the TD Commander. Otherwise improper use of the TD guns will result. Local infantry commanders are prone to dispose TD guns in localities which limit fields of fire, or in exposed positions which do not permit the advantage of hull defilade.
  - c. AT defense between adjacent units and localities must be carefully coordinated to include definite fixing of responsibility, mutual assistance by fire, constant liaison, communication and interchange of information.
  - d. Where operations are likely to be continuous and prolonged, a portion of each TD Battalion should be retained in reserve to permit rotation either of single M-10's or platoons for purpose of rest of crews and maintenance of equipment.
  - e. It is imperative that TD units participate in combined training with infantry and artillery to the maximum extent possible prior to active operations. Wherever practicable the same TD battalion should habitually operate with the same division in order that the most intimate acquaintance and understanding may be developed and maintained.
  - f. This operation has brought out the following regarding training of TD personnel:
    - (1) All crews should be proficient in indirect fire.
    - (2) Trained wire men should be provided in each company.
    - (3) Replacements for every job must be trained.
    - (4) Definite steps must be taken to insure that the pioneer platoon is trained in maintenance and construction of roads to gun positions and construction of positions.
    - (5) The maximum number of cannoners should be trained and all TD personnel trained to read maps and operate FM radio.
    - (6) Insure that TD personnel know enemy tricks.
  - g. Equipment changes or additions as follows have been indicated by this operation.
    - (1) Some added armor protection should be added on bottom of M-8 and M-20.
    - (2) Ball-mounted .30 or .50 caliber MG is needed on M-10, for fire against ground targets.
    - (3) Armor protection for radiator of M-10 is needed.
    - (4) Chevron type tread on M-10 will improve the capability of the vehicle.
    - (5) An independent battery charger for each M-10 is seriously needed.
    - (6) Armor plate battery box in M-10.
    - (7) Provide uprights in ammunition racks of M-10's.

h. The following points regarding employment of TD units should be emphasized;

- (1) Infantry must insure local security of M-10.
- (2) Wherever possible, reconnoiter and prepare positions for M-10s prior to occupation; reconnaissance by CO of unit to occupy.
- (3) Insure that AT guns are mutually supporting.

/s/  
/t/ RUFUS S. RAMEY  
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Anti-Tank Officer.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

APPENDIX 2

HE-DUART-RE 894th TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
A.P.O. #464, U. S. Army

7 March 1944.

Summary (24 Jan.—(Mar.) 12 hours to completely dewaterproof. 24 hours to make reconnaissance of beachhead and submitted plan to Corps for defense of beachhead from attack at any point.

Mission by Companies:

A	B	C	Rcn
Corps Res.	Corps Res.	Corps Res.	Corps Res.
2 Bri Brig	15 Bri 77 FA	24 Cds Brig (Br)	1st Armd Div
45 Inf Div	Ranger Force	1st Armd Div	45 Inf Div
Corps Res.	1st Armored Div	1st Inf Div (Br)	Corps Res.
1st Inf Div (Br)	1st Inf Div (Br)	SSP	
3rd Inf Brig (Br)	179th R.C.T.		
	1st Inf Div (Br)		
	Corps Res.		
	56 Div (Br)		
	5th Inf Div (Br)		

In addition to the above at one time the Battalion was required to maintain liaison with the 24 Guards Brigade, Irish Guards, Scottish Guards, Duke of Wellington, The Gordons, London Irish, VI Corps, Grenadier Guards, 45 Inf Div, and the 157 R.C.T. During this period the situation was tense, radio and wire communications were maintained with B and C Companies and the 24 Guards Brigade. Officers of the Battalion staff maintained O.P.s and contacted frequently the 1st Armored Div. Reconnaissance Company platoons were assigned sectors to maintain O.P.s and listening posts.

The Battalion has been used in the attack and in defense with the British, working with the 17 pounder, 6 pounder towed anti-tank guns and Sherman Tanks.

SUMMARY OF 894TH T. D. BN. ACTIVITY ON ANZIO BEACHHEAD  
26 January - 10 March

26 Jan- Bn closed 1100A on Anzio Beachhead, reconnoitered for positions for two Companies.

27 Jan- C Co in support of 24th Guards Lde. "B" Co in support of Ranger Force for AT defense. Bn minus two Companies in Corps Reserve.

28 Jan- "B" Co fired indirect fire missions supporting Ranger Force on enemy SP guns. One was set on fire and others silenced. Also fired on enemy battery with good effect.

29 Jan: "B" Co moved to AT positions to support Ranger Force. "A" Company alerted to support 2nd Bde (Br) on left flank. Bn attached to 1st A. D. "B" and "C" Companies to remain in present positions until called for by 1st A. D.

30 Jan: "C" Co destroyed one Mk VI tank and two more probables, two AT guns were destroyed caliber unknown. The M-10's carried British Infantry into the lines and assisted in capturing 70 P.O.s and recapturing several British prisoners. One M-10 destroyed (burned) by an anti-tank gun, caliber unknown. Another M-10 was hit and a bogie knocked off.

31 Jan: One destroyer of "C" Co operating separately with the Scots Guards destroyed a possible Mk VI Tank, one Volkswagen, which the M-10 ran over, and an AT gun probable destroyed. The pioneer platoon was moved to 855-308 to clear mine fields. Continuous reconnaissance being pushed by "B" Co preparatory to action with 1st A. D. "C" Co remained in area defense of British sector per verbal orders C/S 1st A. D. "A" Co remained in support of 36th Engineers on left flank.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1 Feb: "A" Co fired 80 rds HE into machine gun nest and occupied houses. Results unknown. During night maintenance crews working on vehicles of "C" Co took two PW. Bn loss "E" and "C" Co's was attached to 45th Div. Co's B and C attached to 1st

Inf Div (Br). Ren Co in positions reinforcing 157th Infantry.

2 Feb: Ren Co acting as mobile reserve for 157th Inf in left sector. "B" Co protecting CARROCETO area with 6 guns, remainder of Co in reserve at CR 8628. "C" Co protecting left flank ANZIO-ALBANO Road from CARROCETO to RJ 660-364.

3 Feb: Active patrolling and reconnaissance by Ren Co continues. OPs established. One Pl A Co moved to vic 758-303.

4 Feb: Enemy counter-attacked strongly with infantry and tanks. C Co destroyed four Mk VI tanks (confirmed by British) and one AT gun. During darkness, two M-10 hold off German infantry with .50 caliber machine guns for two hours. Many casualties were inflicted. Two M-10's with crews were lost in this action, one destroyed and one captured. B Co destroyed one Mk VI tank and fired into enemy occupied houses. One M-10 was hit by tank fire and destroyed. One destroyer which was disabled is now in enemy territory. Another M-10 which is bogged down may be recovered but doubtful. B and C companies withdrawn to vic CARROCETO and took up AT positions. B Co observer adjusted 141st FA Bn on concentration of 15 enemy tanks. Three were destroyed or disabled.

5-6 Feb: AT defenses being coordinated with 1st Inf Div (Br). C Co is reorganizing. 2nd Pl to move to vic 876-306. Friendly aircraft attacked 3rd Pl Ren Co causing three casualties and damage to equipment. E Co knocked out two OP's at 875-365.

7 Feb: CoCo continuing reorganization. Replacements have been received on all M-10's. Vehicles will be put in action as soon as serviced.

8 Feb: During night enemy attacked and penetrated our lines which were later restored. 3rd Pl B Co fired on infantry and assisted in capture of 30 prisoners. One M-10 received a direct hit from mortar fire and broke track. Enemy overran position and destroyer was set afire by crew. 1st pl B Co fired on infantry and MG emplacements with good effect. 1st pl C Co supported 3rd Brig (Br) in their counter attack. They hit 8 enemy occupied houses prior to the jump-off. 3rd pl A Co forced to abandon one M-10 when infantry withdrew and M-10 threw a track. The radio, part of the gun, and engine were removed to immobilize it. After assembling his Co in reserve the CO reports the following additional equipment destroyed during the period Jan 31 to Feb 4. One MI IV tank, one S P gun, one unidentified tank, six AT guns, one AT crew, ten MG's one mortar, and one prime-mover.

9 Feb: 2nd pl B Co fired on one enemy tank moving along railroad bed causing it to retire; also engaged 8 or 9 enemy tanks including 2 Mk VI's approaching CARROCETO from left; tanks withdrew. 3rd pl engaged and destroyed three enemy vehicles, types unknown. 3rd pl B Co fired into enemy infantry in NE corner of factory killing several and wounding several.

10 Feb: During night enemy infantry penetrated the lines in the CARROCETO station area and forced infantry to withdraw some. One M-10 was hit with direct fire either from a tank or anti-tank gun. The remainder of 1st & 2nd pl B Co retired only after expending their entire supply of .50 cal. MG ammo on enemy infantry. The three vehicles destroyed by B Co Feb 9 were identified as two Mk IV tanks and a prime-mover for an AT or AA Gun.

11 Feb: One section of B Co engaged a Mk VI tank, results unknown. One M-10 received a direct hit in the engine compartment immobilizing it. Bn (Cos B & C) relieved attachment 45th Inf Div and reverted to Corps control, Bn to remain in present position.

12 Feb: The CARROCETO station and factory changed hands several times during day. One M-10 was hit on the track and disabled. Six guns of B Co attached to 1 DWR. The balance of B and C are in Div reserve.

13 Feb: B Co relieved by A Co 645th TD Bn in 45th Div sector. B Co 1spl 862-312, 1 pl 865-315 and 1 pl 361-299. C Co reverted to Corps control and relieved B Co 645th in SSF Sector. Ren Co maintaining active patrols in 157th and 1st Inf Div (Br) sectors. One M-10 retrieved vic CARROCETO.



( C O N F I D E N T I A L )

- 14 Feb: C Co completed relief of B Co 645th TD Bn. The 2nd pl registered in indirect fire position.
- 15 Feb: C Co fired 210 rds in SSF sector, harassing and interdictory fires. B Co knocked out two IG's in the 1 DWR sector. A patrol was sent out and found that the Germans had evacuated their position leaving numerous small arms. OP's adjusted arty in counterbattery missions with excellent results.
- 16 Feb: B Co relieved attachment to 1st Inf Div (Br). Reverted to Bn control. Moved to area vic 86-25 to be held in Corps reserve. Pioneer pl repaired road at 870-298. C Co fired 100 rds indirect on tank concentration. Results unknown. 3rd pl C Co shot down ME-109. B Co attached to 56th Inf Div (Br). Ren Co operating OP at 864-298. Bn operating school in radio, map reading, wire laying, and maintenance.
- 17 Feb: C Co fired 100 rds indirect fire, also fired direct on one tank. Results unknown. B Co moved to position in 56th Inf Div (Br) sector. Ren Co shelled out of their OP at 884-298 and set up another at 863-286. Bn School continuing.
- 18 Feb: 1 Pl A Co attached 45th Div. Moved to vic 920-280. Remainder of Bn no change.
- 19 Feb: No Change.
- 20 Feb: C Co fired 50 rds interdiction fire in SSF sector. 3rd Pl A Co moved to vic 829-293 in direct support of 56th Inf Div (Br).
- 21 Feb: A Co moved one platoon to vic 864-243 to meet any thrust that might develop on beachhead. Route reconnaissance conducted in all directions. 2nd pl A Co relieved attachment 45th Div reverted to Bn control in Corps reserve.
- 22 Feb: C Co fired 120 rds harassing fire into Littoria with excellent results. A Co in Corps reserve.
- 23 Feb: A Co fired 55 rds harassing and 18 rds counterbattery. A Co attached to 1st Inf Div (Br) to relieve 701st TD Bn in position along ALBAIO-MANZIO Road.
- 23 Feb: A Co moved to 867-238 to take up indirect fire positions. 1st pl Ren relieved 2nd pl at OPs.
- 25 Feb: 1st Pl A Co in direct support of 3rd Inf Brig (Br) vic overpass. 3rd pl in direct support of 2nd Inf Brig (Br). B Co received heavy mortar and arty fire disabling one M-10 temporarily. C Co fired counterbattery during night.
- 26 Feb: 2nd pl A Co moved to indirect fire positions. 2nd pl C Co adjusted by air OP on enemy guns vic LAGO-FAGLIANO and concentration of enemy trucks with good effect.
- 27 Feb: 2nd Pl A Co in indirect fire positions and adjusted by air OP. 2nd Pl C Co fired 48 rds harassing fire and 8 rds on vehicles.
- 28 Feb: 2nd pl A Co fired 9 rds on 88mm gun and suspected OP. Red Cross flag displayed and firing discontinued. 1st pl B Co fired 33 rds AP and 20 rds HE on houses and concentration of tanks. Building demolished and HK IV tank destroyed by fires of AT and TD guns. 2nd pl C Co fired 41 rds HE on house with good effect 4 rds fired on infantry. Results unknown.
- 29 Feb: One section 2nd pl A Co moved to direct fire position to support 3rd Inf Bde (Br). Balance of pl fired 200 rds harassing and interdiction on 10 locations in CARROCCETO area and fired observed fire on vehicles and guns. B Co fired 60 rds HE at enemy occupied buildings.
- 1 Mar: One section 2nd Pl A Co fired 200 rds interdictory fire on road junction W of CARROCCETO. 2nd pl C Co fired 140 rds interdictory, 48 rds counterbattery in vic LITTORIA. C Co OP located enemy battery firing and adjusted 2nd pl after firing 94 rds apparently on target area enemy guns were silent. Ren Co maintaining OP vic overpass and adjusted artillery fire on 6 SP guns.
- 3 Mar: One section A Co in indirect fire position fired 61 rds on enemy held house and mortars B Co fired 88 rds at enemy occupied house. Neutralized. C Co moved one TD in support of infantry to fire on SP gun and tank, fired 215 rds in this area, results unknown.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

4 Mar: One section, 2nd Pl A Co fired 80 rds HE at enemy held houses and harassing and interdiction fires. 2nd Pl C Co fired 140 rds interdiction fire on 14 points.

5 Mar: One section, 2nd Pl A fired 119 rds on enemy guns, personnel, vehicles, and harassing fire. C Co fired 19 rds harassing fire on LITTORIA. Counter-battery fire received.

6 Mar: One section, 2nd Pl A Co fired 192 rds indirect on enemy battery, 2 SP guns (set one on fire). Factory area and personnel in buildings (heavy black smoke appeared). 2nd Pl C Co fired 143 rds harassing and interdiction fire on 15 points including LITTORIA.

7 Mar: 1 Section, 2nd Pl A Co in indirect fire position, fired 205 rds interdiction and harassing fire on roads and personnel, with excellent results. B Co fired 53 rds on buildings occupied by personnel. C Co fired 120 rds harassing and interdiction fire on 14 targets.

8 Mar: One section A Co fired 20 rds on enemy personnel and harassing missions. 2nd Pl C Co fired 176 rds interdiction fire and 65 rds in houses with several direct hits. SP gun hit on 6 March was burned and now claimed.

9 Mar: One section, 2nd Pl A Co fired 214 rds on observed missions, targets were enemy personnel, mortar emplacement and armored vehicles (3 vehicles destroyed, one probable), and enemy SP gun. B Co captured Italian saboteurs which had been fired on by friendly units. 2nd Pl C Co fired 150 rds harassing and interdiction fire. SSF confirms one Mk IV tank destroyed by indirect fire by 2nd Pl C Co on March 3, Two pls Ren C working with SSF.

10 Mar: One section 2nd Pl A Co fired 133 rds indirect fire on personnel in houses and wards. B Co moved on gun to indirect fire positions to fire down Coast Road. 20 rds were fired on MG's result unobserved. 2nd Pl C Co fired 150 rds harassing fire. 8 rds counterbattery and 48 rds on infantry concentration with excellent results. Ren Co maintaining OP's and working with SSF.

16 AFU

1 Mar 1949